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Abstract 
The present study analyzes the performance of different strategies 
of monetary and fiscal policy to be used as possible guidelines for the 
establishment of the EMU. To this end, the research focuses on two 
important concepts that, during the past decade, have played a cen- 
tral role in the economic policy debate: the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy and the sustainability of the fiscal policy. The 
study can be divided into three parts. The dissertation consists of 
six chapters. The first two parts are focused on the monetary policy 
implementation in the Euro area. The third part is focused on the sus- 
tainability of the public debt and the estimation of optimal fiscal policy 
rule, for a Government with commitment. In particular, the first part, 
Chapters 1 to 2, is based on the member country's past evidence to 
evaluate how, in each country, monetary policy strategies are transmit- 
ted to the real economy. Such a study is of crucial importance when 
assessing the future performance of the European Monetary Union. 
The second part, Chapter 3 and 4, attempts to evaluate how monetary 
policy strategies are transmitted to real economy in the Euro Area as 
whole. In the final part, Chapter 5 implements a multivariate test for 
the sustainability of public debt while Chapter 6 proposes a procedure 
to estimate the optimal fiscal policy rule. 
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The present study analyzes the performance of different strategies of mone- 
tary and fiscal policy to be used as possible guidelines for the establishment 
of the EMU. To this end, the research focuses on two important concepts 
that, during the past decade, have played a central role in the economic 
policy debate: the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the sus- 
tainability of the fiscal policy. 
The debate which has developed around those concepts may seem aged. 
On the contrary, the increasing literature on the strategies a central bank 
should adopt to set interest rates, as well as on the sustainability of the 
public finances, demonstrate the actuality of the problems that are concealed 
behind them. In fact, the rapid and persistent evolution in the tools used as 
well as in the objectives pursued by monetary and fiscal policy authorities, 
making necessary a faster adaptation of theories and practices to the new 
developments, continuously renews the actuality of the debate. The frequent 
change of macroeconomic variables used as policy instrument, intermediate 
target and institutional goals in the implementation of monetary and fiscal 
policy strategies being an example. 
Regarding the channels through which the monetary policy affects the 
real economy, in fact, there is a huge amount of empirical evidence indicating 
that, in the last few years, there has been a strong change in the behavior 
of the central banks regarding their use of explicit targets for conducting 
monetary policy. The change has concerned both the effective existence 
of announced rules and the presence of international institutions able to 
influence the behavior of the monetary authorities. 
Also the empirical literature on the finances of the public sector seems 
to show new approaches to solve the problem. Nevertheless, the two most 
significant questions about these issues, still remain, namely: "Whether, 
or not, the high public debt is becoming increasingly unsustainable" and 
"Which is the optimal strategy to utilize in order to achieve the public debt 
target ? ". 
*** 
4 CONTENTS 
We now introduce the two main concepts the research focuses on. The 
first of these is related to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and 
the rules a central bank should follow, in applying its strategy. The second, 
is related to the sustainability of the fiscal policy, and the estimation of a 
fiscal rule to be used as a guideline for the fiscal policy authority. 
The increasing literature on the effectiveness of the monetary policy, and 
therefore on the channels through which this effectiveness is realized, finds 
an appropriate justification in the inadequacy of the theoretical schemes in 
developing models that maintain a good level of approximation towards the 
empirical reality. Besides, a working knowledge of how the transmission 
process operates in countries that have membership, in a currency union, 
appears of crucial importance for assessing the future performance of the 
monetary union. These are the reasons that have pushed many researchers 
to investigate the exact characteristics of the transmission process of the 
country members of the EMU. 
In addition to an explanation of these issues a certain degree of analysis, 
of the possible reaction function that the new European monetary institution 
may adopt is required. The reaction function, summarizing how central 
bank alters monetary policy in response to economic developments, can be 
useful in predicting actual monetary actions and, therefore, in assessing the 
current stance and the future direction of monetary policy. The econometric 
evidence resulting from this kind of study, can also suggest which monetary 
rule ECB should adopt, in order, to achieve its primary institutional goal, 
namely, price stability. To this end, the monetary rules analyzed differ in 
their method of expectation formation, some being backward looking, and 
others being forward looking and in the variables they allow to enter into 
the monetary policy reaction functions. 
The joint study of the systematic portion of policy behavior and of the 
possible effects that monetary shock may have on the real economy, ex- 
haustively explains the causes of the policy-instrument variability. In other 
words, by analyzing both the systematic and the stochastic components of 
a central bank's behavior, it is possible to obtain an enhanced assessment 
of the implemented monetary strategy. 
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The study of the two components requires different econometric tech- 
niques. In fact, while the analysis of the effects of the systematic reaction 
the central bank has in response to economic developments requires struc- 
tural modeling in order to develop policy-invariant behavioral relationships, 
the shock component is evaluated through VAR procedures. 
The second topic the research faces, is the uncertainty as well as the 
sustainability of a country's budgetary position. The unsustainable accu- 
mulation of the public debt for a country may hinder the Central Bank, in 
complying with its primary objectives of internal monetary stability. More- 
over, the negative externalities of lax budgetary policies include among other 
things, its impact on interest, inflation and exchange rate. The need for hav- 
ing a procedure to test the budgetary sustainability of a country, as well as 
the need for having a procedure to estimate the fiscal policy rule are then 
generally accepted. 
*** 
The study can be divided into three parts. The dissertation consists of 
six chapters. The first two parts are focused on the monetary policy imple- 
mentation in the Euro area. The third part is focused on the sustainability 
of the public debt and the estimation of optimal fiscal policy rule, for a 
Government with commitment. 
In particular, the first part, Chapters 1 to 2, is based on the member 
country's past evidence to evaluate how, in each country, monetary policy 
strategies are transmitted to the real economy. Such a study is of crucial im- 
portance when assessing the future performance of the European Monetary 
Union. 
The second part, Chapter 3 and 4, attempts to evaluate how monetary 
policy strategies are transmitted to real economy in the Euro Area as whole. 
In the final part, Chapter 5 implements a multivariate test for the sus- 
tainability of public debt while Chapter 6 proposes a procedure to estimate 
the optimal fiscal policy rule. 
*ý* 
6 CONTENTS 
Chapter 1 analyses the implications of the monetary rules efficiency for 
practical monetary policy making. Special emphasis is given on strategies 
for setting interest rates by the EMU participating economies. First, the 
structural model, thought to be representative of the main effects that the 
central bank has on inflation and output, is presented. Second, a set of in- 
strument rules consistent with the inflation targeting regime are estimated. 
Third, a comparative analysis is made of the ability of the rules to corre- 
spond to the historical central bank behavior. Fourth, the study focuses on 
the volatility of output, inflation and interest rate changes that each rule 
implies. Finally, the study compares the efficiency frontiers across EMU 
countries. The results suggest that simple rules perform quite well and that 
the advantages obtained from adopting an optimal control-based rule are 
not so great. Moreover, the analysis emphasizes the success of the German 
model of central banking, during the sample period. 
*** 
Chapter 2 analyzes monetary policy asymmetries in EMU participating 
countries. In particular, we use a structural dynamic modeling approach to 
investigate asymmetric monetary transmission in Europe. Asymmetries are 
investigated in two different ways. First, we restrict the estimated structural 
models reflecting the monetary constraints each country faced during the 
EMS period. We obtain well-behaved and comparable effects of monetary 
policy shocks. Second, efficiency frontiers for the selected EMU countries 
are estimated. In computing the optimal combinations of output gap and 
inflation volatility we use a weighted average of interest rate and exchange 
rate, i. e. the Monetary Condition Index (MCI), as a policy instrument. The 
impulse response analysis implemented with the MCI shows relatively small 
differences in the responses of the real economy, to monetary policy shocks. 
Altogether the results suggest that, no matter which policy instrument is 
used, output gap and inflation respond to identical monetary shocks with a 
similar speed and movement, albeit with a different degree of effects. 
**ý 
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Chapter 3 attempts to exploit whether the monetary authorities present 
different behavior during recession and expansion. To this end, a multi- 
variate extension of Hamilton's (1989) Markov Switching Model is adopted. 
First, regime dependent Taylor-type rules are estimated for the Euro Area 
and the United Kingdom, in order to capture the systematic behavior of 
central banks. Then, impulse response functions that account for the dif- 
ferent phases of the business cycle are analyzed. In addition, a comparative 
analysis concerning the estimated rules as well as the different reaction of 
the real economy to monetary shocks is implemented. The study strongly 
suggests that central banks cannot neglect the regime where the monetary 
action takes place. The phase of the business cycle is an important matter 
in the monetary policy decision process. 
*** 
Chapter 4 aims to model the main determinants of the confidence of 
economic agents in the Euro Area. In particular, it measures the impact of 
the labour market conditions, the stock market developments and interest 
rates on consumer and business confidence. The study is articulated in two 
parts. We estimate two models, respectively for the survey indicators of 
consumer confidence and of business confidence. The analysis relies on the 
use of multivariate econometric techniques. Specifically, we use a structural 
VAR and a dynamic simultaneous equations model. Empirical results show 
that models are well-behaving. Impulse response analysis suggests that the 
main determinants of consumer confidence are labour market conditions 
and interest rates. Empirical evidence for business confidence shows that 
this indicator is strongly affected by economic conditions in the United 
States. Industrial production and labour market conditions in the euro area 
play an important role in the short term. 
*** 
Chapter 5 provides a formal theoretical framework for analyzing the 
sustainability of fiscal policy based on the government intertemporal budget 
constraint, and derives conditions that determine whether a fiscal stance is 
8 CONTENTS 
sustainable in the medium and long term. In contrast to previous studies, it 
uses a log-linearization of the public debt identity and generalizes the results 
obtained in literature, by using a multivariate test. The analysis is applied 
to the fiscal position of the United States and Euro Area. On the basis 
of infinite horizon-tests the broad conclusion is that, both countries have 
an unsustainable fiscal policy. The chapter also provides two procedures 
to construct forecasts of the future level of public debt. Forecasted values 
confirm the evaluation elaborated in the cointegration analysis. 
*** 
Chapter 6 constructs a procedure to estimate the optimal fiscal policy 
rule in the presence of a public sector, with objectives of convergence for 
public debt and primary balance to GDP ratios. To this end, the study 
uses a stochastic simulation framework. In order to ensure the existence of 
converging paths towards the target values of fiscal variables, we introduce 
a simple fiscal policy rule. According to this rule, the primary balance ratio 
is adjusted in function of the distance between the current and the target 
level of the public debt, the current and the target level of the primary 
deficit and the output gap. The study gives interesting insights. First, it 
shows that the fiscal rule displaying time invariant parameters may produce 
non-linear dynamic processes of adjustment of the public debt. Second, 
it suggests a procedure to construct confidence intervals for the parameters 
characterizing the optimal fiscal policy rule. Finally, it estimates a stochastic 
efficiency frontier for the public sector . The analysis 
is first applied to a 
theoretical economy and then to Italy and Belgium. 
Part I 
Asymmetries across EMU 
countries 
Blank 
In 
Original 
Chapter 1 
The Efficiency of Monetary 
Rules in the EMU countries 
This chapter analyzes the implications of the efficiency of monetary rules 
for practical monetary policy-making. The efficiency analysis of alternative 
policy rules is based on the differences between actual and estimated reac- 
tion functions as well as on the ability of the rules to stabilize output and 
inflation. Special emphasis is given to strategies for setting interest rates by 
the EMU participating economies. First, the structural model, thought to 
be representative of the main effects that the central bank has on inflation 
and output, is presented. Second, a set of instrument rules consistent with 
the inflation-targeting regime are estimated. Third, a comparative analysis 
is made of the ability of the rules to correspond to historical central bank 
behavior. Fourth, the study focuses on the volatility of output, inflation and 
interest rate changes that each rule implies. Finally, the study compares ef- 
ficiency frontiers across the EMU countries. The results suggest that simple 
rules perform quite well, and that the advantages obtained from adopting 
a complicated rule are not so great. Moreover, the analysis emphasizes the 
success of the German model of central banking during the sample period. 
11 
12 CHAPTER 1. THE EFFICIENCY OF MONETARY RULES 
1.1 Introduction 
The study analyzes the performances of different reaction functions to be 
used as possible guidelines, for the establishment of monetary policy in the 
EMU. The reaction function, summarizing how the central bank alters mon- 
etary policy in response to economic development, can be useful in predicting 
actual monetary actions and, therefore, in assessing the current stance, as 
well as the future direction, of monetary policy. The econometric evidence 
resulting from this kind of study, can also suggest which monetary rule the 
ECB should adopt in order to achieve its primary institutional goal, namely, 
price stability. 
The monetary rules analyzed differ in their method of expectation for- 
mation, some being backward-looking, others being forward looking and in 
the variables they allow to enter into the monetary policy reaction func- 
tions. The rules studied include an optimal feedback rule, two different 
specifications of the Taylor rule, a forward-looking rule and two alternative 
inflation rules. All the rules are retrieved from an intertemporal optimiza- 
tion problem of a loss function penalizing the volatility of output, inflation 
and policy rates under the constraints given by a small, backward-looking, 
closed-economy structural model. 
In order to evaluate the various results a central bank obtains from adopt- 
ing a particular rule, a preliminary definition of what constitutes rule-based 
monetary policy in practice must be given. As no central bank will be bound 
to the prescription of any simple rule (or any optimal control algorithm), the 
distinction between rule-based and discretionary monetary policy is crucial. 
As stressed in McCallum (2000), while a discretionary monetary policy takes 
into account current macroeconomic conditions, ignoring past development 
in the economic system, a rule-based monetary policy is based on a "timeless 
perspective", i. e. the rule is constructed as if the current conditions were 
not known. According to this definition, when following a discretionary pol- 
icy, the central bank re-optimizes its decision-making process periodically, 
while in a rule-based policy, monetary authorities implement a contingency 
formula chosen to be applied for an infinite number of time periods. Nev- 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 13 
ertheless, in the rule-based framework, the possibility of revising a rule is 
also contemplated, once the central bank gets new information on the state 
of the economy. In this sense, the inflation-targeting regime, although not 
restricting monetary authorities to select instrument settings according to a 
particular rule, can be considered an example of rule-based policymaking. 
The reason why a central bank should adopt a monetary rule, instead of 
discretionary behavior, has a theoretical basis in time-consistency literature. 
In this literature, to which the seminal contribution was made by Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), it is shown that if a cen- 
tral bank does not commit itself to a rule, the policymakers will be tempted 
to choose a suboptimal inflation policy. The contribution of Barro and Gor- 
don is of particular interest for the issues analyzed in the paper because the 
"rules vs. discretion" dichotomy is separated from the debate on "activist 
vs. non-activist" central bank policy. This separation has resulted in the 
possibility for monetary policymaking to concentrate on the issue of policy 
rules. 
Moreover, there are other advantages the central bank can obtain by 
limiting the range of possible policies, i. e. adopting a rule. The first is an 
increase in monetary policy credibility. A second motivation, related to the 
first, considers a policy rule as a helpful device for improving transparency, 
accountability and the clear communication of targets, characteristics that 
may be viewed either as desirable in themselves or as serving to make com- 
mitments more effective. Thirdly, a rule may be useful in providing a guide 
to policy that is robust to uncertainty. The acknowledgment of which policy 
rules are likely to work robustly across a range of possible models is able to 
decrease the uncertainties of market participants. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents 
a structural model designed to show the main channel through which mon- 
etary policies affect inflation and output. Section 1.3 introduces a set of 
instrument rules consistent with the inflation-targeting regime. In Section 
1.4, the study focuses on the historical analysis of monetary policy rules. 
Section 1.5 examines the efficiency of the estimated monetary rules. Section 
1.6 ends the chapter with concluding remarks. 
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1.2 The Model 
In empirical literature, several types of models have been used for evalu- 
ating monetary policy rules, including an optimizing model with represen- 
tative agents, closed and open-economy models, and rational expectation 
models. Despite EMU countries have been commonly considered as small 
open economies in the Pre-Euro Area period, we model these countries as 
closed economies. This choice relies on the results stressed by Clarida, Jordi 
and Gartler (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2001). They showed that the mone- 
tary policy design problem for the small open economy is isomorphic to the 
problem of the closed economy. In particular, they conclude that qualitative 
results for a closed economy can be extended to the small open economy and 
vice versa. Openness only suggests quantitative implications. Regarding the 
price setting behaviour of the private sector, we prefer a backward-looking 
model . There is a large part of literature arguing that the behaviour of 
the private agents should be forward-looking and the forecast should be 
therefore an integral part of it. Nevertheless, a different strand of this liter- 
ature(i. e. Rudebusch and Svensson 1999,2002; Ball 1999,2000), following in 
the spirit the VAR models popularized by Sims, focuses on ad-hoc backward- 
looking model. They argue that this kind of models are appreciable from 
at least two important aspects. They tend to offer a good fit of the data, 
and their dynamics closely resemble those filtered with structural VARs, 
an issue that pure forward-looking models have some troubles in dealing 
with(Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002). Altogether, the model used in this analysis 
is a backward-looking closed economy model. 
The specification of equations is thought to be representative of the main 
effects that a central bank might have on inflation and output. 
The model consists of an aggregate supply equation of the form: 
h 
7rt+i = af7rt+i-h + ah+lYt + ut+l (1.1) 
iz=1 
This autoregressive Phillips curve relates the CPI inflation rate (it) to 
its own lags and to a lagged output gap (y), measured as a percent gap 
between the actual real GDP and the potential GDP. The specification of 
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aggregate supply is consistent with an adaptive representation of inflation 
expectations. The expectations are treated implicitly by the inclusion of 
lagged values of the variables. 
Equation (1.2) identifies the aggregate demand equation: 
k 
Yt+i => Qiyt+i-k - Qk+i(zt - TO +u +i (1.2) 
j=1 
According to the above equation, the output gap is related to the real 
interest rate and to its own lags. The real interest rate is calculated as 
the difference between the short-term interest rate and the inflation rate. 
In the above equation, it is the four-quarter average short-term interest 
33 
rate, i. e. 4 L it-j; art is the four-quarter inflation rate, i. e. 4 L' ? rt_j. This 
j=o j=o 
specification implies that interest rate is an exogenous variable under the 
complete control of monetary authorities. The particular specification of 
the model is a crucial issue. In fact, the conclusions reached in the empiri- 
cal analysis are all obtained assuming that the economic structure implied 
by the proposed model is not grossly incorrect. Nevertheless, literature has 
not converged on a single interpretation of inflation and output dynamics. 
In particular, the disagreement concerns the effects of inflation on the real 
economy. Much of the empirical literature suggests a negative influence of 
inflation on the output gap. Yet many economic theories predict neutrality, 
or even a positive effect of average inflation on economic performance. The 
particular specification of the inflation process is also important. The ab- 
sence of forward-looking variables in the estimated model is in line with the 
analysis of Fahrer (1997), on the importance of future price expectations 
in explaining price and inflation behavior. He finds that the performance 
of a model, built for a purely forecasting purpose, with a forward-looking 
specification of the inflation is no better than a backward-looking model. 
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows: an increase in 
monetary policy instrument it in period t affects output with one period 
lag; it takes another period, i. e. at time t+2, for output to affect inflation. 
The timing in which inflation affects the real economy as well as the size 
of the impact is important, because only if inflation is sticky can monetary 
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authorities influence real economic performance through monetary policy. 
The model has been estimated by applying the OLS technique and using 
quarterly data for the period 1979: 1-1998: 41. Potential output has been 
computed by using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. As we have quarterly 
data, we set the smoothing parameter to 1600 as in Kydland and Prescott 
(1990). All variables were de-meaned prior to estimation. 
The order of the autoregressive coefficients in equation (1.1) and equa- 
tion (1.2) is tested, for each country, by implementing standard test statis- 
tics. Table 1.1 computes the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC), Hannan-Quinn, and FPE for aggregate demand 
equations. These are all done in log form, so their values look fairly similar. 
For each line in the table, the selected lag is highlighted. The table suggests 
that for most of the countries, the order of autoregression in the output equa- 
tion is equal to two. Only for Austria and the Netherlands do we apply a 
four-lag output gap structure. Concerning the inflation equation, we impose 
a fourth order autoregressive structure. In order to analyze the long-term 
properties of the model, we also test the hypothesis that the autoregressive 
coefficients of the inflation equation equal one. This test is of particular 
interest because its outcome implies a particular slope of the Phillips curve. 
Table 1.2 summarizes the results. As shown, the hypothesis that the sum 
of the lag coefficients of inflation is equal to unity is not rejected for all 
countries. This restriction is imposed in the estimation. This means that 
we assume the existence of a natural unemployment rate (NAIRU) when 
inflation is stable. 
'The data used in the empirical analysis are taken from the IFS statistics. 
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AIC 0.650 0.707 0.633 #1 a" 
SBC 0.790 0.791 0.748 0s906 
Hannan -Quinn 0.706 0.741 0.681 4 
(log) FPE 0.650 0.707 0.635 0.9$'0 
Belgium 
1 2 3 4 
AIC 
SBC 0.71 0.76 0.81 QZ6 
Hannan -Quinn 0.67 0.71 ä. 1'T 0.74 
(log) FPE 0.65 0.67 0.69 0 72 
Finland 
1 2 3 4 
AIC L. U "0/ 1.09 
SBC 1.12 fi. 1.15 1.20 
Hannan-Quinn 1.09 1: 35 1.10 1.13 
(loe) FPE 1.07 1.09 1.07 
France 
1 2 3 4 
AIC 
SBC 0.29 G. 42 W 0.37 0.34 
Hannan-Quinn 0.26 ___. .. 0.29 0.31 0.33 F 
(log) FPE 0.24 0.26 0.26 0,27 
Germany 
1 2 3 4 
AIC 0,6b V. 9 1 0.92 0.90 
S 0.93 ' 05 1.04 0.99 
Hannan-Quinn 0.90 0.965 0.969 'i 0.93 
log) FPE 0.88 r 0.9 1 0.92 0.90 
Ireland 
AIC 
SBC 1.78 1.87 1.83 
Hannan-Quinn 1.73 1.77 1.78 1.81,;;, 3 
(log) FPE 1.71 1.74 1.73 1.73 
Italy 
AIC 1.07 1.07 1.7 
SBC 1.13 1.16 
Hannan-Quinn 1.09 3.14 Yý^ 1.13 1.11 
lox) FPE 1.07 I 1.09 1.07 1.07 
Netherlands 
AIC 1.22 1- 22 1.23 1 7,6 
SBC 1.28 1.31 1.35 1.40 
Hannan-Quinn 1.25 1.26 1.28 11.31 
(log) FPE 1.22 1.22 1.23 1.24 
Portugal 
AIC 1.01 I L. 1 1. 
ýý SBC 1.08 1.18 !4 ' 1.13 
Hannan-Quinn 1 . 03 1.10 1.08 1.07 (log) FPE 1.01 
_. 
1.04. 1.02 1.03 
Spain 
AIC 0.30 i7 Ui l 0.08 
SBC W 0 39 _ 0 . 38 0.36 0.23 Hannan-Quinn ý : , 0 34 . _ 0.35 0.29 0.14 
(log) FPE 0.30 0.32 0.24 0.08 
17 
Table 1.1: Lag Analysis 
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Austria F(1,83) 2.827 [ 0.10 ] 
Belgium F(1,79) 0.69 [ 0.41 
Finland F(1,80) 3.56 [ 0.06 
France F(1,80) 0.52 [ 0.47 ] 
Germany F(1,80) 3.609 [ 0.06 ] 
Ireland F(1,56) 0.05 [ 0.82 ] 
Italy F(1,80) 0.92 [ 0.34 ] 
Netherlands F(1,80) 2.89 [ 0.09 ] 
Portugal F(1,56) 1.14 [ 0.29 ] 
Spain F(1,71) 0.06 [ 0.80 ] 
Table 1.2: Test of Restrictions 
The estimated equations are presented in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4. 
T-statistics are given in square brackets. For each equation, the tables 
also provide the R2, the Durbin-Watson statistics (DW), the standard error 
of estimates (S. E. E. ) and the ARCH(1) test. For our purposes, the key 
coefficients in the tables are the ßk+l's, which represent the effect of the 
real interest rate on output gap; the coefficients on the lagged aggregate 
supply curve that represent the inertia of the inflation process, i. e. ah's; 
and ah+1 which measures the effect of an increase in the output gap on 
the inflation rate, i. e. the slope of the Phillips curve. At first glance, the 
model seems to perform rather well. Almost all coefficients are significant 
at the 5% level. The DW test as well as the ARCH(1) test give evidence of 
the absence of serial correlation and heterosckedasticity, respectively. The 
parameter , ßk+l ranges from -0.07 in Finland to -0.18 in Ireland and Belgium. 
On the average, a one percentage-point increase in the interest rate reduces 
the output gap by almost 12 basis points. Concerning the effects of the 
output gap on inflation, the estimated coefficients vary from 0.1 in Spain to 
0.18 in the Netherlands. 
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7r, 
-1 
z1-2 
-3 
Y, Y-i yt-2 yr-3 r 
AusHa 
Yr+i 1.18 -0.66 0.20 0.10 -0.13 
[10801 [-3.90] [1.22] [084] [-1.221 
R2 = 0.70 DV= 1.96 SEE= 1.00 ARCJI(1) = 0.25 [0.62] 
ýz+, 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.? 3 0.13 
(a711 [260] [042] [1029] [1.33] 
R2 = 0.56 DIW 1.79 SEE- 208 ARCH(1) = 0.08 [0.78] 
Be4ium 
Yr+i 0.77 -0.07 - - -0.18 
[693] [4150] [-2.09] 
R' = 0.58 DV= 202 SEE= 1.39 ARG O= 0.24 [0.62] 
7t+, 0.12 0.30 0.17 0.40 0.15 
[1-151 [30(1 [1.71] [3.99] [1.60] 
] = 0.59 DJV= 1.79 SEE= 1.81 ARCII(1) = 1.97 [0.16 
Fuzkmd 
Yr+i 0.91 -0.07 - - -0.07 
[813] [4150] [-1.22] 
jr = 0.73 DW= 2.02 SEE= 1.68 ARCR(1) = 0.03 [0.87] 
0.50 -0.18 0.23 0.45 0.16 
[5.031 [-1.651 12111 [4.61] [2.12] 
R'- = 0.71 DIV= 1.96 SEE= 1.35 ARChi(1) = 2.28 [0.13] 
Fiance 
Yr+1 0.72 0.14 - - -0.08 
[6531 [1.03] [-1.70] 
j? '- = 0.62 DW= 202 SEE= 1.11 ARM(1) = 0.35 [0.56] 
7 t+, 0.59 002 012 0.27 0.04 
[5.47] [0171 [1-691 [2.64] [037] 
/ = 0.85 DW= 1.96 SEE= 1.62 ARGI(1) = 0.02 [0.891 
Ck"n ny 
Y, +l 0.77 0.03 - - -0.16 
[696] [023] [-1.40] 
I? 2 = 0.64 DIV= 1.97 SEE= 1.53 ARCH(I) = 0.29 [0.59] 
0.37 0.04 0.12 0.47 0.11 
[382] [040] [1.15] [4.81] 11.101 
R'- = 0.83 DIV= 202 SEE= 1.13 ARC41) = 0.22 [0.64] 
Table 1.3: Estimated Models 
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17,91-1 )Tt-2 )TI-3 Y, . 
YI-1 yt-2 
. 
Yr-3 1 
Irdwid 
yr+i 0.57 0.26 - - -0.18 
[4.41] [1.801 [-L77] 
=0.57 DW= 200 SEE= 2.29 ARC71(1)= 0.77 [0.38] 
, z+l 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.46 0.14 
[1.74] [1.57] (1.14] [3.88] [-049] 
R2 = 0.53 DW= 1.92 SEE= 1.71 ARC71(l) = 3.91 [0.05 
Italy 
yr+t 0.85 -0.22 - - -0.12 
[7.78] [-1.541 [206] 
0.63 DW= 206 SEE= 1.66 ARCH(1) = 0.00 [0.98] 
0.61 -0.18 0.35 0.22 0.15 
[5.99] [-1.49] [294] [219] [1.63] 
[r2 = 0.84 DW= 1.93 SEE= 1.23 ARCA(1) = 0.29 (0.591 
Mwdmuk 
r+l 0.46 0.09 0.10 0.03 -0.09 
[4131 [074] [0821 [031] [0861 
=0.63 DW= 1.98 SEE= 1.82 ARCH(I)= 0.59 [0.44] 
yr+l 0.29 a23 -0.02 0.50 0.16 
[3.07] [2391 [-021] [5.53] [1.85] 
0.52 DW= 1.85 SEE= 1.64 ARCJ-I(1) = 0.99 [0.32) 
y, +l 
0.92 -0.09 - - -0.08 
[7.01] [-0711 [-032] 
R' = 0.70 DW= 201 SEE= 1.63 ARCN(1) = 0.15 [0.70] 
ýTl+l 0.37 -0.05 0.35 0.33 0.13 
[3041 [-040] [3.07] [3.02] (065] 
J=0.63 DW= 206 SEE= 1.52 ARC71(I) = 0.22 [0.64 
y1+l 1.05 -0.21 -- -0.09 
[9.36] [-J. 90] [-1.15] 
0.76 DW= 1.97 SEE= 1.14 ARC7l(1) = 2.16 [0.141 
7+1 0.24 0.04 0.15 0.57 0.10 
[251] [044] [1.55] [601] [082] 
IF = 0.71 DV= 1.98 SEE= 1.42 ARCl1(I) = 0.29 [0.59] 
Table 1.4: Estimated Models 
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1.3 Monetary Policy Rules 
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The class of rules considered in the analysis, are instrument rules that 
are consistent with the inflation-targeting regime. The inflation-targeting 
regime is modelled by using a quadratic loss function over policy targets. 
Following Rudebush and Svensson (1998) and Svensson (1998a, b), the cen- 
tral bank should minimize an intertemporal loss function that increases, if 
there is a deviation between a target variable and the target level for this 
variable. 
The loss function takes the following general form: 
00 
EtEO'Lt+T (1.3) 
=o 
where Et refers to expectations conditional upon the available information 
set at time t, while z9 is a given discount factor, with 0<0<1. 
The specific features of the loss function that must be considered raise 
some problems. Several authors have stressed the perverse attitude to risk 
of the quadratic loss function; by utilizing such a function, we are implicitly 
assuming the central bank treats symmetrically both positive and negative 
deviations from the target. Even so, as shown in Chadha and Shellekens 
(1999), conducting the analysis with a different attitude to risk through the 
introduction of an exponential (CARA) or isoelastic (CRRA) loss function 
does not produce, in a context of additive uncertainty, a richer description 
of policymaking behavior. In fact, also in these cases certainty equivalence 
applies, provided that the alternative loss function is symmetric. For these 
reasons, the analysis uses a quadratic loss function of the form: 
Lt =)ºýrt + coyc +7(zt - it-i)2 (1.4) 
Following the terminology introduced in Svensson (1997), the above ex- 
pression describes a flexible inflation target where the goal variables de- 
scribing central bank preferences are art, i. e. the deviation of actual inflation 
from a constant, given inflation target; yt, i. e. the output gap and it - it-i, 
an interest-rate smoothing term. Moreover, A, cp and ry are non-negative 
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weights that the central bank attaches to stabilize output and interest-rate 
smoothing, respectively. If cp and y are set to zero, we are in a situation of 
strict inflation-targeting. Something must be said about the variables that 
enter into the loss function. In real monetary policy-making, the inflation 
rate is usually preferred to the output gap as a formal target for monetary 
policy. The reasons are related to the specific features the inflation rate has 
in comparison with the output gap. From a theoretical point of view, the 
long-run neutrality of monetary policy on output capacity suggests that cen- 
tral banks should concentrate on the variables, like inflation, that they can 
influence on a long-term basis. From a practical point of view, the difficulty 
in measuring the output gap and public familiarity with the concept of in- 
flation supports the choice of inflation for central bank communication and 
econometrics estimation purposes, respectively. Nevertheless, even if the 
central bank official target is expressed in terms of inflation, it is believed 
that output stabilization is still important to monetary authorities. Finally, 
the inclusion of the objective of interest rate smoothing is proposed to ac- 
count for two phenomena. The first is the aversion that the central banks 
have to frequently changing the direction of their strategy. The second is 
related to the idea that central banks also care about financial stability: 
interest rate instability can lead to a destabilization of the financial system. 
As shown in Rudebush and Svensson (1998), for z9 = 1, the optimization 
problem can be rewritten interpreting the intertemporal loss function as the 
unconditional mean of the period loss function; it means that the intertem- 
poral loss function can be written as the weighted sum of the unconditional 
variances of goal variables: 
E [Lt] = AVar [art] + (pVar [yt] +7Var [it - it-fl. (1.5) 
In the following, this loss function will be used, assuming, therefore, the 
limiting case O=1. 
1.3.1 State-Space Representation 
The State space representation of the estimated model is : 
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Xt+i = AXt + Bit + vt+i (1.6) 
This compact form is helpful in summarizing the structure underlined by 
the dynamic model. More precisely, in the above equation the (k+h+3) x1 
vector2 X contains the state variables, the (k +h+ 3) x (k +h+ 3) matrix A 
and the (k +h+ 3) x1 column vector B contains the estimated parameters, 
and the (k +h+ 3) X1 column vector vt is the disturbance term. This 
representation summarizes the dynamic structure of the economy and the 
uncertainty that the central banks face regarding this structure. The matrix 
A and the vector B govern the dynamics of the state vector. Uncertainty 
enters through the additive stochastic vector vt+l. The terms in equation 
(1.6) can be written as: 
aiei + ah+leh+1 
i=1 
e1 
A= 
eh 
k 
Qk+lei: h + 
EQiei 
- 
Qk+ie(h+k+1): (h+k+2) 
i=1 
eh+l 
eh+k 
eo 
eh+k+i 
eh+k+2 
where ei denotes a1x (k +h+ 3) row vector with all elements equal to zero 
and with the elements i=1, ....... 
k +h+2 equal to unity; and where e2: k 
(i < k) denotes a1x (k +h+ 3) row vector with elements i, i+1, ..., 
k equal 
2Where h and k are the number of lags of the inflation and output equations respec- 
tively. 
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to 4 and all other elements equal to zero. Notice that all variables entering 
in the state-space representation are expressed as a function of lagged data 
only. This condition comes from the particular model considered in the 
analysis which is, in fact, a backward-looking model3. 
lrt 
7rt-1 
nt-h 
Xt= Yt B= 
Yt-i 
Yt-k 
it-1 
2t-2 
it-3 
0 
0 
_ 
ßi 
4 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
and Vt= 
u7r t 
0 
utt 
0 
0 
Writing the target variables, -rt, yt and it - it_, as a function of the state 
variable Xt we get: 
-Tr t e1: h 0 
0 ý't = yt = CxXt-ý Ciit, where Cx = eh+1 and C= = 
it - it-1 -eh+x+1 1 
The loss function can now be expressed as: 
A00 
Lt =E [Yt KYt] , where K=0w0. 
(1.7) 
007 
°A forward-looking, open-economy model was used in Svensson (1998b). In this case, 
the state-space representation is much more complicated to derive. 
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The class of linear feedback rules considered here takes the following 
generic form: 
it = fXt (1.8) 
where f denotes a1x (k +h+ 3) vector. Using the foregoing relations, 
the dynamics of the model follow: 
(1.9) Xt+i = MXt + vt+i, M=A+Bf 
Yt=CXt, C=Cx+Cif (1.10) 
The optimal linear feedback rule is an interest rate rule that, given the 
economic structure implied by the rule, is able to minimize the central bank 
loss function. Thus, the optimal linear feedback rule can be expressed as: 
f=- (R + B'VB) -1 (U' + B'VA) Xt (1.11) 
where the matrix V satisfies the Riccati equation: 
V=Q+Uf+ f'U' + f'Rf + M'VM (1.12) 
and where: 
Q=CXKCX, U=CXKCC and R=C'"KCC 
In this section, different specifications of instrument rules will be esti- 
mated. Within this class of rules, the monetary policy instrument is ex- 
pressed as a function of the available information. The analysis considers 
six instrument rules. The first one is the unrestricted optimal control rule: 
it = fXt (1.13) 
where f denotes a1x (k +h+ 3) vector of response coefficients. In this 
case, monetary policy responds to changes in every state variable. 
The second rule is the classical Taylor rule. Since the Taylor (1993) 
seminal paper, a great deal of literature has been written which aims at 
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explaining the stabilizing power of active interest rate rules. Recently, sev- 
eral authors including Taylor (1998) and Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) have 
underlined the usefulness of the Taylor rule as an informal benchmark for 
setting interest rates in the EMU area. The classic Taylor rule (henceforth 
TR), assumes that the interest rate is a function of the current values of 
both inflation and the output gap: 
it = fart + fyyt (1.14) 
where f, and fy are the response coefficients of inflation and output gap 
respectively4. 
By adding an autoregressive term to the previous specification, thus 
allowing the central bank to react to a lagged interest rate, we get the 
Generalized Taylor Rule (GTR): 
it = fir7t + fyyt + feit-i (1.15) 
The fourth and fifth rule are pure inflation rules with and without an 
interest rate smoothing term: 
it = fnlrt (1.16) 
it = f-xrt + flit-i (1.17) 
Finally the sixth rule is a forward-looking rule. In monetary policy liter- 
ature, there has been a great debate on the information set that the central 
banks should use to fix the interest rate. More precisely, the discussion has 
focused on the possibility and the relevance for monetary authorities to in- 
clude some forward-looking variables, in the reaction function specification. 
The need for a forward-looking dimension in monetary policymaking has 
been stressed by several authors, among others Batini and Haldane (1998) 
and Svensson and Woodford (2000), as a necessary condition for a better 
representation of central bank behavior. Nevertheless, many economists 
'The Taylor rule restricts the vector f as: 
f= firei: h + fyeh+i 
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are sceptical about the improvement that can be obtained from the inclu- 
sion of a forward-looking variable in a macroeconomic model of monetary 
policy and, in any case, they stress the need to incorporate a sort of history- 
dependence in a rule to be considered as optimal5. This scepticism is based 
on the consideration that, by allowing a central bank to react to forecasts 
of future inflation, we are not eliminating the backward-looking component 
in central bank behavior; as the forward-looking components are recovered 
from current and lagged data of the related variables, they are, in fact, 
backward-looking. The main advantage of the forward-looking rule then, is 
the inclusion of other variables besides the output gap and inflation that 
can help to forecast monetary actions. 
In our specification, the central bank is allowed to respond to an inflation 
forecast rather than to current inflation. 
Zt = fý t+81t + fyYt + fizt-1 (1.18) 
Where Wt+8It is the 8-quarter ahead inflation forecast for a given interest 
rate and it is calculated as: 
+81t = el: h(AXt + Bi)8 
The forecasts are also computed conditional upon the current state vari- 
ables Xts 
Figure 1.1 shows, for each country, the forecast used to compute the 
forward-looking rule together with the actual inflation rate. As shown in 
the figure, the forecasts appear to capture the dynamic of the inflation rate. 
Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 present the estimated response coefficients of the 
selected reaction functions. In principle, there are several factors affecting 
the particular specification of the rule that a central bank can follow. In 
fact, different values of the state variable, X, different impacts of monetary 
policy, A and B, and different central bank preferences over inflation, output 
and interest rate smoothing, K, may result in a different interest rate policy, 
5See Woodford (2000) on this point. 
sThis means that the restrictions on f are: 
f= frei: e(A+ Bi)8 + fveh+i + fleh+k+i. 
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i. e. a different rule. The differences in the response coefficients reflect all 
those variables. 
The tables give some interesting results. Consistent with a-priori be- 
liefs, the first interest-rate smoothing coefficients are quite high, 0.6 on the 
average, while the third and fourth lag coefficients are much lower. 
For the optimal control rule, the estimated coefficients of inflation are 
much more persistent than the output gap lag coefficients. The inflation 
response coefficients for the Taylor rule and the Generalized Taylor rule are 
well above the value of 1.5 suggested in Taylor (1993). 
However, Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 show that the coefficients in the TR, 
GTR and FLR have an unambiguous theoretical meaning; they suggest that 
the central banks of the EMU countries have -raised nominal interest rates 
by more than any increase in inflation, so that inflation has never spun out 
of control. In fact, the interest rate response coefficients of the inflation rate, 
i. e. f, are above the stability threshold of one. This evidence, as stressed by 
Taylor (1998), is a crucial feature for a dynamically stable monetary policy. 
In his paper, Taylor also gives a theoretical basis for this result. Essentially, 
he argues that having a response coefficient lower than one results in a 
positively-sloped aggregate demand curve and causes the output to decrease 
in response to an inflation shock, which is destabilizing. 
From the tables we can also see that Germany is the country where a rise 
in expected inflation produces the largest response from the central bank 
in terms of real interest rate reaction; an increase of one percent induces 
the monetary authorities to raise the real rates by 176 basis points. More 
generally, in all the EMU countries the central banks have responded to 
inflationary pressures by raising the real rates. 
Another interesting result regards the output gap estimated coefficients. 
In all countries, a rise in the output gap induces central banks to increase 
interest rates. According to the optimal feedback rule, a one-percent increase 
in the output gap in Italy, for example, should induce the Bank of Italy to 
increase nominal (and thus real) rates by almost 50 basis points. 
We can conclude that over the sample period, the central banks of the 
EMU countries reacted to real economy pressures independently of their 
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concern about inflation. 
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Figure 1.1: Actual Inflation Rates (solid lines) vs. Inflation Forecasts 
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Rules 2-t 'c-z "-3 Yr Yr-I Yr-2 Yr-3 is Ir-z Ira 
Austda 
q, tinal famtocknile 0.52 0.54 0.47 0.42 0.66 -0.31 0.19 0.07 0.59 -0.04 -0.04 
Tayior Rule 246 ---0.84 - ----- 
CxnffWiad Ta}1or Rule 210 ---0.66 - --0.59 
pue Inflation Rule 245 ----- ----- 
&nx JinglnflationRule 212 ----- --0.57 -- 
r 1-loddngRule 1.51 ---0.357 - --0.75 - 
Beginn 
Optirral f= beck rule 0.57 0.54 0.38 0.26 0.58 -0.02 --0.38 -0.09 -0.04 
Taylor Rule 202 ---0.52 - ----- 
c ali xi Tayia Rule 231 ---0.57 - --0.37 -- 
Pure Irtlation Rule 206 ----- --- 
Sm )Wing Inflation Rule 265 ----- --0.28 -- 
Fm'. ard-to)kingRule 1.72 ---0.49 - --0.42 -- 
FmIand 
gxin 1 fe9I kmle 0.58 0.32 0.42 0.29 0.45 -0.10 - - 0.57 -0.04 -0.02 
Taylor Rule 230 ---0.37 - --- GaxaalizcdTaylaRule 2.31 ---0.45 -- - 0.57 -- 
Pue InflaticnRule 229 ------ ---- 
Smxhing Intlatim Rule 2.33 ------ - 0.54 -- 
Fcmard - loo1dr Rule 1.61 ---0.49 -- - 0.58 -- 
Fiwice 
Optimal ft d kmle 0.79 0.33 0.26 0.17 0.36 0.0001 - - 0.68 -0.02 -0.01 Taylor Rule 295 - --0.20 -- ---- 
Gaiaalized Taylor Rule 3.14 - --0.36 -- - 0.68 -- 
Pue Inflation Rule 294 - ----- ---- 
Smx*hing Inflation Rule 3.16 - ----- - 0.66 -- 
Fm%ard-looking Rule 1.53 - --0.34 -- - 0.71 -- 
cemiary 
Optimal feedbacknile 0.65 0.41 0.38 0.29 0.55 0.01 - - 0.41 -0.08 -0.04 Taylor Rule 251 - --0.47 -- ---- Genaalize d Taylor Rule 262 - --0.54 -- - 0.40 -- P1re Inflation Rule 261 - ----- ---- 
&nx11ing Inflation Rule 270 - ----- - 0.32 -- 
Farzd - looking Rule 1.76 - --0.53 -- - 0.38 -- 
Table 1.5: Response Coefficients 
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Wes ;r ; rt-1 '. 
-2 
)T, 
-,; 
Y, Y1-1 Yi-2 Y: 
-3 
lr-1 t1-2 lt-3 
Ireland 
Optinal feedback rule 0.36 0.33 0.26 0.18 0.36 0.07 --0.31 -0.10 -0.05 
TayicrRule 1.11 -- - 0.32 - --- -- 
GencralizedTaylcrRule 1.45 -- - 0.36 - --0.30 -- 
Pure Inflation We 1.35 -- - - - --- -- 
Smoothing Inflation We 1.41 -- - - - --0.25 -- 
Fa- and - looking Rute 1.13 -- - 0.27 - --0.35 -- 
Italy 
Optinfil feedback rule 0.70 0.30 0.43 0.22 0.499 -0.068 --0.513 -0.052 -0.024 
Taylor Rule 2.94 -- - 0.404 - --- -- 
GeocralizcdTaylorRute 2.81 -- - 0.494 - --0.509 -- 
Pure Inflation Rule 2.94 -- - - - --- -- 
Smxlhing Inflation Rule 2.84 -- - - - --0.48 -- 
Fauard - looking Rule 1.63 -- - 0.429 - --0.547 -- 
Netherlands 
Optimal feedback Wile 0.59 0.47 0.31 0.32 0.38 0.08 0.04 0.005 0.78 -0.01 -0.01 
TayicrRule 2.69 -- - 0.27 - --- -- 
Generalized TaylcrRule 2.69 -- - 0.41 - --0.77 
PRare Inflation Rule 2.68 -- - - - --- -- 
Snvahing inflation Rule 2.70 -- - - - --0.76 -- 
Femard- looking We 1.60 -- - 0.39 - --0.60 -- 
Portugal 
Optimal feedback rule 0.60 0.43 0.41 0.25 0.522 0.036 --0.462 -0.065 -0.031 
Taylor Rule 2.22 -- - 0.42 - --- -- 
GerezalizedTaylorRule 2.41 -- - 0.521 - --0.455 -- 
RaE Inflation Rule 2-25 -- - - - --- -- 
Srmahing Inflation We 2.47 -- - - - --0.384 -- 
Fe ani-looking Rule 1.43 -- - 0.214 - --0.926 -- 
Spain 
Optimal feedback nlle 0.36 0.33 0.26 0.20 0.47 -0.20 --0.85 -0.01 -0.002 
TayiorRule 0.74 -- - 0.30 - --- -- 
GercrelizedTaylor Rule 1.46 -- - 0.48 - --0.85 -- 
Rue Inflation We 0.74 -- - - - --- -- 
Smocthing Inflation Rule 1.45 -- - - - --0.85 -- 
Fauard - locking Rule 1.47 -- - 0.42 - --0.84 -- 
Table 1.6: Response Coefficients 
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1.4 The Historical Behaviour of EMU Member 
Central Banks 
This section focuses on the historical analysis of monetary policy rules. An 
analysis of the historical behaviour of the EMU central banks can give use- 
ful insights for the conduct of monetary policy, in the European currency 
area. In fact, as shown in De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001), the monetary 
strategy of the ECB might be considered as a proxy of the optimal policy 
rule estimated by using the national data of the EMU member states. 
In particular, the section analyzes the differences between the estimated 
policy action functions and the rule the EMU member central banks have 
been using during the past decades. Following the terminology introduced 
by Taylor (1998), the deviation of the actual policy rules, summarized by 
the short-term nominal interest rate, from the optimal rules is considered to 
be a "policy mistake". We can, then, assess whether the value of the interest 
rate implied by the six policy rules considered in the previous section are, 
significantly, different from the actual central bank behaviour. 
Figures 1.2 to 1.7 show the value of the interest rate implied by the 
six estimated policy rules (dashed lines), versus the actual central bank 
behaviour (solid lines) for each EMU member. 
Consistently across countries, we can characterize three periods of mon- 
etary policy history. 
In the first period, covering most of the 1980s, the actual interest rates 
appear to be well below the estimated policy rules. This evidence suggests 
that the monetary strategy implemented by the central banks of the EMU 
economies was too loose. Optimal monetary policy rules would have implied 
higher level of the interest rate for majority of the EMU countries. This is 
true for all EMU countries with the exception of Spain. For this country, 
the Taylor rule and the pure inflation rule suggest a lower interest rate in 
the sample period. Nevertheless, when the smoothing term is included in 
the rules, the results for this country become consistent with the remaining 
EMU countries. 
The second period, occurring in the early 1990s, embraces the European 
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monetary system crises. In this period, the behaviour of the EMU monetary 
authorities was quite dissimilar. The differences basically derive from the 
strategy each central bank followed in response to speculative attacks. In 
fact, the selected rules predict well central bank behaviour during the ERM 
crisis for Italy, France, Germany, Austria and Belgium, but fail to do so for 
Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
The third period goes from the early 1990s to the end of the sample. In 
this period, the outcome of the estimated rules appears to be much closer 
to the actual interest rates. According to the estimated rules, the decrease 
in interest rates in the late 1990s was about the right magnitude. In fact, 
the convergence criteria stated in the Maastricht Treaty, permitted interest 
rates to be lowered by forcing the central banks to stabilize the inflation 
rate without making policy mistakes. 
We can conclude that, over the last two decades, macroeconomic perfor- 
mance has improved markedly in the EMU countries. Better macroeconomic 
performance has not only resulted in lower inflation: it has also improved 
the stability of the inflation and real growth rates. Monetary policy au- 
thorities have become more skilful in implementing strategies to meet their 
stabilization objectives. 
The ability of the various rules to reproduce the actual interest rate, 
is shown in Figures 1.2 to 1.7. From this analysis, it is clear that all the 
rules perform quite well in replicating actual interest rate movements. In 
contrast, it is not clear which is the best performing rule. Overall, the 
Generalized Taylor rule and the forward-looking rule seem to be consistently 
the most successful across the countries, in describing historical central bank 
behavior. The inclusion of a smoothing term for interest rates, and the 
possibility for the central bank to respond to forecasts about future inflation, 
are then to be considered as realistic features of policy-making. The worse 
performing rules are instead those that only rely on inflation. These rules 
neglect the dynamics of the output gap in the monetary policy decision 
process. A comparative analysis between the optimal interest rate implied 
by a simple Taylor rule and the optimal interest rate generated by a pure 
inflation rule, suggests that a monetary policy rule accounting only for the 
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inflation dynamics would have implied higher interest rates over the whole 
sample period and especially during the 1980's. This result is consistent 
with the theory. However, monetary policy authorities cannot neglect the 
output gap dynamics in practice. Therefore, the bad performance of the 
rules, relying only on inflation, was to some degree expected. 
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Figure 1.2: Estimated Optimal Feedback Rules (dashed lines) vs. Actual 
Interest Rates (solid lines) 
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Figure 1.3: Estimated Taylor Rules (dashed lines) vs. Actual Interest 
Rates (solid lines) 
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1.5 The Efficiency of the Monetary Rules 
This section analyzes the efficiency of the estimated rules. An efficiency 
analysis of alternative policy rules cannot solely rely on the differences be- 
tween actual and estimated reaction functions. Following the definition of 
Taylor (1994), a policy rule has to be considered optimal if it minimizes a 
weighted sum, where the weights are set by the tastes of policymakers, out- 
put variance and inflation variance. In our case, given the specification of 
the loss function in equation (1.5), a term in interest-rate smoothing is also 
taken into account. In other words, the efficiency of a rule results from its 
ability to stabilize output, inflation and interest rate changes around their 
target values for an infinite number of periods. 
The unconditional variances of inflation, output and interest rate are 
calculated using the method developed in Rudebush and Svensson (1998). 
More precisely, the 3x3 covariance matrix of the goal variables is given by: 
EYY =E 
[YtYt] 
=CJ: XX 
d (1.19) 
where the (k +h+ 3) x (k +h+ 3) matrix EXX represents the uncon- 
ditional covariance matrix of the state variables and satisfies the following 
relationship: 
Exx 
-E 
[xx} MExxM'+ 1: 
vv 
(1.20) 
In order to recover the covariance matrix of the state variables we can use7: 
vec 
(Exx) 
= vec 
(M EXX M') + vec 
(Evv) 
_ (M 0 M) vec 
(Exx) + vec 
Cývv) 
Finally we can solve for (>xx): 
vec 
(ýxx/ 
= [I - (M ® M)]-1 vec 
(Ev") (1.21) 
Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 provide the results for the volatility of goal vari- 
ables, measured as the unconditional variances, implied by the six estimated 
7The relationships used are: vec(A+B) = vec(A) + vec(B) and vec(ABC) = vec(C 
A) + vec(B). 
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rules under the hypothesis that A=0.4, cp = 0.4 and y=0.2. With this 
assumption, the analysis is implicitly carried out under the hypothesis that, 
for the central bank, the volatility of output and inflation are equally un- 
desirable (A = cp) while the variability of nominal interest rate changes are 
much less costly (y = 0.2). 
These tables also report the loss implied by the rules and the relative 
ranking in terms of loss in the fourth and fifth columns of Tables 1.7 and 
1.8, respectively. In all countries, the variability of optimal feedback rules 
outperforms, in terms of minimum losses, the other rules. It means that the 
volatility of the goal variables is minimized once the central bank adopts an 
optimal feedback rule. Moreover, the simple, forward-looking, Taylor-type 
rule is consistently, across the countries, the second, top-performing rule; 
the results in terms of the volatility of target variables and, therefore, in 
terms of losses are very close to those of the optimal feedback rule. We can 
conclude that the inclusion of a forward-looking dimension in a monetary 
authority decision process seems to improve the performance of the simple 
rule. 
The Generalized Taylor rule outperforms, with the exception of Portugal, 
the classic Taylor rule. This is thought to be due mainly to the inclusion of 
an autoregressive term in the GTR. This result corroborates the evidence 
emerging from comparative analysis between actual and estimated rules; an 
interest-rate smoothing term then improves not only the ability of the rule to 
give a better representation of central bank behavior, but also the efficiency, 
measured in terms of volatility, of the rules. 
Nevertheless, for many models, the volatility of interest rate changes is 
higher in the rule that reacts to the lagged interest rate. 
However, the inclusion of an autoregressive term does not improve the 
performance of the rule in all cases. This is, in fact, not true for the pure 
inflation rule. The smoothing inflation rule performs badly relative to simple 
inflation-targeting in all countries with the exceptions of Germany, Spain 
and Portugal. 
To augment the tables, Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9 show the efficiency 
frontiers of each rule in all EMU countries. These curves illustrate the 
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trade-off between inflation variability and output gap variability. They are 
obtained by varying the weight on inflation from 0.01 to 0.8 and assuming 
ry = 0.2. The weight on inflation stabilization implicitly determines the 
weight on output stabilization since cp is set to be equal to 1-A. Thus, 
as the weight on inflation stabilization is increased by 0.01, the weight on 
output stabilization is reduced by the same amount at each step. As A 
increases, the rules correspond to points further to the right on the curve. 
The trade-off resulting from the optimal rule is shown as a solid line. 
The dashed lines show the remaining rules. The efficiency frontiers basi- 
cally confirm the results of the tables. Moreover, they provide the following 
insights. First, the performances of the rules seem to be very close to one an- 
other even though the performances of the optimal and the forward-looking 
rules result in the best performance. This is particularly true for France and 
Portugal, as the Netherlands and Belgium show greater differences between 
the efficiency frontiers, with respect to the other EMU countries. Second, 
the performances of the rules become closer as the weight on inflation stabi- 
lization increases. This means that a higher weight on inflation reduces the 
differences in the efficiency frontiers of each rule. 
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Rules Var [y] Var [7r ] Var [i, -i, _, 
] Loss Rank 
Austria 
Optimal feedback rule 5.07 8.49 1.70 5.41 1 
Taylor Rule 7.80 7.36 1.61 6.03 6 
Generalized Taylor Rule 4.94 8.53 2.14 5.52 4 
Pure Inflation Rule 6.86 7.83 1.09 5.64 5 
Smoothing Inflation Rule 4.80 9.23 1.62 5.51 3 
Forward - looking Rule 4.92 8.44 2.07 5.46 2 
Belgium 
Optimal feedback rule 5.33 8.56 1.80 5.58 1 
Taylor Rule 8.21 6.21 1.73 5.79 4 
Generalized Taylor Rule 5.71 7.59 2.18 5.54 3 
Pure Inflation Rule 6.70 8.58 1.21 5.89 5 
Smoothing Inflation Rule 3.91 18.87 2.64 8.14 6 
Forward-looking Rule 6.85 6.56 2.17 5.60 2 
Finland - 
Optimal feedback rule 10.81 13.48 2.86 9.75 1 
Taylor Rule 16.23 10.74 2.33 10.42 5 
Generalized Taylor Rule 10.05 14.24 3.18 9.82 2 
Pure Inflation Rule 14.74 12.13 1.76 10.21 4 
Smoothing Inflation Rule 8.69 18.79 2.05 10.23 6 
Forward - looking Rule 10.15 14.40 2.92 9.82 3 
France 
Optimal feedback rule 28.47 25.72 3.18 20.43 1 
Taylor Rule 38.09 19.43 2.71 20.81 5 
Generalized Taylor Rule 26.12 28.29 3.29 20.56 2 
Pure Inflation Rule 35.99 20.76 2.58 20.64 4 
Smoothing Inflation Rule 20.98 37.97 2.93 21.52 6 
Forward - looking Rule 26.43 28.69 2.72 20.51 3 
Germany 
Optimal feedback rule 16.80 17.30 3.64 13.58 1 
Taylor Rule 14.10 21.66 3.50 13.97 4 
Generalized Taylor Rule 14.10 20.78 3.66 13.75 2 
Pure Inflation Rule 20.16 18.10 2.03 14.31 5 
Smoothing Inflation Rule 10.91 37.18 2.64 16.69 6 
Forward - looking Rule 14.34 21.22 3.19 13.80 3 
Table 1.7: Results of Inflation and Output Volatility 
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Rules Var[y, } Var[; r, ] Var[i1-i, 
_, 
] Loss Rank 
Ireland 
Optimal feedback rule 1474 8.63 0.92 2.43 1 
Taylor Rule 4459 3.84 078 2.71 4 
Generalized Taylor Rule 1473 8.63 0.94 270 3 
Pure Inflation Rule 1771 7.40 0.65 2.84 5 
Smoothing Inflation Rule 13.32 9.53 0.63 3.66 6 
Forward - looking Rule 18.07 7.19 0.98 2.67 2 
Italy 
Optimal feedback rule 10.42 10.44 3.88 8.87 1 
Taylor Rule 10.77 10.34 4.09 9.02 4 
Generalized Taylor Rule 11.62 9.54 3.65 8.89 2 
Pure Inflation Rule 10.17 11.90 3.61 9.21 5 
Smoothing Inflation Rule 9.63 13.37 2.89 9.26 6 
Forward - looking Rule 10.73 10.69 3.28 8.88 3 
Netherlands 
_ 
Optimal feedback rule 4.81 7.28 2.03 5.02 1 
Taylor Rule 9.87 5.84 1.19 5.96 6 
Generalized Taylor Rule 5.45 6.67 2.10 5.09 3 
Pure Inflation Rule 9.49 6.27 0.86 5.86 5 
Smoothing Inflation Rule 4.93 9.07 1.23 5.36 4 
Forward - looking Rule 4.59 7.89 1.78 5.05 2 
Portugal 
Optimal feedback rule 71.02 60.62 9.53 50.45 1 
Taylor Rule 74.93 59.23 8.73 50.86 2 
Generalized Taylor Rule 59.77 74.76 9.74 51.48 3 
Pure Inflation Rule 56.78 88.67 8.85 54.40 5 
Smoothing Inflation Rule 43.13 133.99 9.16 61.82 6 
Forward - looking Rule 60.51 75.90 8.54 51.56 4 
Spain 
Optimal feedback rule 14.01 12.03 2.99 10.43 1 
Taylor Rule 49.95 6.73 0.38 15.90 6 
Generalized Taylor Rule 12.40 13.20 4.99 10.95 3 
Pure Inflation Rule 48.65 6.88 0.24 15.51 5 
Smoothing Inflation Rule 11.45 16.20 4.65 11.52 4 
Forward - looking Rule 16.04 10.59 3.38 10.70 2 
Table 1.8: Results of Inflation and Output Volatility 
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Further conclusions arise from the comparison of the efficiency frontiers 
across the EMU countries. Figure 1.10 shows the efficiency frontiers for the 
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OFR in the largest countries, i. e. Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT) 
and Spain (ES). Figure 1.11 shows the efficiency frontiers for the remaining 
countries, i. e. Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Netherlands (NL), Portugal 
(PT), Finland (FI) and Ireland (IR). In these graphs, we only report the 
optimal feedback rule for the following reasons. First, as the performances 
of the rules are quite similar, the results of the comparative analysis would 
remain unchanged. Thus, the results obtained for this rule can be easily 
extended to the other estimated rules. Second, the OFR has resulted to be 
the top-performing rule and thus the best candidate for this analysis. Figure 
1.11 confirms the success of the Bundesbank strategy in stabilizing output 
and inflation during the sample period. The results also highlight the bad 
performance of the Italian and French models of central banking. 
Figure 1.12 shows the good performance of Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands with respect to the other EMU countries. These countries, in 
fact, are relatively small neighbors of Germany and strongly influenced by 
its economic condition. Their monetary policy has been strongly affected by 
the Bundesbank decisions during the last few decades. A closer performance 
of the OFR in Austria, Belgium and Netherlands to that in Germany was, 
then, expected. 
Altogether, these results support the choice of the Bundesbank frame- 
work as a role model in designing the ECB strategy. 
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This chapter attempts to analyze the performance of different rules capa- 
ble of modeling how the central banks of the EMU countries have made 
policy decisions affecting interest rates. In particular, the study focuses on 
six different rules relating the interest rate, which the central banks are as- 
sumed to control, to a set of variables thought to affect monetary authority 
behavior. The set of rules includes an optimal feedback rule, two different 
specifications of the Taylor rule, a forward-looking rule and two alternative 
inflation rules. Consistent with the inflation-targeting regime, all the rules 
are calculated from an intertemporal optimization problem of a loss func- 
tion penalizing the volatility of output, inflation and policy rates under the 
constraints given by a small, backward-looking, closed-economy structural 
model. The estimated coefficients of the rules are used to detect the main 
differences they imply in terms of monetary policy strategy. Once the in- 
terest rate rules are estimated, we study their performance by using two 
different analyses. 
The first one relies on the historical behavior of EMU member central 
banks. A comparison between the actual and optimal policy rules gives rise 
to some important observations. First, for most countries the estimated 
rules suggest that the actual policy followed by the central banks was looser 
than needed in the early and mid-1980s, while higher interest rates would 
have been advisable during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, the 
selected rules predict well central bank behavior during the European mon- 
etary system crisis for Italy, France, Germany, Austria and Belgium, but 
fail to do so for Ireland, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. An- 
other interesting observation that arises from the analysis, is that the actual 
policy rule has come closer to the optimal rule since 1993. This evidence 
suggests that monetary policy has indeed become more efficient during the 
1990s. Another issue considered in the analysis, is the ability of the rules 
to replicate historical interest rate movements, i. e. central bank behavior. 
The results emerging from the study stress that simple rules perform quite 
well in following interest rate historical records. The ability to mimic inter- 
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est rate changes increases once an interest-rate smoothing term is included 
in the reaction function. This suggests that central bank behavior can be 
better explained by adding a lagged interest rate. Moreover, considering 
a forward-looking dimension that takes into account expectations of future 
inflation movements seems to give further improvement. 
Finally, the study focuses on the efficiency of the estimated reaction 
functions. The analysis suggests that the rule obtained by solving an optimal 
control algorithm is the top-performing rule. Nevertheless, the performance 
of a simple, forward-looking rule with a smoothing term for the interest 
rate is almost as stabilizing as the optimal feedback rule. Thus, the gains 
obtained by a central bank in following a complicated rule are not so high. 
It follows that the European Central Bank should adopt a simple rule as a 
guideline for its monetary strategy. In fact, the easier communicability of 
the simple rule can also increase the transparency and thus the credibility 
of the central bank. 
Further conclusions arise from the comparison of the efficiency frontiers 
across the EMU countries. The outcome confirms the success of the Bundes- 
bank strategy in stabilizing output and inflation during the sample period. 
It also highlights the bad performance of the Italian and French models of 
central banking. 
These results provide additional evidence on how the European mone- 
tary authorities should conduct and characterize their policy strategy. The 
analysis strengthens the choice of the Bundesbank framework as a role model 
in designing the ECB strategy. 
Chapter 2 
Monetary Shocks and 
Systematic Policy 
This chapter analyzes monetary policy asymmetries within EMU participat- 
ing countries. In particular, we use a structural dynamic modelling approach 
to investigate asymmetric monetary transmission in Europe. Asymmetries 
are investigated in two different ways. First, we estimate structural mod- 
els reflecting the monetary constraints each country faced during the EMS 
period. We obtain well-behaved and comparable effects of monetary pol- 
icy shocks. Second, we derive the efficiency frontiers for the selected EMU 
countries. In computing the optimal combinations of output gap and infla- 
tion volatility we use a weighted average of interest rate and exchange rate, 
i. e. the Monetary Condition Index (MCI), as a policy instrument. The im- 
pulse response analysis implemented with the MCI, shows relatively small 
differences among the EMU countries in the responses of the real economy 
to monetary policy shocks. Altogether the results suggest that, no matter 
which policy instrument is used, output gap and inflation respond to iden- 
tical monetary shocks with a similar speed and movement, albeit with a 
different degree of effects. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Since the beginning of 1999, the monetary policy regime in Europe has 
changed substantially. The centralization of the monetary policy of the EMU 
member countries has resulted in a single decision process that prevents 
national monetary authorities from pursuing systematic policies to offset 
country-specific shocks. In this scenario, understanding the transmission 
mechanism of the monetary policy is crucial to a successful implementation 
of the Eurosystem's monetary policy strategy. 
The chapter analyzes monetary policy asymmetries in 10 EMU countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain) with a particular emphasis on the time lag involved 
between a policy change and its impact on inflation and output. 
There exists a large quantity of empirical literature focusing on whether 
monetary policy asymmetries across EMU members will become less pro- 
nounced, over time, as a result of a single monetary orientation. 
Most of these studies apply VAR methodology to evaluate the effects of 
monetary policy on output and prices, through the unsystematic component 
of monetary authority actions. Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998), for example, 
find that the effect on output in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland and 
the Netherlands takes longer to occur but is almost twice as great as that 
in France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Portugal and Denmark. Gerlach and Smets 
(1995; 97) using long-run identifying restrictions find that the output re- 
sponse in Germany is larger than the one in France and Italy. Ehrmann 
(1998) detects a substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude of responses: 
small responses in small economies are opposed to large reactions in large 
countries. Finally, Kiler and Saaranheimo (1998) highlight that, given the 
strong dependence of the results on applied identification schemes, it is not 
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possible to detect significant cross-country differences in the monetary trans- 
mission mechanisms in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Other 
research explicitly models the ERM constraints the EMU members faced 
during the last two decades. Peersman and Mojon (2001) and Clements et 
al. (2001) propose imposing alternative identification restrictions on each 
EMU country in order to account for the EMS institutional requirements. 
In particular, the study of Clements et al. (2001) suggests that for France, 
Italy, Ireland and Finland, the average effect on output of a contractionary 
monetary policy shock is larger than for the other EMU economies. 
Other studies, the research of BIS (1995) being an example, use large- 
scale macroeconometric models. The results of BIS (1995) reveal an almost 
identical response of output to a monetary shock in Germany, Italy and 
France. Also Hallett and Piscitelli (1999) using the IMF MULTIMOD follow 
this approach. They underline the lesser effect of monetary policy on output 
in Italy, with respect to the reaction of output in France and Germany. 
Britton and Whitley (1997), instead, utilize a small-scale structural 
model. Their research detects non-significant differences of the output re- 
actions in Germany and France. Moreover, the same study detects a larger 
response of the United Kingdom with respect to other EMU countries. 
Finally, other authors use single equation models. Dornbush et al. 
(1998), for example, stress that the impact-effect of a change in monetary 
policy is similar in Germany, France and the United Kingdom and smaller 
in Sweden and Italy. However, they also suggest that the full effect of the 
co-ordinated monetary policy action is lower in the UK than in France and 
Germany. 
The contribution of the study with respect to the existing literature on 
the asymmetric transmission mechanism in Euro Area countries is twofold. 
First, we show that imposing restrictions on the estimated structural 
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models, reflecting the monetary constraints each country faced during the 
EMS period, obtains well-behaved and comparable effects of the monetary 
policy shocks in the selected economies. Moreover, following Peersman and 
Mojon (2001), our approach avoids the homogeneity of models that charac- 
terizes most of the literature on cross-country comparisons of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. 
Second, we model policy behaviour with monetary rules that account 
for exchange rate changes. Such rules better describe the reaction functions 
each country used, in order to set interest rates during the Pre-EMU period. 
An outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents an open- 
economy structural model, which is designed to summarize the main chan- 
nels through which monetary policies affect the real economy. Section 2.3 
studies the asymmetries in the output and inflation responses to monetary 
policy shocks across the EMU countries. Section 2.4 derives a set of effi- 
cient rules in a small open economy consistent with an inflation targeting 
regime. Section 2.5 analyzes the response of the real economy, when mone- 
tary authorities use the estimated MCI as a policy instrument. In Section 
2.6, concluding remarks end the study. 
2.2 A Structural Model of EMU Countries Econ- 
omy 
In the empirical analysis, we use a structural dynamic modelling approach 
to investigate asymmetric monetary transmission in Europe. 
The model consists of an aggregate supply equation of the form: 
4 
-7rt = 'Yi7rt-i + Pyt-1 - ý(qt - 9t-1) + rjt (2.1) 
i=1 
This autoregressive Phillips curve relates the CPI inflation rate (ir) to its 
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own lags, to a lagged output gap (y), measured as a percent gap between the 
actual real GDP and the potential GDP, and the change in the real effec- 
tive exchange rate(Ogt). The last term(Ogt) reflects the pass-through of the 
exchange rate to the consumer price index. The specification of aggregate 
supply is consistent with an adaptive representation of inflation expecta- 
tions. The expectations are treated implicitly by the inclusion of lagged 
values of the variables. 
4 
yt =I azyt-i - , ßqt-i - co(it - art) + et (2.2) i=1 
According to equation(2.2), the output gap is related to the real interest 
rate and to its own lags. The real interest rate is calculated as the difference 
between a short-term interest rate and the inflation rate. In the above equa- 
3 
tion, it is the four-quarter short-term nominal interest rate, i. e. 4 L' it-j; Wt 
j=o 
3 
is the four-quarter inflation rate, i. e. 4 7ct-j. From equation (2.2) we can 
j=o 
see that an increase in qt, representing an appreciation of the home currency, 
shifts the aggregate demand of the home country (ß > 0). 
The last equation of the model is a monetary policy reaction function. 
We explore the real effects of a monetary shock using alternative specifica- 
tions of monetary authority behaviour. On each EMU member, we impose 
an explicit instrument rule, taking into account the predominant variables 
that are likely to have driven their monetary policy during the last two 
decades. Within this class of rules, the monetary policy instrument is ex- 
pressed as a function of the available information. In the following, we 
consider three versions of open-economy Taylor rules'. 
'Since the Taylor (1993) seminal paper, a great amount of literature has been written 
which aims at explaining the stabilizing power of active interest rate rules. Recently, 
several authors including Taylor (1998) and Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) have underlined 
the usefulness of the Taylor rule as an informal benchmark for setting interest rates in the 
58 CHAPTER 2. MONETARY SHOCKS AND SYSTEMATIC POLICY 
The first refers to the German economy. It assumes that the interest 
rate is a function of the lagged values of inflation, output gap and the real 
effective exchange rate. We also add a smoothing term for the interest rate. 
it = biyt-i + 627rt-1 + b34t + 54it-1 + wt (2.3) 
The second type of rule is estimated for Austria, Belgium and the Nether- 
lands. As stressed in Peersman and Mojon (2001) these countries have 
strictly followed the monetary policy of the Bundesbank during the last 
decades. Thus, for those countries, the home interest rates are replaced 
with the German nominal rate WE). 
it = SlYt_1 + b2lrt_1 + b3gt + b4it 1 +Wt (2.4) 
The third Taylor-type rule is designed for Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal. This rule takes into account the so called "German 
dominance" in the EMS in two different ways. First, the nominal interest 
rate of Germany is included in the reaction functions. Second, the real 
effective exchange rate is replaced with the real bilateral DM exchange rate 
(qDE) : 
it = Ölyt-1 + S2lrt-1 + S3q 
f» + 542t_1 + J52ýE + Wt (2.5) 
Although we use structural models, the monetary policy rules we adopt 
are similar to the interest rate equations of the VAR considered in Peersman 
and Mojon (2001). 
The model has been estimated by applying the OLS technique and using 
quarterly data for the period 1979: 1-1998: 42. The length of the sample 
EMU area. 
2The data used in the empirical analysis are taken from the IFS statistics. 
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period is chosen in order to have a single monetary policy regime involved in 
the estimations. Potential output has been computed by using the Hodrick- 
Prescott (HP) filter. As we have quarterly data, we set the smoothing 
parameter to 1600 as in Kydland and Prescott (1990). All variables were 
de-meaned prior to estimation. 
The estimated equations are reported in table A2.1, A2.2 and A2.3 in 
Appendix. Most of the crucial coefficients have the expected sign and are 
significant at 5%(or 10%) level for the majority of the countries under ex- 
amination. Among the explaining variables in the demand equation, special 
emphasis must be given to the coefficient on the real effective exchange rate. 
Only a few EMU countries show the right sign and have a significant coef- 
ficient. This might be due to the J-curve effect. A change in the domestic 
currency rarely shows its effect on the GDP after only one quarter. The 
Marshall-Learner condition only holds in the long run. Regarding the mon- 
etary policy functions, it should be stresses that several countries in the 
third group show not significant parameters. This is particularly true for 
the coefficients relating the domestic interest rate with the German vari- 
ables. Overall, Spain and Portugal are the countries displaying the worse 
statistics. This is probably due to data limitation. 
Having estimated the model, it is then possible to observe some proper- 
ties of the monetary policy shock time series. 
Figure 2.1 shows the monetary shocks. As the measure of monetary 
shock is by construction serially uncorrelated, the four-quarter moving av- 
erage of the shock, i. e. (wt + wi+l + wi+2 + wi+s) /4, is reported. 
In interpreting the results, we assume that a positive smoothed policy 
shock represents a tight monetary policy, while a negative shock corresponds 
to a loose monetary policy. Figure 2.1 shows that the selected measure of 
a policy shock, the monetary policy of almost all EMU countries, was con- 
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tractionary during the main recessionary episodes and became expansionary 
after depressions. This evidence is in line with the historical records of mon- 
etary policy actions. If we look, for instance, at the period 1992-93 we can 
see that all countries experienced a period of tight monetary policy. 
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Figure 2.1: Four Quarter Monetary Shock 
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2.3 Simulation Analysis 
After estimating the model, it is now possible to apply the impulse response 
analysis. The objective of this analysis is to measure the time profile of the 
incremental effect of the innovation of the variables on the future state of 
the economy. In other words, once the monetary rule has been estimated, 
the analysis focuses on the response of the macroeconomic variables to a 
deviation from the rule. 
The estimated responses to a 1% point increase in the nominal interest 
rate are reported in figures 2.2 and 2.3. Each response is provided with 
the associated asymptotic confidence bands3. The patterns of the responses 
are similar in all the countries. In all the economies, a positive monetary 
policy shock decreases output gap. Moreover, after an initial delay, the 
response function shows a hump-shaped pattern that reaches the maximum 
decline after roughly a year to a year and a half. Figure 2.3 reports the 
inflation response to a monetary policy contractionary shock. Common to 
all member countries, inflation falls slightly after a monetary shock. The 
estimated responses corroborate the presence of a certain degree of rigidities 
in inflation dynamics. 
Figure 2.4 outlines the average responses as well as the maximum impact 
of the monetary policy shocks on output gap and inflation. Despite some 
differences, figure 2.4 seems to suggest a similar quantitative response across 
countries. The largest responses are observed in Germany and Italy; in 
particular, the response of the German output gap reaches the minimum of 
minus thirty-six basis points after one year and a half, while the reaction 
3Confidence bands are computed using Monte Carlo integration. See Sims and 
Zha(1999) for a discussion on these issues. 
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of the Italian output gap is quicker and smaller: minus thirty-three basis 
points after almost one year. This evidence, supported by some previous 
studies, is in line with the larger manufacturing sector in Germany and 
Italy that increases the sensitivity of the output to monetary policy shocks. 
The asymmetric inflation responses to monetary shock across the countries 
are displayed in Figure 2.44. In almost all countries the inflation response 
is initially very low; this result is consistent with the presence of nominal 
rigidities. The maximum impact on inflation is observed in Finland, Italy 
and France. These countries also share the largest average inflation response. 
It means that in these countries, inflation rates- appear to be more sensitive 
to the monetary policy shocks. 
"Notice that the bar charts in Figure 2.4 denote negative impacts. 
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Figure 2.4: Average and Maximum Responses of Output gap and Inflation 
Our analysis from individual country models provides evidence that the 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms of EMU participating economies 
are similar in many respects. Specifically, the speed and the nature of the 
adjustment occurring to the inflation and output gap in response to mone- 
tary policy shocks are reasonably similar. The size of those responses seems 
to be different across countries. However, when considering the asymptotic 
confidence bands those differences almost disappear. 
Table 2.1 compares our results with previous studies. The studies differ 
in terms of the size of monetary shock they consider as well as for the model 
used in the impulse response analysis. Potentially, the differences across the 
selected economies may stem from different measurement of the monetary 
shock. In the present study, the monetary policy shock was set for all 
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countries equal to 1%. This may improve the cross-country comparability of 
the estimated responses. Other studies, for example the BIS (1995) research, 
analyze the responses of the real GDP and the GDP deflator to a 100 basis 
point increase in the policy rate for two years, followed by a return of the 
rate to the normal level. Finally, Peersman and Mojon (2001) assume a one 
standard deviation monetary policy shock. 
AT BE DE ES FI FR IR IT NL PT 
AhavMa- Landoffo [ü] -0.207 -0.214 -0358 -0.204 -0.262 -0.206 -0.112 -0.332 -0.128 -0.19 
Mojon and Peersman (2001) [iv] -0.25 -032 -0.2 -0.14 -0.44 -0.2 -032 -0.12 -0.45 -0.08 
Cements et aL (2001) [iii'] -1 -1.4 -0.8 -13 -1.7 -2.2 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -03 
Peersman and Smets (2001) [iv] -0.93 -0.87 -1.8 -1 -1.15 -1.85 
Mhov (2001) [ii] -0.55 -03 -0.35 -035 -0.4 
Ehrmann (2000) [i] -0.05 -036 -0.9 -0.22 -0.6 -0.4 -03 -0.42 -0.1 -0.4 
Barran et al (1997) [iv] -035 -0.65 -0.55 -0.36 -0.46 -03 -0.48 
Ramuwamy and S1oek (1997) [iv] -0.7 -0.95 -0.75 -0.28 -0.85 -0.48 -0.5 -0.6 
BIS: National central banks (1995) (iti] -0.18 -037 -025 -0.23 -036 -0.44 -0.14 
Gerlach and Smets (1995) [iv] -0.28 -0.19 -031 
Note: [i] : effect of monetary policy on industrial production. 
[ii] : effect of a 100 basis points, eight quarters sustained increase of the interest rate. 
[iii] : effect of a1 percentage point increase in the short-term rate. 
[iv]: effect of a one-standard deviation increase in the shoe-term interest rate 
Table 2.1. The maximum impact of Monetary Policy on Output: A 
Comparison with Previous Studies 
As shown in table 2.1 the estimated effect on output gap are similar 
to the one obtained in Mojon and Persman (2001) and BIS (1995). We 
next explore the statistical significance of the estimated asymmetries by 
computing standard Wald tests. Under the null hypothesis, the average 
output response in the country i, i. e. y, R, is equal to the average of the 
estimated impulse response function (IR) for country j. 
H0 IR = µIR 
2.4. OPEN ECONOMY MONETARY RULE FOR EMU COUNTRIES67 
[/L - SIR] 
2 
X2 (1) 
var (IRL) + var (IRS) - 2cov (IRS,, IRS) 
Table 2.2 investigates the degree of asymmetry in the interest rate chan- 
nel across the three biggest EMU member countries, i. e. Italy, Germany and 
France. The table presents the test results regarding the significance of the 
existence of asymmetric transmission. Those results suggest that the differ- 
ences in the policy impact across EMU members are not significant. Only 
in Ireland is the difference in the estimated output responses statistically 
significant. 
Country Germany Italy France 
Austria 1.31 0.51 -1.25 
Belgium 2.13 1.33 -0.47 
Finland 0.48 -0.36 -2.02 
France 2.63 1.90 - 
Germany - -0.82 -2.63 
Ireland 24.10* 34.07* 10.72* 
Italy 0.82 - -1.90 
Netherlands 3.18 3.88 0.88 
Portugal 2.53 1.90 -0.15 
Spain 1.07 2.68 3.05 
Table 2.2: Testing for asymmetric interest rate effects on output gaps 
2.4 Open Economy Monetary Rule for EMU Coun- 
tries 
In the previous section the monetary policy behavior has been modelled by 
imposing explicit instrument rules to the structural model. This section 
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derives the set of efficient rules in a small open economy consistent with 
the inflation targeting regime. We then use the estimated rules to compute 
the responses of output and inflation to a monetary policy shock under the 
estimated reaction functions. In order to compute implicit monetary rules 
for an open economy, we augment the model expressed in equation (2.2) and 
equation (2.1) with an equation linking the real exchange rate and the real 
interest rate. 
qt=Ort+vt (2.6) 
Equation (2.6) is similar to the one used in Ball (1998). It captures in 
spirit the Uncovered Interest Parity(UIP). In particular, this relationship 
expresses the idea that a rise in the interest rate makes domestic assets 
more attractive, leading to an appreciation of the exchange rate. The shock 
vt captures other influences on the exchange rate, such as expectations, 
investor confidence and foreign interest rate. The model is similar to the 
more complicated macroeconometric models of many central banks. 
By including equation (2.6) the timing of the model goes as follows. The 
interest rate takes two periods to work. A monetary tight raises the interest 
rate and the exchange rate contemporaneously, but it takes a period for these 
variables to affect output and another period for output to affect inflation. 
In contrast, an exchange rate change takes only one period to affect inflation. 
These assumptions express the common view that the exchange rate effect 
is the quickest channel through which monetary policy influences inflation. 
Unlike Chapter I and the first part of the current chapter, the policy 
instrument used here is a weighted sum of the interest rate and the exchange 
rate. The resulting series is the so-called Monetary Condition Index (MCI). 
The ratio is as follows. 
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Many economists advocate the use of a Taylor rule as guideline for the 
monetary policy authorities. According to this rule, a central bank rises 
interest rates when inflation rises above its target, or when output rises 
above its long run level, and reduces interest rates in the opposite cases. 
The idea is "leaning against the wind'. Under a closed economy assumption, 
this rule fits reasonably well with the macroeconomic scenario. However, if 
we assume a certain degree of openness, the monetary policy rule must 
be modified to account for the role of the exchange rate in the economy. 
Under this assumption, since the interest rate affects the exchange rate, 
central banks, choosing the interest rate, choose indirectly the exchange 
rate. Monetary policy affects spending through two channels: the interest 
rate and the exchange rate. The overall stimulus to spending depends on the 
average effect of these two variables with weights given by the IS coefficients. 
Hence, the intuition for putting the MCI in the rule is straightforward. The 
inclusion of this index provides a better assessment of the overall impact on 
the real economy as well as of the underlying monetary conditions. This 
is particularly true for small open economies, where the exchange rate has 
greater importance for economic developments. 
Recently, there has been a long debate about whether the MCI should 
appear in the rule. It has been argued that the inclusion of the MCI in the 
policy rule is not absolutely necessary. The openness of the economy could 
be taken into account by adding the exchange rate on the right hand side 
of the Taylor rule. In this way, policymakers would adjust the interest rate 
in response to output and inflation dynamics as well as the exchange rate 
fluctuations. A strand of literature believes that, to some degree, the issue 
"Modified Taylor rule or MCI? " is merely semantic. Using trivial algebra 
can be shown, in fact, that the modification of the Taylor rule accounting for 
the exchange rate and the policy rule having the MCI as policy instrument 
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are equivalent. The only difference is that the latter looks like more radical. 
However there is a different strand of literature arguing that the difference 
is not merely semantic in reality. In practice, policymakers adjust their 
instrument slowly over time. Policy setting is held constant between policy 
reviews. Within a quarter an interest rate rule means that the interest rate 
is constant, and an MCI rule means that the interest rate is adjusted to offset 
exchange rate movements. Therefore, the rules produce different outcomes 
when there are shocks to the exchange rate and consequently, the choice of 
policy instrument does matter in practice(Ball, 2000). 
In computing the efficiency frontier and impulse response analysis, the 
parameters of the model are calibrated using a set of base values. Several of 
these values are borrowed from the small open economy model described in 
Ball (1998). We assume that the total output loss from a one point rise in 
the interest rate is 1. In the current model, this means that cp+/30 = 0.175. 
If we set cp/ß equal to 3 (capturing a common rule-of-thumb about IS 
coefficients) and 0 equal to 0.5 (a one-point rise in the interest rate causes 
a two percent appreciation on a yearly basis), we implicitly assume that co 
and / are, respectively, equal to 0.15 and 0.05. Finally, we also assume that 
the slope of the Philips curve, i. e. p, is equal to 0.2 and the coefficient ý is 
equal to 0.05 (a one percent appreciation reduces inflation by two tenths of a 
point on a yearly basis). Unlike the calibrated model used by Ball, we leave 
ai as free parameters, and since the analysis is based on quarterly data, we 
4 
make the coefficients ryi total 1 (i. e > ryi = 1). This means that we assume 
i=1 
the existence of a natural unemployment rate (NAIRU) when inflation is 
stable. 
The approach followed in this study differs from the traditional approach 
in two aspects. 
First, we use the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) as a policy instru- 
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ment. As mentioned above, the rationale for using an MCI' is that it 
measures the overall policy stance, by considering both interest rate and 
exchange rate dynamics. Second, we assume as a measure of inflation the 
following term(7r*): -yj7rt_i+l + 6qt-i I. This term can be interpreted 
as a long-run forecast of inflation under the hypothesis that output is kept 
at its natural level. There are two good reasons for targeting long run in- 
flation ir* instead of ordinary inflation. First, policy makers tighten only 
when there is inflation increases that would otherwise be permanent. This 
approach allows some short run volatility in inflation, but it keeps inflation 
stable over the longer run and reduces output variability. Second, it allows 
to distinguish temporary from permanent shifts in the exchange rate. Of 
course, it is not easy in practice to tell whether a change in the exchange 
rate is permanent or temporary. A disadvantage in targeting rr* is that 
requires the estimation of the long run equilibrium exchange rate in the 
Phillips curve(-y). In contrast, measuring ordinary inflation does not require 
knowledge of equilibrium exchange rates or Philips curve parameters. 
Following Ball (1998), we define the efficient rule as the rule that is 
optimal for some weights, or equivalently, a rule that puts the economy on 
the output variance/ inflation variance frontier. 
Every rule is usually interpreted as a rule for setting the interest rate. 
Using equation (2.6), it is possible to turn a rule for setting the interest 
rate into a rule for setting the exchange rate. In particular, by substituting 
equation (2.6) into equation (2.2) we eliminate the interest rate from the 
model. Then, in order to show the effects of the current exchange rate on 
future output and inflation, we shift the lags of equation 2.1 and equation 
2.2 one period ahead. This yields: 
5The MCI is a weighted sum of the interest rate and exchange rate. 
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3 
Yt+i = a: yt-i - (ß +8 )4t -B vt + et 
(2.7) 
i=o 
3 
7rt+i =E YZ7rt-: + pmt - ýAqt + 77t 
(2.8) 
=o 
A policy maker choosing the interest rate, and implicitly the current ex- 
change rate, looks at the expressions corresponding to terms on the right 
sides of equation (2.7) and equation (2.8). The state variables of the model 
44 
are obtained by using such expressions: ajyt_j+1+(cp/O)vt and > ryt7rt-z+l-I- 
i=1 
pyt + ýqt-i 
The future paths of output and inflation are determined by these two 
expressions, the rule for choosing the exchange rate and future shocks. Since 
the model is linear quadratic, one can show the optimal rule is linear in the 
two state variables: 
44 
Qt =mt aiyt-i + (W/O)vt +n 'Yz7rt-z + Pyt + eat-i (2.9) 
By equation (2.6) vt can be replaced by qt-Ort . 
Making this substitution 
and rearranging terms yieldss: 
44 
wr + (1 - w)q =a> yt-i +b ryi7rt-i + ýqt-1 (2.10) 
where w is the weight and it is equal to: 
w= mcpü/(B - mcp + mcoO) (2.11) 
4 
6Notice that ry; =1 
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and a and b are the coefficients of the rule and are equal respectively to: 
4 
a= O(m a= + np)/(O - mcp + mV O) 
b= nO/(O - mcp + mcoO) 
The coefficients of the rule depend upon the constants m and n. Equa- 
tion (2.10) states the optimal policy as a rule for a weighted average of 
interest rate and exchange rate. By substituting equation (2.2) and equa- 
tion (2.1) into equation (2.9) yields an expression for the exchange rate: 
44 
qt = [mal + np(1 + al)] +E [mai(1 + a1) + npa: ] yt-i + nry27rt-i + [m Y: (1 +'Yi)7rt-: ] + 
2=2 z=2 
-{ (mal + np) (ß + 
8) } 
4t-i + [mal + np] &t +m vt + 
[(m + np) 
8] 
vt-ý 
This equation, together with equation (2.2) and equation (2.1), represent 
the single equations of a VARMA(4,1) process. Thus follows: 
Xt = A1Xt-1 + A2Xt-2 + A3Xt-3 + A4Xt-4 + Bi¬t + B2Et_l (2.12) 
where Ai are the (3 x 3) matrices of the restricted coefficients and Bi 
are the structural matrices of the errors; Xt is the vector of the endogenous 
variable [yt, itt, qt]' and et is the vector of the shocks [et, rat, vt]' . The appendix 
shows the model in a more explicit form. 
For a given parameter values and given values of the constants m and 
n, one can numerically derive the variance of the vector X using standard 
formulas. Thus follows: 
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(I9K2 -A0 A)-lvec(EE)) 
where A is the companion matrix and EE is the variance covariance 
matrix7. 
We derived the optimal efficiency rule by searching the combinations of 
m and n that put the economy on the output variance - inflation variance 
frontier for a given value of A. The coefficient A is the non negative weight 
that we impose upon the variance of the inflation in the loss function. The 
coefficient A is a non-negative weight that the central bank attaches to stabi- 
lize inflation. The value of A implicitly determines the weight on the output 
stabilization since it is equal to 1-A. Thus, as the weight on the inflation 
stabilization increases, the weight on the output stabilization is reduced by 
the same amount at each step. By applying this procedure, we derive the 
efficient frontiers for the EMU countries. 
'For details see Lutkepol, chapter 6 
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Figure 2.5: Efficiency frontiers for the largest EMU countries 
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Figure 2.6: Efficiency frontiers for the smallest EMU countries 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the efficiency frontiers for the selected EMU 
members. Two results are noteworthy. From figure 2.5, it emerges that Ger- 
many is the second top-performing country. Surprisingly, the first country 
is France. As the good performance of Germany is consistent with historical 
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records of the country, and thus justifies the choice of the German model as 
a benchmark model in the ECB monetary strategy, the good performance of 
France is inconsistent with results obtained in literature so far. This result 
could be due to the removal of the closed economy hypothesis or/and the 
calibration of the model. 
On the other hand, the bad performance of Italy and Spain with re- 
spect to Fiance and Germany are consistent with the results of most of the 
literature. 
Another reasonable result concerns the performance of Austria, Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Figure 2.6 suggests that the performance of these 
countries is quite similar. This result is highlighted in figure 2.7 where the 
efficiency frontiers of these countries are compared to that of Germany. 
78 CHAPTER 2. MONETARY SHOCKS AND SYSTEMATIC POLICY 
10.0 
7.5 
w 
R 
ß > 5.0 
a 
ß 
.r 
a 
.r 
0 
2.5 
0.0 
Ger 
Aus 
Net 
l 
Bel 
\_ 
0 
Inflation Rate Variance 
23 
Figure 2.7: Efficiency frontiers for Germany and Neighbours 
This graph confirms the common belief that Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands are relatively small neighbors of Germany and strongly influ- 
enced by its economic condition. During the sample period, they followed 
monetary policy strategy similar to that conducted by the Bundesbank. 
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2.5 Impulse Response Analysis under the MCI 
In this section we present the estimated dynamic effects of monetary policy 
shocks on output gap and inflation. In particular, we examine the similarity 
of monetary policy transmission mechanisms in each economy, when they 
operate according to the estimated reaction function and face flexible ex- 
change rates. To this end, we analyze the effect of one percent shock to the 
MCI on the real economy in each country. This is accomplished by using 
impulse response functions with a structural decomposition of the variance 
covariance matrix explained below. A 25-quarter horizon is considered. 
Impulse responses under the estimated monetary rules are depicted in 
figures 2.8 and 2.9, with dashed lines denoting the asymptotic bands around 
the estimated responses. The impulse responses for Germany, Italy and Fin- 
land are again slightly larger than those for the other countries, though it 
should be remembered that there are slight differences in the model spec- 
ifications and thus comparisons should not necessarily be accepted at face 
value. With the caveats mentioned above, we observe some similarities in 
the response of each country to a monetary policy shock. 
The effect of the monetary policy shock on the inflation rate persists 
in all economies for approximately 6 quarters. The inflation rate follows a 
similar path in all countries. Consistent with our priors, the CPI inflation 
in all countries does not respond immediately to the monetary policy shock. 
Moreover, we do not observe a price puzzle. We note that the speed of 
the adjustment of variables in the EMU members is similar. Some differ- 
ences emerge in the sizes of adjustments. In Austria, France and Italy, the 
observed decrease of inflation is greater than in the other countries. 
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Figure 2.8: Response of Output Cap to a 1% Positive Monetary Shock 
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Output: Average Impact 
Output: Maximum Impact 
Inflation: Average impact 
Inflation: Maximum Impact 
Figure 2.10: Average and Maximum Responses of Output gap and Inflation 
The average response and the maximum impact of a contractionary mon- 
etary policy shock are shown in figure 2.108. The evidence emerging from 
these figures suggests that the timing of the inflation response is similar 
across the countries; the monetary shock exerts the maximum effect after 
more than two years in almost all countries. The largest responses are ob- 
served in Germany, Austria and Finland. 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
Up to now, the large quantity of literature aimed at analyzing the possible 
asymmetries in output and price responses to the single monetary policy 
across the EMU countries, has not yet provided a consistent and unambigu- 
8Similarly to figure 2.4, the bar charts in Figure 2.10 denote a negative impact. 
2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 83 
ous picture of cross-country heterogeneity in monetary transmission. The 
aim of the chapter is to shed some light on how monetary transmission may 
heterogeneously work in different countries. 
In this respect, the chapter has attempted to detect the different ef- 
fects of monetary policy shock on the output gap and inflation rate, across 
EMU countries. The importance of this issue lies in the consideration that 
differences in transmission mechanisms can generate asymmetric behaviour 
among currency union partners, even when they experience the same mon- 
etary policy shock. 
The analysis has been divided into two parts. First, we have shown that 
imposing restrictions on the estimated structural models according to the 
monetary constraints each country faced during the EMS period, obtained 
well-behaved and comparable effects of the monetary policy shocks in all the 
countries. Second, we have modelled policy behaviour with monetary rules 
which accounts for exchange rate changes. Such rules better describe the 
reaction functions each country used in order to set interest rates during the 
Pre-EMU period. 
The impulse response analysis highlights the presence of nominal and 
real divergences across EMU members. These asymmetries, concerning the 
interest rate channel, will probably not be large enough to cause frictions 
for the EMU. Importantly, the results also suggest that the output gap 
and inflation in the selected economies respond to identical monetary policy 
shocks with similar speed and movement, albeit with different dimensions 
of the effects. From the empirical analysis applied in this chapter, we see 
that the effect of a monetary shock on output mostly depends on the output 
structure of the country. 
Other channels, not considered here, could be a cause of concern. The 
study did not take into account the asymmetries that might arise from the 
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credit channel or from the stock market channel. Nevertheless, it seems 
plausible to imagine that the cross-country differences in monetary trans- 
mission across EMU countries could decrease over time, as a result of in- 
creasing financial structure homogeneity. This means that, in the long run, 
asymmetries in monetary transmission will not be a cause of concern. How- 
ever, some differences are likely to persist; those divergences call for a better 
understanding and monitoring of the national monetary transmission mech- 
anisms. 
Part II 
Monetary Policy issues in 
the Euro Area 
85 
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Chapter 3 
Do Central Banks act 
asymmetrically? 
This Chapter attempts to exploit whether the monetary authorities have 
a different behavior during recession and expansion. To this end, a multi- 
variate extension of Hamilton's (1989) Markov Switching Model is adopted. 
First, regime dependent Taylor-type rules are estimated for the Euro Area 
and the United Kingdom in order to capture the systematic behavior of cen- 
tral banks. Then, impulse response functions that account for the different 
phases of the business cycle are analyzed. In addition, a comparative analy- 
sis concerning the estimated rules as well as the different reaction of real 
economy to monetary shocks is implemented. The study strongly suggests 
that central banks cannot neglect the regime where the monetary action 
takes place. The phase of the business cycle is an important matter in 
monetary policy decision process. 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to shed some light on three important issues. First, 
it investigates whether the monetary policy authorities have an asymmetric 
87 
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behaviour in the different phases of the business cycle. Second, it analyses 
whether a monetary policy action has a different effect on the real economy 
depending on the phase of the business cycle. Third, it observes whether 
there exist some asymmetries in the monetary policy strategies followed by 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England. 
The empirical literature concerning monetary policy rules, as well as 
the strand of literature on the monetary transmission mechanisms, is quite 
extended. Most of these studies model the central bank behaviour with a 
linear reaction function that is by construction, symmetric over the different 
phases of the business cycle. Moreover, they neglect the asymmetric impact 
that a monetary policy action might have on the real economy according to 
the particular phase of the business cycle, where the action takes place. 
The current study differs from the existing literature in three aspects. 
First, it accounts for non-linearity in the econometric model. Second, it 
derives regime dependent monetary policy rules that account for the different 
phases of the business cycle. Finally, it provides a quantitative analysis of 
the asymmetric impact of a monetary policy action on the real economy. 
The analysis focuses on the Euro Area and the United Kingdom economies. 
The econometric technique used in the empirical analysis is a multivariate 
extension of Hamilton's (1989) Markov-switching model. In particular, we 
use a Markov Switching Vector Autoregressive model (henceforth MS-VAR). 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 investigates the pres- 
ence of non-linear serial dependence in a trivariate linear VAR. Section 3.3 
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discusses the econometric methodology used in order to analyze the way 
through which monetary policy affects the real economy depending on the 
state of the economy. Section 3.4 provides the estimation and the com- 
parison of state-dependent reaction functions for the ECB and the Bank 
of England. Section 3.5 presents the main results of the impulse response 
analysis. In particular, it shows the timing and the dimension of the likely 
effects the ECB and the Bank of England have on output gap and inflation 
during recessions and booms. In Section 3.6, concluding remarks end the 
chapter. 
3.2 Linearity vs. Non-linearity hypothesis 
Most of the literature on central banking applies VAR methodology to eval- 
uate the effects of the monetary actions on output and prices. These studies, 
neglecting the effects of business cycle fluctuations on the monetary author- 
ity behaviour, rely on single state linear models. 
However, the existence of asymmetric effects of unanticipated monetary 
policy changes and thus the use of non-linear methodologies can be moti- 
vated by a variety of theoretical models. 
According to the Keynesian framework, for example, prices and wages 
are assumed to be more rigid downward than upward. The different sign of 
the shock might produce asymmetries concerning the effects of tight and 
loose monetary policies. In particular, negative shocks lead to a lower 
output and employment while positive shocks are thought to be neutral. 
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In the credit channel theory many studies, such as Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Schmidt (1999), and Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995), assume that monetary policy has a greater impact on the 
real economy in low growth states. Finally, the size of the monetary author- 
ities' actions is considered a further source of asymmetries in the menu cost 
frameworks. Those models, like Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Blanchard 
and Kiyotaki (1987), predict that only small policy actions would have real 
effects, since a large shock is reflected in a change of the menu prices. 
Nevertheless, the strand of empirical literature accounting for non-linearity 
is not so extended. Some studies utilize the Multiple Regime Smooth Tran- 
sition Autoregressive model (MRSTAR) methodology to evaluate the non- 
linear effects of monetary policy on output and prices. These models, intro- 
duced by van Dijk and Franses (1999), generalize the STAR' models that 
were extensively used in the literature. Dufrenot et al. (2002), for example, 
use this methodology to analyse the effect of monetary policy on the US 
real economy, assuming that output fluctuations are governed by regime- 
shift models. 
In the present study, instead, we account for non-linearity in the eco- 
nomic structure by adopting a multivariate extension of Hamilton's (1989) 
Markov-switching model. In particular, we analyse the asymmetric behav- 
iour of the monetary authorities by estimating a regime-dependent reaction 
'STAR (Smooth Transition Autoregressive) models were originally introduced by 
Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992). Their statistical properties are studied in Luukkonen 
et al. (1988), Luukkonen and Teräsvirta (1991), Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), Eitrheim 
and Teräsvirta (1996). 
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function. 
In order to test for non-linearity in the monetary policy behaviour we 
proceed as follows. First, we estimate a linear VAR with the OLS technique. 
Then, we check the non-linearity of the residuals by employing a battery of 
standard tests. 
The sample period, for both the Euro Area and the United Kingdom, 
goes from 1980: 1 to 2001: 4. The data used in the empirical analysis for 
the UK are seasonally adjusted quarterly observations and were drawn from 
Datastream, which, in turn, takes the data from the OECD Main Economic 
Indicator Database. The aggregate variables for the Euro Area, instead, 
come from the dataset used by Fagan et al. (2001) to construct the Area- 
Wide Model for the Euro Area. As the last data set ends in 1998: 4 we extend 
the time series by adding the values reported in the ECB Monthly Bulletin. 
The estimated model is a trivariate VAR of the form: 
Xt = A(L)Xt_1 + Ct (3.1) 
where the vector Xt contains the following variables: 
Xt = [Wt 7rt it] 
In model (3.1), A(L) is a polynomial lag of order four; Wt is the output 
gap, measured as a percentage gap between actual real industrial production 
and potential industrial production2; 7rt, the inflation rate, is the percentage 
2Potential output was computed by using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. As we 
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of the annual HICP inflation rate, i. e. 100 (log HICPt - log HICPt_4) and 
it is the short term interest rate. 
The model is identified by assuming a recursive structure. The variables 
are ordered as output gap, inflation rate and nominal interest rate. As the 
monetary instrument is the last variable, it implies that monetary authorities 
can react to changes in output gap and inflation, but it is not able to affect 
the other variables within the same quarter. This structure is consistent 
with the general assumption that real markets do not instantaneously react 
to monetary policy actions. The timing of the model can be summarized as 
follows. A shock to monetary policy instruments in period t affects output 
with one period lag. In period t+1 the aggregate supply change resulting 
from the slightly decreasing in inflation rate leads to a fall in output gap 
through the real interest rate channel3. 
We check the non-linearity of the residuals by using three of the most 
popular tests. Specifically, we apply the BDS, the Engle and Tsay test to 
the residuals of each equation in the VAR system, i. e. the output gap, the 
inflation rate and the interest rate. The null hypothesis for these tests is 
that the residual generating process is linear. Table 3.1 to 3.3 show the 
results. 
have quarterly data, we set the smoothing parameter to 1600 as in Kydland and Prescott 
(1990). 
3We keep this particular causal order also in the 1\1S-VAR analysis. 
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Eumn Area 
Outp ut Gap Inflation Interest Rate 
Dimension Asymptotic Bootstrap Asymptotic Bootstrap Asymptotic Bootstrap 
2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.069 0.103 
3 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.023 
4 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 
United Kingdom 
Outp ut Gap Inflation Interest Rate 
Dimension Asymptotic Bootstrap Asymptotic Bootstrap Asymptotic Bootstrap 
2 0.006 0.021 0.000 0.004 0.741 0.876 
3 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.043 0.061 
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.014 
Table 3.1: BDS Test statistics 
Eum Area 
Output Gap Inflation Interest Rate 
Using up to lag 1 0.001 0.000 0.071 
Using up to lag 2 0.003 0.000 0.027 
Using up to lag 3 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Using up to lag 4 0.006 0.000 0.000 
United Kingdom 
Output Gap Inflation Interest Rate 
Using up to lag 1 0.408 0.221 0.588 
Using up to lag 2 0.055 0.045 0.068 
Using up to lag 3 0.075 0.067 0.015 
Using up to lag 4 0.634 0.001 0.381 
Table 3.2: Engle Test 
Output Gap Inflation Interest Rate 
Eum Area 0.015 0.010 0.068 
United Kingdom 0.034 0.038 0.041 
Table 3.3: Tsay Test 
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The tables report, for each equation from the VAR, the p-values under 
the null hypothesis that the corresponding residual is a serially i. i. d. process. 
Table 3.1 also reports the bootstrapped p-values for the BDS test statistic. 
All tests reject the null hypothesis of a linear generating mechanism for the 
residuals in the Euro Area. For the United Kingdom the BDS and the Tsay 
test fully reject the linear hypothesis while the Engle test rejects the null 
only for some lags. 
The analysis altogether suggests the presence of non-linearity in the 
residuals. This evidence corroborates the decision of estimating the model 
in non-linear form. 
3.3 Estimation Issues 
The asymmetric behaviour of the monetary authorities is investigated by 
estimating a multivariate extension of Hamilton's (1989) Markov-switching 
model. In the MS-VAR framework, the shocks to the interest rate policy 
rule followed by the monetary authorities are allowed to influence both the 
growth rate of output and the transition probabilities of moving from one 
phase to another. 
The asymmetry of the effects is captured by allowing for state-dependent 
parameters where the latent state variable follows a Markov switching process. 
The idea behind this class of models, is that the parameters of the under- 
lying data generating process of the observed time series vector Xt depend 
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upon the unobservable regime variable st, which represents the probability 
of being in a different state of the world. 
This variable st is governed by a discrete state of a Markov stochastic 
process, which is defined by the following transition probabilities: 
pik = Pr(st+l =ji st = i) 
P11 P12 Plm 
P21 P22 P2m 
Pmt Pmt Pmm 
where pik is the probability that state i is followed by state j and P is 
the correspondent transition matrix. 4 
The two states MS(m)-VAR(p) model can be represented as follows: 
I vi + AiiXt-i + ... + ApiXt-p + Biul if at =1 
Xt = (3.2) 
V2 + Ai2Xt-i + ... + 
Ap2Xt_p + B2u2 if st =2 
where Xt = [Wt 7rt it]' is the vector of the endogenous variables ; vl and 
v2 are the vectors of intercepts respectively in state 1 and 2; All """ Apt are 
the matrices of the coefficients in the state 1; A12 """ Ape are the matrices of 
the coefficients in the state 2; B1.. B2 are respectively the structural matrix5 
in state 1 and in state 2; ul and u2 are the errors respectively in the state 
1 and state 2 distributed as NN (0,11S). ' 
When the process is in regime 1 (expansion), the observed vector of 
variables Xt is presumed to have been drawn from a N(µ1, Sl) distribution. 
4Note that pll+p12 ......... +p1m =1 
5These matrices describe the relationship between endogenous variables within each 
regime. 
65 is the Variance-Covariance matrix in the state s and m is the number of the states. 
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If the process is in regime 2 (recession), then it is drawn from a N(µ2,92). 
This means that, given the order of the endogenous variables, the last 
equation in the system corresponds to the backward-looking version of the 
regime-dependent Taylor rule. 
In the empirical applications not all the parameters are conditioned on 
the state of the Markov chain. Usually, just some of them are regime de- 
pendent. Depending on which parameters are allowed to switch a great 
variety of specifications arise. These specifications are named in different 
ways. In this work a Markov switching intercept heteroskedasticity VAR- 
model (MSIH(m)-VAR(p)) is used. This means that, while the vector of the 
intercepts and the variance-covariance matrix are allowed to switch within 
regimes, the autoregressive coefficients are state invariant. In addition, the 
homoskedasticity assumption of the residuals is relaxed. 
The optimal lag length is checked by computing three classical tests, i. e. 
AIC, SC, HC. The lag length is chosen, for both countries, to be one in order 
to ensure the non serially correlation of the residuals (see figure in appendix 
3.1). This choice is supported by one (the SC criteria) of the three tests we 
implemented to assess the optimal lag length. Table 3.4 shows the results 
of the tests. 
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Lag length AIC HQ SC 
EMU 
1 3.00 3.47 4.18 
2 2.55 3.25 4.29 
3 3.11 4.03 5.43 
4 3.12 4.28 6.03 
United Kingdom 
1 5.95 6.37 6.99 
2 5.57 6.19 7.13 
3 5.68 6.52 7.76 
4 5.66 6.71 8.26 
Table 3.4: Lag Analysis 
We re-estimated the model with two lags in order to check the robustness 
of the results. The qualitative results of the analysis remain unchanged 
whether we use one or two lags. 
The population of parameters in a MSIH-VAR is given by 0= (µl, µ21 h i, 522,71,7r2). 
In a n-dimensional MS(m)-VAR(p) model where all parameters are regime 
dependent the number of switching parameters is equal to (Y and the num- 
ber of parameters 0 to be estimated is then equal to * m. In this case, 
the total number of parameters to be estimated is 278 as Xt is a three 
dimensional vector and the autoregressive coefficients are time-invariant. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of 0 is based on the implementation of 
74) is equal to n(number of intercepts) +(n x n)p (number of autoregressive coefficients) 
+ (n x (n + 1)/2) number of elements in the variance covariance matrix 
8In such a case 4*m is equal to [3(number of intercepts)+6(number of elements 
of the variance-covariance matrix)]*2(the number of states)+9(invariant autoregressive 
coefficients) 
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the Expectation Maximization problem9 proposed by Hamilton (1990)'° 
This algorithm, introduced by Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977), is de- 
signed for a general class of models where the observed time series depend 
on some unobservable stochastic variables. For a MS-VAR model these are 
the regime variables st. 
Once we have estimated" the model we compute the transition proba- 
bilities of moving from one state to another for the UK and the Euro Area. 
As the estimated process follows a 2-state Markov chain, it is possible to 
collect the transition probabilities in a (2 x 2) transition matrix: 
Euro Area 
ý, 
=r0.828 
0.049 
L 0.171 0.950 
United Kingdom 
0.786 0.065 
0.213 0.934 
The elements on the main diagonal of the transition matrices suggest that 
the estimated regimes are very persistent. From the estimated transition 
probabilities one can easily derive the expected duration of an expansion as: 
00 
zpil l ll - pll) pu)-1 
z=1 
Similarly, the expected duration of a recession is: 
00 
zp221(1 - P22) = li - P22)-1 
z=1 
9For further details about the maximization problem see appendix 3.2 
'°For this class of model an overview on alternative numerical techniques for the maxi- 
mum likelihood estimation of VAR(b1)-MS(p) model is given in Krolzig(1997b). 
', All estimations were done with MSVAR package for OX. 
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The expected duration of both recessions and expansions12 are reported 
in table 3.5. 
Euro Area United Kingdom 
Recession 5,83 4,69 
Expansion 20,24 15,33 
Table 3.5: Expected Duration 
Table 3.5 suggests that the degree of inertia of the two regimes is very 
different. There is a significant asymmetry between the average length of 
expansions and recessions, the latter much shorter than the former, which 
is to be expected of classical cycles in a growing economy. 
This result is consistent with the evidence coming from previous studies, 
such as Artis and Krolzig (1999), on the asymmetries between booms and 
recession. The average durations of expansion are 15.33 and 20.24 quarters 
for the United Kingdom and the Euro Area, respectively. This means that 
the Euro Area tends to have a longer cycle than the UK although, the 
differences are not great. 
The smoothed probabilities together with the output growth are depicted 
in figure 3.1 and figure 3.2. The shaded area represents the time path of 
smoothed probabilities of being in recession, while the solid line is the quar- 
terly output growth. The figures demonstrate the ability of the estimated 
12 See appendix 3.3 for the proof. 
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model in capturing the historical business cycles features. Consistent with 
the results of the traditional business cycle dating analysis, the years 1986, 
1990-92,1996 and 1998-99 are identified as periods of recession. The consis- 
tency of the estimated business cycles can be also checked by looking at the 
time path of the two series in the figures. Specifically, when the probability 
of being in recession is relatively high the output growth is lower than zero. 
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Figure 3.1: Output Growth and Recession Probabilities in the Euro Area 
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Figure 3.2: Output Growth and Recession Probabilities in United Kingdom 
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3.4 Regime-dependent Reaction Function 
Most of the literature on monetary policy reaction function models the cen- 
tral bank behaviour with a linear reaction function, that is by construction 
symmetric over the different phases of the business cycle. As stressed above, 
this procedure neglects the possibility for the monetary authorities to cali- 
brate their action on the state of the economies. 
In order to fill this gap this chapter allows for switching monetary rules 
within regimes. The reaction function considered in the analysis is a classical 
Taylor rule of the following form: 
it = i* + ai(7rt - lr*) + a2(yt - y*) + vt (3.3) 
where i* is the steady-state value of nominal interest rate, lrt is the 
current value of inflation rate, rc*is the target value for annual inflation rate 
while the term (yt - y*) represents the output gap, i. e. the deviation of the 
current output from its potential value. Usually this rule is estimated as: 
it = ao + aiirt + a2yt + Vt (3.4) 
where ao = i* - allr*, and Wt = (yt - y*) 
Nevertheless, we consider a backward-looking version of the classical 
Taylor rule in order to derive the monetary policy reaction function from 
the MS-VAR13: 
"In our model, the last equation in the system represents the Taylor rule, as we consider 
only one lag, i. e. n=1. 
3.4. REGIME-DEPENDENT REACTION FUNCTION 103 
nnn 
it =k+ Nj7rt-j + 
1: 
Yj7t-j + Pjit-j + Vt (3.5) 
j=1 j=1 j=1 
The estimated monetary rules and related standard errors for the Euro 
Area are: 
Regime 1 it = 0.272 + 0.17irt_1 + 0.08yt_l + 0.9it_1 
[S. E 0.01821 [S. E 0.0912) [S. E. 0.02901) [S. E. 0.0738) 
Regime 2 it = 2.0 +0.327rt_1 + 0.19yt_i + 0.59it_1 
[S. E 0.7341] [S. E 0.07971 [S. E. 0.04751 [S. E. 0.0101] 
while the estimated reaction functions for United Kingdom are: 
Regime 1 it = 0.259 + 0.25irt_1 + 0.16yt_1 + 0.85it_1 
[S. E 3.16E-011 [S. E 0.065] [S. E. 0.098] [S. E. 0.0733] 
Regime 2 it = 3.19 + 0.283irt_i + 0.37yt_1 + 0.5it_1 
IS. E 1.0137] [S. E 9.34E-021 [S. E. 0.0113] [S. E. 0.01285] 
These rules capture the criteria used by the central banks to set the short- 
term interest rate depending on the state of the economy. Having estimated 
the regime-dependent reaction functions it is then possible to compute the 
long-run response coefficients as follows: 
nn 
r, 
Nj 
E-yj 
k j=1 j=1 
ao 
n ; 
al =n ia2= n 
Epj Epj Epj 
j=1 j=1 j=1 
The corresponding long-run response coefficients are shown in Table 3.6. 
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Regime 1 (Recession) Regime 2 (Expansion) 
Inflation Output Gap Inflation Output Gap 
Euro Area 1.82 0.803 0.8 0.48 
United Kingdom 1.8 1.19 0.54 0.72 
Table 3.6: Long-run Response Coefficients 
The differences concerning the dimension of the inflation and the output 
gap response coefficients might depend on a particular state of the economy 
the central bank faces. The results suggest that there is alternation between 
periods of aggressive reaction to the state of the economy and periods of less 
aggressive response. The aggressive type of policy seems to be more asso- 
ciated with periods of low output growth. By contrast, during expansions 
the monetary authorities seem to react to the economic developments, in a 
less aggressive way. 
The estimated long-run response coefficients can be also used to compare 
the behaviour the two central banks demonstrate during contractions and 
booms. In fact, having estimated a regime dependent reaction function is 
possible to check the inflation target each rule implies. 
As ao - i* - al7r*, and i* = r* + lr*, the implied inflation target can be 
recovered as follows: 
*=r*-ao 
al-1 
where r* is the long run equilibrium real interest rate (if the sample is 
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sufficiently long we can use the sample average). 
Table 3.7 reports the computed targets for the two central banks. 
Regime 1 Regime 2 
Inflation target Inflation target 
Euro Area 1.77 3.03 
United Kingdom 2.56 5.10 
Table 3.7: Comparison between Estimated Target Inflation Rate 
Note: Estimates of 7r* for United Kingdom and Euro Area assume that long-run equilibrium 
real interest rates are equal to 3.87 and 4.35 respectively. 
The estimated inflation targets can be better understood if we take into 
account the general framework followed by the ECB and the Bank of Eng- 
land. In fact, the monetary strategies of the two central banks adhere to 
different frameworks. In particular, the ECB adhere to a model of "nar- 
row" central bank, i. e. the German model, rather than to a "broad" central 
bank, i. e. the Anglo-Saxon one. This means that the ECB designs its own 
strategy with the sole aim of achieving price stability. On the contrary, the 
Bank of England following the "broad" central bank framework can pursue 
several targets. Financial supervision, output and unemployment stabiliza- 
tion as well as exchange rate pegging are all targets a broad central bank 
may attempt to achieve. 
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It is then not surprising to observe the different size of the inflation 
targets described in table 3.7. 
In particular, during recession both central banks seem to set the interest 
rate in order to achieve a lower level of inflation target, in comparison with 
the estimated targets the central banks pursue during expansion. In fact, 
while during booms the estimated targets are 3% and 5.1% for the Euro 
Area and the UK respectively, in recession times those coefficients almost 
halve: the ECB is estimated to set its inflation target at 1.77% while the 
Bank of England targets its inflation rate at 2.56%. Moreover, the results 
suggest that, independently from the phases of the business cycle, a narrow 
central bank achieves a lower level of inflation target. 
3.5 Simulation 
After estimating the model, it is now possible to apply the impulse response 
analysis. The natural object of this analysis is to measure the time profile of 
the incremental effect of variables' innovation on the future state of the econ- 
omy. Unlike the linear case, we allow the impulse response functions to be 
regime dependent. This means that we capture the asymmetric effects that 
the central bank interventions might have on the real economy, conditional 
on a given regime dominant at the time the disturbances occurred. 
The use of the impulse response functions in the analysis requires a priori 
identification of the fundamental disturbances in the system. The identifica- 
tion problem is faced by imposing a recursive structure to the economy. The 
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restricted model allows for a simultaneous feedback from monetary variables 
to macroeconomics variables but not the vice versa. This kind of identifica- 
tion implies that the shock to a variable has only contemporaneous effects 
on the variable itself, and the variables ordered below it. The resulting lower 
triangular matrix is exactly identified14 
In the single state case, the matrix B is obtained from the Choleski 
decomposition of the estimated variance-covariance matrix 1 of the unre- 
stricted VAR: 
S2 = E(BututB) = BE(utu )B' = BIkB' = BB' 
In a MS-VAR model the variance-covariance matrix is regime dependent 
and consequently the matrix B. The Choleski decomposition is then as 
follows: 
SZs = E(Butu Bs) = B8E(utut)Bs = BsIkB' = BSBs 
In each regime the vectors of the fundamental disturbances are pre- 
multiplied by the regime dependent matrix Bs which describes the relation- 
ship between the endogenous variables in the system. 
The estimated responses to a 1%, i. e. contractionary, monetary policy 
shocks are reported in figure 3.3 and figure 3.4. In these figures the first 
column refers to regime 1 while the second column synthesizes the result of 
14This is achieved by imposing K(K - 1)/2 exclusion restrictions above the main diag- 
onal of the structural matrix B. Where K is the number of variables. As in the estimated 
system K is equal to three we impose three restrictions. 
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regime 2. Each response is provided with the associated asymptotic confi- 
dence bands. 
In both the UK and the Euro Area the patterns of the responses appear 
to be very similar. A positive monetary policy shock leads, in both regimes, 
to a decrease in output gap and inflation. 
The output gap shows, after an initial delay, a hump-shaped response. 
This particular pattern of output gap reaction, is in line with many previ- 
ous studies conducted with standard VAR models on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism 15 
An important feature of the specified MS-VAR model consists of not 
generating the so-called price puzzle. This puzzle refers to a situation in 
which a contractionary monetary policy shock results in an increase in infla- 
tion. On the contrary, in our models, inflation slightly falls after a monetary 
shock. Moreover, consistent with the presence of some degree of nominal 
rigidities, the inflation response is initially very small. 
The different timing and size concerning the real economy response 
across the Euro Area and the United Kingdom are depicted in Figure 3.3 
and Figure 3.4. Table 3.8 summarizes the results. 
The table describes the average response and the minimum level reached 
by output gap and inflation rate, after a monetary policy shock. In the third 
column it is also represented the number of periods output and inflation take 
to reach their minimum level, i. e. the period after shock where the maximum 
15See Christiano et al. (1998) and Peersman and Smets (2001) for example. 
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effect occurred. 
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Response Analysis for Euro Area 
3.5. SIMULATION 
Recession 
0.25 
0.00 
-0.25 
-0.50 
-0.75 
V. ' 
0.0 
-0.5 
-1A 
to 
vutpuc "ap 
5 10 15 20 25 
0.00 
-0.25 
-0.50 
Inflation Rate 
r\ 
1\ 
ý\ 
-ýý-----ý 
Interest Rate 
0.5- 
OD 
1 ý 
` r -Os ýf 
-0s -1A 
5 10 15 20 25 30 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Figure 3.4: Impulse Response Analysis for UK 
OA 
-03 
111 
Expansion 
u urpur ap 
/ice 
1ý 
1 
1 
5 10 15 20 25 
Inflation Rate 
ýý 
., 
5 
Interest Rate 
112 CHAPTER 3. DO CENTRAL BANKS ACT ASYMMETRICALLY? 
Output Gap 
Average Minimum Time to Maximum Effect 
Euro Area Regime 1 -0.145 -0.649 5 
Regime 2 -0.089 -0.408 10 
United Kingdom Regime 1 -0.094 -0.359 6 
Regime 2 0.045 -0.162 2 
Inflation Rate 
Average Minimum Time to Maximum Effect 
Euro Area Regime 1 -0.084 -0.229 6 
Regime 2 -0.356 -0.788 14 
United Kingdom Regime 1 -0.045 -0.145 9 
Regime 2 -0.256 -0.802 7 
Table 3.8: Impulse Response Asymmetries 
Common to the UK and the Euro Area, the results document significant 
negative effects on output gap of a rise in the interest rate during periods of 
below-average growth. 
Some differences arise from the timing of the responses. During recession, 
the maximum effect of the monetary tight is experienced in the Euro Area. 
Table 3.8 shows a decrease of -0.649 that occurs after 5 periods. In the 
United Kingdom the minimum level of the output gap is -0.359 and this 
happens after 6 quarters. The situation is different during expansion. In 
the Euro Area the output gap takes 10 quarter to reach its lowest level 
(-0.408), while in the UK the greatest effect on output (-0.162) happens 
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after 2 periods. 
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Asymmetries arise also when considering the dynamic pattern of the in- 
flation rate after monetary shock. In both countries positive shocks have 
a larger negative effect on inflation rate in time of expansion than during 
recession. However, in the Euro Area the decrease in inflation rate, -0.22 
after 6 quarters, is greater and quicker than the one estimated for the United 
Kingdom (-0.14 after 9 periods). The situation is opposite when consid- 
ering the expansionary periods: in the UK the minimum incremental effect 
(-0.802) happens after 7 quarters while in the Euro Area the effects are 
slower (14 periods) and smaller (-0.788). 
The obvious implication that arises from the impulse response analysis 
is that an interest rate increase will have a larger (negative) effect on output 
gap during recessions than in booms. Consequently, when monetary au- 
thorities show an increase in the interest rate during expansion, it will not 
have the same recessionary effect on real economy. These results confirm 
those derived in theoretical models assuming price rigidities and implying a 
convex supply curve. 
The size and the timing of those effects mostly depend on the strategy a 
central bank follows. In general, monetary authorities can follow two types 
of frameworks. In the first one, the central bank only aims at achieving price 
stability. This framework is followed by the ECB. In the second one, a central 
bank can pursue several objectives like price stability, output stability and 
low unemployment. The Bank of England adheres to the latter framework. 
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The choice of a particular model influences the way through which a central 
bank affects the real economy. In particular, a central bank that only targets 
inflation, like the ECB, has a greater and quicker change in output during 
recession than a central bank that targets several variables, like the Bank of 
England, that has quicker but smaller output reaction during expansion. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The chapter analysed whether monetary authorities asymmetrically affect 
the real economy depending on the phases of the business cycle. 
Asymmetric effects are a common feature of many theoretical models. In 
the literature there are many different versions of such asymmetries. They 
might be related to the direction of monetary policy action, or to the size 
of the monetary change, or to the position of the business cycle. In this 
chapter, we investigated the asymmetries due to the position of the business 
cycle. In particular, we measured the likely effects of monetary policy actions 
on output and inflation using a multivariate extension of Hamilton's regime 
switching model. 
The empirical analysis was organized as follows. 
We estimated a regime dependent Taylor rule in order to account for 
the different phases of the business cycle; then, we analyzed how monetary 
policy shocks are transmitted to the output gap and inflation in the United 
Kingdom and the Euro Area. 
The empirical evidence coming from the estimated models corroborated 
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the existence of asymmetries in the conduct of central banks. 
The estimated Taylor rules for the UK and the Euro Area led to the 
following conclusions. 
First, the two central banks have a more aggressive behaviour in recession 
rather than in expansion. In fact, the response coefficients in both countries 
are higher in regime 1 than in regime 2. This result was also confirmed by 
the estimated inflation targets. In both countries the implied targets are 
significantly higher in expansion than in recession. _ 
Second, the reaction function of the Bank of England shows a higher 
output gap response coefficient. This supports the common belief that the 
Bank of England contemporaneously targets output and inflation. More- 
over, the occurrence of a switch in regime, seems to affect both inflation 
and output gap response coefficients: they are greater in recession than in 
expansion. 
Third, the ECB seems to be more sensitive to the inflation dynamic. 
The response coefficients of the inflation and output gap in expansion are 
greater in recession in comparison with the ones obtained in expansion. 
Nevertheless, the ECB output gap reaction seems to be lower with respect to 
the one estimated for the Bank of England. This confirms that the primary 
goal of the ECB consists of achieving price stability. 
Some interesting results also came from the impulse response analysis. 
First of all, the models appeared to perform quite well. No price puzzles 
have been detected in the simulations. In general, an interest rate shock 
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leads to a larger effect on the output gap during recession than during ex- 
pansion. In other words the interest rate has a greater influence on output 
when past growth has been high than when past growth has been normal 
or negative. 
We also provided a comparison of the impact of monetary policy shock 
in different regimes. 
Common to the UK and the Euro Area, the results highlight significant 
negative effects of an increase in interest rate, during recessionary periods. 
Some differences arise from the size and the timing of the responses. The 
patterns of the responses are supposed to be depending upon the particular 
strategy followed by the central bank. A central bank that primarily aims 
at achieving price stability, like the ECB, has a greater and quicker output 
response during recession than a central bank that targets several variables, 
like the Bank of England, that, in contrast, has quicker but smaller output 
reaction during expansion. 
Altogether the analysis strongly suggests that the stage of the business 
cycle is important in the monetary policy decision process. A central bank 
cannot neglect the specific regime where the monetary action takes place. 
The obvious implication that arises from the impulse response analysis 
is that an interest rate increase will have a larger (negative) effect on output 
gap during recessions than in booms. Consequently, a tight monetary policy 
will not have the same negative effect on the real economy during expansion. 
Chapter 4 
Modelling Confidence in the 
Euro Area 
This chapter aims to model the main determinants of the confidence of 
economic agents in the euro area. In particular, it measures the impact of 
the labour market conditions, the stock market developments and interest 
rates on consumer and business confidence. The study is articulated in two 
parts. We estimate two models, respectively for the survey indicators of 
consumer confidence and of business confidence. The analysis relies on the 
use of multivariate econometric techniques. Specifically, we use a structural 
VAR and a dynamic simultaneous equations model. Empirical results show 
that models are well-behaving. Impulse response analysis suggests that the 
main determinants of consumer confidence are labour market conditions and 
interest rates. Empirical evidence for business confidence shows that this 
indicator is strongly affected by economic conditions in the United States. 
Industrial production and labour market conditions in the Euro Area play 
an important role in the short term. 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses how the general economic environment affects con- 
sumer and business confidence in the euro area, with a focus on the role of 
monetary policy. 
The literature analyzing what drives economic confidence is rather poor. 
Among the few papers attempting to model confidence, most focus on the 
causal relationship from one factor to consumer confidence. Moreover, it 
seems that there has not been any published study attempting to model the 
business confidence indicator. 
The contribution of the chapter with respect to the existing literature 
is two-fold. First, it expressly specifies a model for the business confidence 
indicator. Second, it uses a structural multivariate framework in order to 
account for the interactions of several factors a priori determining confidence 
indicators. 
The chapter is articulated in two parts, respectively proposing a model 
for consumer and business confidence. Specifically, the models are a struc- 
tural VAR for consumer confidence, and a dynamic simultaneous equation 
framework for business confidence. The models are estimated for the overall 
indices as well as for their sub-components (i. e. the indices corresponding 
to the individual questions in the surveys). In the absence of an existing 
theoretical framework, we select a priori the factors determining consumer 
and business confidence based on experience and previous analysis. The 
importance of these factors is then tested empirically, by analyzing their 
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impact on the confidence indicators. 
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A priori analysis suggests labour market conditions, stock market de- 
velopments and interest rates as possible determining factors for consumer 
confidence. In addition to these factors, industrial production is consid- 
ered for the model of business confidence, together with variables capturing 
external developments. Such external factors are an indicator of business 
confidence in the United States, the price of oil and the exchange rate of the 
euro. 
Regarding the results for consumer confidence, the study suggests that it 
is mainly driven by labour market developments in the Euro Area (measured 
by the change in the unemployment rate). The real short-term interest rate 
is likely to play a key role in the long run. In contrast to results from other 
studies, the chapter shows that the role of stock market developments is 
significant, albeit less important with respect to the other factors. 
Regarding the results for business confidence, the dominating factor 
among the variables chosen in our model is business confidence in the United 
States. Among the endogenous variables, industrial production seems to 
have a significant effect in the short run, but negligible compared to the 
external factor just mentioned. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the motivation 
and the conceptual framework. Section 4.3 briefly describes the existing 
literature. Section 4.4 describes the applied econometric technique. Then, 
it estimates the model for the consumer confidence indicator and discusses 
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the results of the dynamic and the sub-components analysis. Section 4.5 
applies the same analysis to the Business Confidence indicator. Section 4.6 
concludes. 
4.2 Motivation and conceptual framework 
4.2.1 Motivation 
The confidence of economic agents plays a key role for economic growth. 
Policy-makers often argue along these lines. In addition, business cycle 
analysts and forecasters closely monitor confidence indicators. Although 
economic confidence receives a wide interest in practice, the literature is 
quite scarce on this issue. 
This holds especially true for the impact of monetary policy decisions 
on confidence. The literature on the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy typically ignores the possibility of a "confidence channel", through 
which central banks' interest rate decisions would also channel to eventually 
affect economic activity. Even though it is possible to argue for the existence 
of such a channel in addition to those commonly reviewed in the literature. ' 
However, it may not be surprising that the literature does not consider 
a specific "confidence channel", given that the effectiveness of this channel 
'For instance, P. McAdam and J. Morgan (2003) identified an income/cash flow chan- 
nel; a wealth channel; a direct interest rate channel on consumption; a cost of capital 
channel; and an exchange rate channel. Other papers also identify an "expectations 
channel", which is related to confidence but only to a small extent. In this channel, a 
commitment by the policy-maker to alter the level of future interest rates in response to 
a current shock affects current spending, so that the current interest rate needs to be 
changed less in order to stabilise output and inflation (Bean, Larsen and Nikolov, 2003). 
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is a priori not clear. In particular, it is not necessarily the case that a cut 
in interest rates would boost confidence, and thereby have positive effects 
on economic growth. ' For example, a reduction in policy interest rates can 
be perceived as a signal of low confidence in the economic outlook, on the 
part of the monetary policy authorities. This would affect negatively the 
confidence of households and investors. Such counter-intuitive effects could 
take place under special circumstances. 3 Furthermore, a policy of keeping 
interest rates unchanged (policy of the "steady-hand") may contribute to a 
monetary environment that is favorable for economic confidence. 4 
Empirical studies produced by various kinds of institutions (including 
central banks) are numerous concerning the role of confidence indicators for 
economic activity. In this respect, it is generally recognized that survey 
indicators of confidence have a leading property for economic activity. In 
particular, consumer confidence has a leading role for private consumption, 
2 The study of non-linearities in the impact of monetary policy decisions on confidence, 
and of the role of a "steady hand" attitude from monetary policy authorities for confidence 
are both left for future research. 
3 Non-linear effects may also be related to the credibility of the central bank. For in- 
stance, a cut in policy rates may dampen the confidence in the central bank's commitment 
to preserving price stability, while an increase in policy interest rates may be seen as help- 
ing to restore the agents' confidence in the central banks' commitment to pursue price 
stability. 
4 Central banks, and especially the ECB, have often argued that monetary policy con- 
tributes to economic stability by keeping a steady hand on interest rates (i. e. keeping 
interest rates unchanged). It is obviously difficult to measure empirically the effects of 
such a policy, given the resulting limited variability in the series of interest rates. How- 
ever, this problem may be partly overcome by using the deviation of the real interest rate 
from its 'natural' or 'equilibrium' level. This real interest rate gap provides a measure 
the monetary policy stance, which could fruitfully replace the actual real interest rate in 
a model designed to analyse the impact of monetary policy on confidence. Obviously, the 
variability in the series of the real rate gap depends on that of the estimate chosen for the 
natural level of interest, which is typically highly model-dependent. 
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and business confidence has a leading role for industrial production, which 
is even stronger than the latter. 
The literature analyzing confidence from the opposite perspective, i. e. 
what drives economic confidence instead of what is the effect of confidence 
on economic activity, is rather poor. Among the few papers attempting at 
modelling confidence, most are focused on the causal relationship from one 
factor (usually developments in stock markets, and more rarely in the labour 
market) to consumer confidence. Moreover, asalready mentioned, it seems 
that there has not been any published study attempting at modelling the 
business confidence indicator. 
This chapter attempts at contributing to filling this gap. Understand- 
ing what drives confidence is indeed crucial for interpreting the confidence 
indicators themselves, and hence for concluding on their explanatory power 
for future economic activity. A better understanding of the determinants 
of confidence is also crucial for policy decision-making. 5 In particular, a 
better understanding of the impact of monetary policy on the confidence of 
economic agents can help policy-makers in taking decisions on interest rates 
and in their communication with the public. 
5While the literature on confidence is poor in the field of monetary policy, the fiscal 
policy literature has addressed the role of confidence to a large extent. The confidence 
of economic agents in the sustainability of public finances plays a key role in the non- 
linearities sometimes observed in the way fiscal policies affect economic activity (e. g. a 
budgetary consolidation may not necessary lead to a decline in output). 
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4.2.2 Conceptual framework 
The first issue addressed in this chapter is to determine the main factors 
possibly influencing confidence. While recognizing an influential role from 
political factors (such as terrorist attacks and speeches of policy-makers 
6) on economic confidence, this chapter focuses on the possible economic 
determinants. Given the absence of a theoretical framework describing what 
drives economic confidence, we use several means to identify the possible 
key determinants of confidence. These include the theory on consumption 
and investment, a review of the literature on economic confidence, and an 
examination of the questionnaire used to construct the confidence indicators. 
In addition, a graphical analysis of the possible factors identified in this way 
help check their potential relevance. 
In this process, we select the labour market conditions, the developments 
in stock markets and interest rates as the potential key determinants of 
confidence, especially consumer confidence. 
Labour market conditions are a traditional indicator of the economic 
health of the country. A high unemployment rate is usually associated with 
a low level of consumer confidence. Consumers who lose their jobs curtail 
spending in response to the loss of income, while the others who remain em- 
ployed may curtail spending in anticipation of future job losses. As a result, 
even small increases in unemployment may lead to a significant decline in 
6See Alan Garner, "Consumer confidence after September 11", for a description of 
the effects on consumer confidence in United States after the terrorist attack on 11th 
September, 2001 
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consumer confidence. We measure labour market conditions with the change 
in the unemployment rate rather than its level for two reasons. The first 
is its higher correlation compared to the level variable with the consumer 
confidence index. The second is the non-stationarity of the variable in level. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship between Confidence and the remaining 
variables in the system. 
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Figure 4.1. The plots of the variables in the consumer confidence model 
Each chart plots the consumer confidence index (values on the left-hand 
side) against one of the variables in the model (dotted line; corresponding 
scale on the right-hand side)'. Specifically, chart 2 draws the Consumer 
7NVe label with: 
D_URX --+ The change of the unemployment rate 
4.2. MOTIVATION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 125 
Confidence index against the first difference of the unemployment rate. The 
graphical analysis clearly implies a negative relationship between the two 
variables, which is particularly strong at the beginning and at the end of 
the sample. 
The linkage between the (real) rate of interest rate and confidence seems 
to be more uncertain. This may be related to the fact that cuts (respec- 
tively increases in) policy interest rates might not necessarily lead to a drop 
(respectively an increase) in the confidence of economic agents, as it theoret- 
ically does on economic activity. As discussed in the introductory section, 
decisions to keep policy rates unchanged might also have an impact on con- 
fidence, while counter-intuitive (or non-linear) effects may also take place 
in special circumstances. In addition, it cannot be expected that the rela- 
tionship between interest rates and confidence is as clear as in the case of 
economic activity, given the absence of a very close link between consumer 
(respectively business) confidence and consumption (respectively business 
investment or production). In other terms, such an assumption may be too 
strong to draw any clear conclusions on the expected impact of interest rates 
on confidence from their theoretical impact on economic activity. 
However, in the absence of other relevant framework, the effects of inter- 
est rates as implied by standard theory of consumption and growth might 
be the best departure point for studying the impact of interest rates on 
R STir --+ Real Short Term interest rate 
PER --+ Price- earning ratio 
EC-cons --+ Consumer Confidence Indicator 
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confidence. 
In this respect, it is commonly argued that a rise in the real interest rate 
implies that consumption and investment (economic activity) are ceteris 
paribus discouraged and saving is encouraged. The opposite holds true for a 
decline in the real rate. More specifically, in an inter-temporal consumption 
model, an increase in the rate of interest leads to a decrease in the level of 
consumption. (In a model with two periods (e. g. Fisher model), an increase 
in the rate of interest rate typically leads to a postponement of consumption 
decisions to time t+2). It may be argued that this effects channels through 
consumer confidence, at least in part (see Section 4.4). Similarly, an increase 
in interest rates should affect industrial confidence negatively, since it raises 
the cost of borrowing, thereby reducing the firms' profit margins. It may 
be argued that this lowers the level of the firms' confidence and ultimately, 
investment and production (see Section 4.5). For the opposite reason, a 
decrease in interest rates can normally be expected to affect (consumer and 
business) confidence positively. 
In our model, monetary policy is captured by a measure of the real short- 
term interest rate, which is the main variable through which the monetary 
authority affects the macro-economy, through its decisions on policy rates. 
In a preliminary analysis, we verified that, among other interest rates (long 
term interest rate, real long-term interest rate, nominal short-term inter- 
est rate), the real short term interest rate performs better in terms of the 
magnitude and expected sign of its impact on confidence indicators. Chart 
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3 in figure 4.1 plots the consumer confidence index against the real short- 
term interest rate. Over the whole sample, the chart shows only a moderate 
inverse relationship between the two variables. The negative correlation is 
strong until the end of 1995, but becomes less clear since then. 
In principle, stock market developments can affect consumption directly 
via three main channels, namely that of wealth, balance sheets and con- 
sumer confidence. The idea of a possible confidence channel in the trans- 
mission of stock market developments to consumption has been proposed 
by Poterba and Samwick. The triangular relationship between stock mar- 
ket developments, consumer confidence and consumption is frequently found 
in the press, in particular at times when stock markets experience sudden 
slumps (Kremer and Westermann, 2004). The link is twofold. Households 
perceive the changes in the stock market developments as implying changes 
in their personal finances and in the general economic environment. In our 
model, stock market developments are captured by the price-earnings ratio 
in the Euro Area stock market rather than by a stock index measuring share 
prices, which is clearly non-stationary (and would therefore lead to bias the 
estimates in our models of confidence). The graphical analysis suggests a 
positive relationship between the price earnings ratio and both consumer 
and business confidence indicators, as well as a predictive power of the price 
earnings ratio. - 
For the business confidence model, additional variables have been used in 
comparison to the consumer confidence model, which include the growth rate 
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of industrial production (smoothed over a quarter) as well as external factors, 
such as a measure of business confidence in the United States (the Chicago 
PMI), the price of oil and the euro exchange rate (in nominal effective terms). 
The variables are plotted in Figure 4.28: 
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Figure 4.2. The plots of the variables against the Business Confidence 
Indicator 
Each chart shows the plot of one variable versus the Business Confidence 
81Ve label with: 
D_IP--+the growth rate of industrial production excluding constructions; 
EC man-Industrial Confidence Indicator 
OILP --+ Oil Price expressed in dollar 
EEN --+ Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 
PIM 
- 
US --+ NAPNI production expectations in manufacturing. 
The other variables keep the above mentioned meaning. 
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Indicator(BCI)9. 
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Overall, the graphical analysis suggests negative relationships between 
the BCI and the first difference in the unemployment rate, the real short- 
term interest rate and the price of oil. The relationships are positive in 
the cases of the growth rate of industrial production, the expectation of 
manufacturing and the price earnings ratio. The relationship between the 
nominal effective exchange rate and BCI is less clear. 
4.3 Brief literature review 
As briefly argued above, the literature is quite poor on the modelling of 
economic confidence. While there seems to be no study addressing the 
determinants of business confidence, a few papers analyse the relationship 
between consumer confidence and other (usually one) economic factors. 
Regarding the relationship between confidence and the unemployment 
rate, Zaretsky (1992) found a weak link between these two variables for the 
United States. The study of the link between interest rate and consumer con- 
fidence is also scarce. Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2003) found that a rise in 
the Fed funds rate leads to a drop in consumers' expectations in the first 18 
months, while the longer-term impact is less clear. Basuchoudhary, Cuter- 
muth and Sen (1996) find a relationship between consumer confidence and 
the real interest rate by using Granger causality tests. Berg and Bergstrom 
(1997) found that the real after tax interest rate and the change in the 
9The vertical axis on the left-hand side corresponds to the BCI, while the axis on the 
right-hand side corresponds to the other variable. 
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inflation are important determinants confidence indices in Sweden. More 
exhaustive seems to be the literature explaining the link between confidence 
and stock prices. The BIS (2001) reports some partial evidence on the re- 
lationship between consumer confidence and movements in the NASDAQ. 
Jansen and Nahuis (2003) show that the relationship between stock prices 
and consumer confidence essentially reflects a link with expectations about 
general economic conditions rather than with, expectations about personal 
finances. Kremer-Westermarm (2002) found a significant causal relationship 
from stock market developments to consumer confidence in the Euro Area. 
A less direct relationship is instead highlighted from the following studies. 
Morck et all (1990) stress a predictive content of stock prices for consump- 
tion. Campbell(1996), in line with other find! Dgs such as Stock and Watson 
(2001), provides mixed and not conclusive results about the relationship be- 
tween the price earnings ratio and consumption growth rate. Katona(1976), 
on the base of a psychological approach, proposed the idea that confidence 
is one of the most important determinants of household spending. Romer 
(1990) uses stock market volatility as a proxy for consumer uncertainty or 
confidence. Mustaka and Sbordone (1995), as well as Schiller (2000), argue 
that stock market developments are important because they provide daily 
information affecting the attitude of the consumers. Desroches and Gossel- 
ing (2002) and Garner (2002) found that consumer confidence on its own, 
has some forecasting power for private consumption, which decreases or van- 
ishes, when controlling for fundamental variables such as income and stock 
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prices. 
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4.4 Consumer Confidence model: a Structural VAR 
model 
In a multivariate framework, where there is no a priori knowledge about the 
theoretical relationships between variables, the use of a VAR model appears 
to be particularly appealing. In particular, we estimate the K-structural 
VAR10 as follows: 
k 
Aoye = Aiya-i + Bvt 
i=1 
where yt = [D_URX, PER, DR_STir, EC_consl' is ap dimensional 
vector of endogenous variables" I Ao is an invertible 
(P Xp)12 matrix describ- 
ing the instantaneous relationships between the variables and B is a (p x p) 
diagonal matrix. The vector of errors vt is distributed as a Normal process 
with zero mean and Variance Covariance matrix E. 
The order of the autoregressive coefficients in the VAR system is tested 
by implementing standard tests statistics. Table 4.1 provides results for sev- 
eral information criteria: 
"See G. Amisano and C. Giannini, 1997 for the definition. 
" We label with DR STir the first difference of the real short-term interest rate while 
the other variables keep the above mentioned meaning. 
12 In our case p is equal to four. 
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VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Endogenous variables: DURX PER R_STIR ECý_CONS 
Exogenous variables: C 
Date: 03108104 Time: 13: 38 
Sample: 1993: 012003: 12 
Included observations: 119 
Lag Logl- LR FPE AIC SC HO 
0 -626.9935 NA 0.473988 10.60493 10.69835 10.64287 
1 -80.26829 1047.507 6.34E-051 1.685181* 2.152261' 1.874848* 
2 -69.59961 19.72361 6,94E-05 1.774783 2.615S27 2.116183 
3 -58.90385 19.05463 7.61 E-05 1.863930 3.078337 2.357062 
4 47.1096S 20.21861 8.20E-05 1.934616 3.522687 2.579481 
5 -37.76916 15.3a435 9.23E-05 2.046540 4.008275 2.843139 
6 -29.8215S 12.55588 0.000107 2.181875 4.517273 3.130206 
7 -23.55288 9.482018 0.000128 2.345427 5.054488 3.445491 
8 -10.66465 18,62837 0.000137 2.39T725 5.480450 3.649523 
9 8.648054 26.61583 0.000133 2.342050 5.798438 3.745580 
10 19.38176 14.07107 0.000150 2.430559 6.260611 3.985822 
11 36.60883 21.42526 0.000153 2.409936 6.613652 4.116932 
12 61.34477 29.10110* 0.000139 2.263113 6.840493 4.121843 
indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FIDE: Final predicUon error 
AIC: Akaike Information criterion 
SC: Schwarz Information criterion 
HO: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
Table 4.1. Optimal Lag Lenght 
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All tests select one as the optimal lag length. In a more explicit form, 
with one lag, the model becomes as follows: 
yt = Aiyt-i + AO lvt 
In the matrix A0 we identify a structure for the instantaneous relation- 
ships between variables. The basis for our assumptions on contemporaneous 
relationships is the lower triangular matrix used in the simple Choleski de- 
composition. In this framework, the ordering of the variables determines the 
level of endogeneity of each variable. In our model we put the change in the 
unemployment rate first as we consider it, a prior!, as the most exogenous 
variable. On the other hand, consumer confidence comes last in the ordering 
of the system as we expect it to be the most endogenous variable. Based on 
reasonable assumptions about the economic relationships in the system, we 
model A0 as follows: 
1.0 000 
Ao all 1.0 
a12 0 
0 a22 1.0 0 
a31 a32 a33 1-0- 
Unlike the Choleski decomposition, we assume no instantaneous rela- 
tionship between the first difference of the unemployment rate and the first 
difference of the real short term interest rate. This is a safe assumption 
given the long lags in the adjustment of the economy, and especially the 
labour market, to interest rate changes. Moreover, we impose an instanta- 
neous relationship between the the change of the real short term interest rate 
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and the price earnings ratio reflecting the direct link between stock market 
valuation and interest rates. The estimated model is overidentified. The 
over-identifying restrictions are tested and not rejected at 10% confidence13. 
The variance covariance matrix of the model is obtained by maximizing 
the following concentrated likelihood function: 
T {log IA 21 - log IB 21 - 
I: Iog(B-'ASA'B'-')ii 
2 
where S is the estimated Variance covariance matrix -from an unstruc- 
tured VAR model. 
The maximization algorithm is the one proposed by Broyden, Fletcher, 
Goldfarb and Shannon (BFGS described in Press et all, 1988) 14 - 
4.4.1 Data Description 
The study uses monthly aggregated data for the period between 1993: 1 and 
2003: 12. The model is estimated by using the OLS estimator. For the 
consumer confidence indicator (CCI) we use Survey data provided by the 
European Commission. This index is defined as the arithmetic average of 
four forward looking questions about the expected, personal and general, 
economic conditionsI5. 
13 The result Of X2 test follows: 
X 2(j) = 3.41757324 Significance Level 0.06450577 
14 The method BFGS starts with a diagonal matrix. At each iteration, it is updated 
based upon the change in parameters and in the gradient in an attempt to determine the 
curvature of the function. The basic theoretical result governing this is that function is 
truly quadratic, and if exact line searches are used, then in n iterations, C will be equal 
to -H-1.1f the function is not quadratic, G will be an approximation of -H-1. "Specifically, it is the arithmetic average of the results from the following questions 
(percentage balances): 
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The unemployment rate is the one published for the Euro Area by Euro- 
stat. The real short term interest rate is computed as the difference between 
the three month Euribor and the annual percentage change in the Harmo- 
nized Index of Consumer Prices (later referred as inflation). 
The price-earnings ratio(P/E ratio) is calculated by Thomson Financial 
as total market capitalization divided by total earnings of constituent com- 
panies (which is equivalent to the ratio of average share prices over average 
earnings per share). 
A first specification test involves determining the time series properties 
of the data. The Dicky Fuller test rejects the hypothesis of a deterministic 
trend in the data but, it does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
for our sample. Results of the test are reported in table A4.1 in appendix16. 
The choice between a model in levels with near unit-root properties and 
a model in the first differences of variables basically, entails a trade-off be- 
tween the risk of drawing invalid statistical inference due to the non-standard 
1. Financial situation of the household over the next 12 months; 
2. General economic situation over the next 12 months; 
3. Unemployment expectations over the next 12 months (with inverted sign); 
4. Savings over the next 12 months. 
The survey is conducted among 20,000 individuals in the EU. To ensure data are rep- 
resentative, National institutes use different random sampling together with stratification 
criteria. Data for the euro area are available from January 1985 onwards. (Until Octo- 
ber 2000, the questions included in the survey were somewhat different, but consumer 
confidence data have been calculated back to correct for this). 
16 The table shows the statistics, as well as the quantiles of their asymptotic distribution, 
for each variable in level. The null hypotheses under which the asymptotic distributions 
are tabulated are always joint hypotheses concerning the coefficient(p), the mean(y), and 
the trend(, 8). The reason is clearly explained in Hamilton(1994). The first three statistics 
are referred to the model without trend, while the remaining statistics to model with 
trend. The asymptotic distribution of all the tests on the coefficients of this regression is 
not standard, but is known and tabulated. The table, in fact, also reports the references 
of the asymptotic distribution which the tests refer to. 
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distributions of the estimated coefficients, and the risk of loosing important 
information contained in the levels. It remains an open issue in literature 
whether the variables in a VAR system need to be stationary. Sims(1980) 
and Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) recommend against differencing even if 
the variables contain a unit root. They argue that a goal of a VAR analysis 
is to determine the interrelationships among the variables, not to estimate 
the parameters of these relationships. The main argument against differ- 
encing is that it discards information concerning the co-movements in the 
data(such as the possibility of cointegrating relationships). The appropriate 
way to estimate a VAR model containing non-stationary variables is then 
the Vector Error Correction Model(VECM). 
Given the specific focus of this chapter, and the difficulty to consider 
cointegration relationships in such an empirical model, we prefer to esti- 
mate our VAR in levels. Nevertheless, we take the first difference of the 
unemployment rate and the real short term interest rate due to a higher 
correlation that the changes in these variable have with the consumer confi- 
dence indicator. Furthermore, the unemployment rate is the only variable, 
which for the hypothesis of a unit root is accepted on the practical and 
theoretical ground and, therefore, the first difference is theoretically needed. 
As regards, the price earnings-ratio and the consumer confidence indicator 
we keep these variables in levels. This choice is supported by the common 
belief that those variables are theoretically stationary. The price-earnings 
ratio, for instance, should be a stationary process as stock prices and earn- 
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ings; form a cointegrated relationship with unitary coefficient (Campbell and 
Shiller, 1987). The consumer confidence index, as stressed by Kremer and 
Westermann(2002), is stationary on the business cycle horizons. Further 
arguments arise from the specification analysis. Table A4.2 in appendix 4 
reports the roots of the model, when including all variables in level, against 
the roots of the model when including the changes of the unemployment rate 
and the real short interest rate(i. e. the estimated model). The table shows 
that the estimated model does not contain explosive roots. Residuals analy- 
sis is reported in table A4.3 in appendix. Both Jarque-Bera normality test 
and Mardia Multivariate test strongly accept the hypothesis of normality. 
Furthermore, the residuals of our model do not exhibit autocorrelation. The 
permanentau test rejects the hypothesis of autocorrelation at 95% signifi- 
cance level. Overall the specification analysis suggests that the introduction 
of the level of price-earnings ratio, and the level of consumer confidence in- 
dicator in the system does not affect the diagnostic tests of the model: the 
system is stable and statistically correct. 
4.4.2 Impulse response analysis 
The econometric tool used here to investigate the reaction of consumer con- 
fidence to the various shocks is the impulse response analysis. A stationary 
stable VAR(p) process can be written in the moving average(MA) represen- 
tation as follows: 
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00 
yt = Xt/ +E Psut-s 
s-o 
where T, is the matrix coefficient at time s and ut-, is the error distrib- 
sited as N(0, E). 
The response at t=k to an initial shock z in the u process is 'Pkz. For 
instance, the response at step k to a unit shock in equation i at t=0 is just 
the ith column of the Tk matrix". The responses are computed with the 
following formula: 
Ts = JMsJ'G 
where J is the extraction matrix, M is the companion matrix obtained 
by starting from the Ai values and G is the decomposition factor. 
The analysis is applied to the consumer confidence index and its subcom- 
ponents. In particular, we re-estimate the model by replacing the aggregate 
index of consumer confidence Nvith the results of individual constituent ques- 
tions (i. e. UPE, ECOE, SAVE and FINE)18 
Plotting the impulse response function is a practical way to visually 
represent the behaviour of one variable in response to various shocks. Figure 
4.3 shows a complete picture of the size and time profile of the reaction 
17 For an orthogonalized innovations Var(u) =E= GG' and then u= Gv where 
Var(v) =I 
18 We label with UPE the index describing the expectations of the labour market condi- 
tion; with ECOE the expectations about the general economic conditions; with S"E the 
expectations about the possibility to save over the next twelve months and finally with 
FINE, the index describing the personal financial situation over the next twelve months 
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of consumer confidence'9 (and its subcomponents) to shocks in the other 
variables forty periods ahead. 
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Figure 4.3. Response of the CCI to various shocks 
The impulse response analysis suggests that the model is well behaving, 
meaning that the responses of CCI (and its sub-components) to the shocks in 
the other variables have the expected sign and a reasonable timing. More- 
over, the responses are significant, according to the estimated confidence 
bands, which are computed using Monte Carlo integration 20. Given that 
the sign of the responses remain in all cases unchanged over time, the aver- 
age of these responses provide useful information on the magnitude of the 
reactions. 
19The time profile of the responses of its sub-components are reported in figure A4.1 in 
the Appendix. 
20 See Sims and Zha(1999) for a discussion of these issues. 
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Figure 4.4 compares the average impact on CCI (and it sub-components) 
of a one standard deviation shock to the other variables 21 . 
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Figure 4.4. Average impact of the CCI responses to various shocks 
2 'Figure 4.4 is composed by two columns. On the left hand side, the graphs compute 
the average impact over twenty periods and, on the right hand side, the average impact 
over forty periods. Black coloums indicate a negative impact as grey coloumn indicate a 
positive impact. We keep this notation for the rest of the chapter. 
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Results suggest that the main driving force of CCI is the change in the 
unemployment rate over twenty periods, followed by real short-term interest 
rates and the price earnings ratio. In the long run the order of the main 
driving forces reverses. The first difference of the real short-term interest 
rate becomes the prime mover. At the sub-component level, developments 
in the labour market are the key factor affecting unemployment expecta- 
tions (UPE), the assessment of the general economic outlook (ECOE) and 
the financial situation over the next twelve months(FINE). As expected, in- 
terest rates have, in relative terms, a more prominent role in determining 
the expectations about the possibility to save over the next twelve months 
(SAVE). In the long run, the real short term interest rate becomes the main 
driving force for all subcomponents. 
In a different way, Figure 4.5 compares the impact on the different sub- 
components of the various shocks. 
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Figure 4.5. Cross-Comparison analysis of the average impact on the 
sub-components of the CCI 
This highlights in particular, that the unemployment rate expectations 
(UPE) is the most reactive component of confidence, and this with respect 
to all shocks accounted for in the model. The assessment of the general 
economic climate (ECOE) is also strongly affected by various shocks. This 
is particularly true for the price earnings ratio. A shock in this variable has 
an impact on the assessment of the general economic conditions (ECOE) as 
strong as the one on the unemployment rate expectations (UPE). Overall, 
144 CHAPTER 4. MODELLING CONFIDENCE IN THE EURO AREA 
confidence is influenced by interest rates through unemployment expecta- 
tions (UPE) and the assessment of the general economic climate (ECOE). 
Unlike the other variables, a shock in the first difference of the real short 
term interest rate has a significant effect on the assessment of the consumer's 
financial situation (FINE, S"E). 
Figure 4.6 shows the maximum impact and the timing of the responses. 
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Figure 4.6. Maximum impact and Timing of the model 
The same analysis is illustrated for the sub-components of the consumer 
confidence index in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7. Maximum impact and Timing in the sub-components 
The maximum impact on consumer confidence following an unemploy- 
ment rate shock is reached after 8 months. The real short-term interest rate 
and the price-earnings ratio achieve the maximum impact on CCI respec- 
tively after 15 and 18 months. The timing of the model for the interest 
rate is consistent with the results obtained by most of the literature on the 
monetary transmission mechanism22. 
Overall, the impulse response analysis suggests that the first difference 
of the unemployment rate, has the quickest impact on confidence and the 
strongest in the first twenty periods. A shock to the change in the unem- 
ployment rate affects the CCI mainly through the expectations of future 
22 See Angeloni et al. 
146 CHAPTER 4. MODELLING CONFIDENCE IN THE EURO AREA 
labour market conditions and the general economic outlook. The reaction 
to a shock in the first difference of the real short-term interest rate, is slightly 
lower than to a change in the unemployment rate but becomes the prime 
mover in the long run. Overall, it appears that the real short-term interest 
rate affects consumer confidence mainly through the expectations of future 
labour market conditions. An interest rate shock has a similar effect on 
the unemployment rate. This would indicate that the channel of interaction 
between confidence and interest rates mainly goes through real economic 
developments. The unemployment rate is, in fact, the only variable captur- 
ing the real side of the economy in the system. The expectation about the 
financial situation over the next twelve months (FINE) and the expectations 
about savings (SAVE), also play an important role in the transmission of 
interest rate shocks to confidence. The reactions of SAVE and FINE to an 
increase in the real short-term interest rate are negative. This result could 
be explained by the fact that consumers are both borrowers and lenders. 
Even though they are net lenders on average, the negative effect of an in- 
crease in the real short-term interest rate on borrowers' expectations seem to 
more than compensates for the positive effect on the lenders' expectations. 
Finally, a change in the price earning ratio mainly impacts confidence 
through the expectations about the general economic conditions. Consis- 
tently with the results provided by Jansen and Nahuis (2003), households 
do not seem to perceive an increase of the price-earnings ratio, as an im- 
provement in their personal finances (as indicated by the response of the 
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sub-component FINE). This could be explained by the fact that a small 
proportion of households' detain stock market wealth. 
4.4.3 Forecast Error Decomposition 
In this sub-section, we compute the forecast error variance decomposition for 
the VAR model. This analysis provides the proportion of the movements 
in a variable which is due to its own shocks, versus shocks to the other 
variables. At each point in time, the forecast error variance is decomposed 
as follows: 
k-1 
E IF,, G G'Ts' 
s=G 
where G is the decomposition factor and IP,, keeps the above mentioned 
meaning. 
This analysis also helps to test the results of the previous impulse re- 
sponse analysis. In particular, it checks whether or not the shocks of the 
variables have a trivial effect on the responses. Table 4.2 decomposes the 
forecast error into the part due to each innovation process. Specifically, 
it provides the decomposition due to each variable at each step. For in- 
stance, the first value in the first column provides the percentage of the one 
step forecast variance, which is due to the innovation in the change of the 
unemployment rate. 
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Table 4.2. Forecast Variance DecomPosition 
The more interesting information is at longer steps, where the interac- 
tions among the variables start to become felt. Figure 4.8 plots the decom- 
position of forecast variance due to each variable. 23 Over the first 20 periods, 
the Variance of the consumer confidence Index is primarily explained by the 
change in the unemployment rate. An innovation in this variable takes al- 
most 3 periods to have an effect but becomes quickly the prime mover. The 
importance of the real short term interest rate is increasing and becomes 
as important as the change in the unemployment rate after twenty-three 
periods. The explanatory power of the price-earnings ratio is increasing but 
23 Each curve corresponds to one of the columns in table 4.3 
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reamains constantly lower with respect the other variables across the range. 
Figure 4.8 shows graphically the decomposition . 
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Figure 4.8. CCI: Decomposition of the Forecast Error 
Overall, the analysis mostly confirms the results of the impulse response 
analysis, namely the main driving force of Consumer confidence is the change 
of the unemployment rate. Nevertheless, in contrast with the results of the 
impulse response analysis, the real short term interest rate explains the 
smallest part of the Variance for the consumer confidence indicator. 
Here, we also decompose for each variable the historical values of its 
variance into a base projection and the cumulated effect of current and 
past innovations. The historical decomposition is based upon the following 
partition of the moving average representation: 
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j-1 00 
'Yt+j =E q'SUt+j-S + +j)3 +E qjsut+i-s 
S=0 
Ixt 
S=j 
I 
The first sum represents that part of yt+j which is due to innovations 
in periods T+I to T+j. The second sum is the forecast of yt+j based on 
information available at time T. 
If u has N components then the historical decomposition has N+1 
parts. The forecast of yt+j based on the information at time T, is the term 
in brackets. For each of the N components of u, the part of the first term 
is due to the time path of that component. Figure 4.9 shows the effect of 
the change in the unemployment rate, the price-earnings ratio and the real 
short term interest rate on the consumer confidence index. 
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Figure 4.9. CCI: Historical Variance decomposition 
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We use the historical Variance Decomposition in order to make a coun- 
terfactual analysis of recent developments in confidence. The shaded area in 
the charts shows the historical variance decomposition of the Consumer Con- 
fidence after the introduction of the euro. The analysis suggests that, in the 
pre-euro period, almost the entire difference between the actual consumer 
confidence index and the base forecast, with the exception of the period 
1997-1999, can be attributed to the real short term interest rate. After the 
introduction of the euro, the change of the unemployment rate becomes the 
variable explaining most of this difference. This result is consistent with 
data relating the change of the unemployment rate one year ahead to the 
Consumer Confidence. Since 1999 a positive rate of the annual change in 
the unemployment rate flows with the behavior of Consumer Confidence. 
4.4.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this part, we have attempted to model the main driving force of con- 
sumer confidence in the Euro Area. To this end, we used a multivariate 
framework. The analysis suggests that the change of unemployment rate is 
the principal factor driving Consumer Confidence. A shock to the change 
in the unemployment rate affects the consumer confidence index mainly 
through two channels, respectively the expectations concerning the labour 
market and the general economic conditions. On the contrary, such a shock 
has a relative small effect on the other components. The developments in 
the stock market, measured by the price-earnings ratio, seem to be a minor 
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driving force. Similarly to the change in the unemployment rate it affects the 
consumer confidence index through the labour market and the general eco- 
nomic conditions. Consistently with the results of Jansen and Nahuis(2003), 
a change in the price-earnings ratio is not really perceived as an improve- 
ment in the personal financial situation. This could be due to the way the 
index has been constructed as well as to the fact that the shock is not per- 
ceived as permanent, because of the high volatility of price-earnings ratio. 
The change in the real short-term interest rate becomes the main driving 
force on the longer horizon. This variable affects the consumer confidence 
index mainly through the labour market conditions. A positive monetary 
policy shock is basically perceived by the households, as implying a future 
increase of the unemployment rate. Nevertheless, the effect on the expecta- 
tions about their finances and savings over the twelve months is also quite 
strong. 
4.5 Business Confidence model: a DSE model 
The business confidence model has a broadly similar structure to the one 
for consumer confidence. In addition to the set of variables included in the 
previous model, we add here the growth rate of industrial production. This 
variable is understood as a good proxy for expected future production de- 
velopments, which is an explicit question included in the surveys. Moreover, 
while consumer confidence is mainly affected by domestic factors, business 
confidence is influenced by external developments as well. Therefore, we ac- 
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count for the presence of key exogenous variables such as US manufacturing 
confidence, the effective exchange rate and oil price. 
In this case the use of a VAR methodology is inappropriate. In a struc- 
tural VAR model no distinction is drawn between endogenous and exoge- 
nous variables and the constraints are usually imposed on the simultaneous 
relationships matrix A0. In this context we use a Dynamic Simultaneous 
Equations Model(DSEM). The structural form of the model follows: 
Ao Bo I[ yt ]=[ A(L) B(L) ][ yt ]+[ ut 
0 Iq xt 0 C(L) xt Vt 
where yt = [D_URX, D_IP, PER, DR_STir, EC_man]'is ap dimen- 
24 
sional vector of endogenous variables , xt = 
[D_OILP, PMI_US, EENJ' 
is aq dimensional vector of exogenous variables 25 and ut and vt are white 
noises processeS26 . The AO and BO are (p x p) and (p x q) , respectively de- 
scribing the instantaneous relationships among the endogenous variables and 
between the exogenous and endogenous variables. The matrices A(L), B(L) 
and C(L) are the lag polynomials describing the relationships between vari- 
ables at time t and their on lags. 
The selection of the VAR order is based on informatia criteria as for 
the consumer confidence model. Two of the tests reach their minimum for 
k=1. Table 4.3 shows the results. 
24 The variables keep the above mentioned meaning. 
25 We label with D- OILP the first difference of Oil Price expressed in dollar while the 
other variables keep the above mentioned meaning. 
26 In our model p and q are respectively equal to 5 and 3. 
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VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Endogenous variables: D_URX PER R_STir EC_c s 
Exogenous variables: OILP PMI-US EEN 
Sample: 1993: 012003: 12 
Included observations: 108 
Lag Logl- LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 66.20909 NA 2.92E-07 -0.855724 -0.359033 -0.654334 
1 467.8159 736.2791 2.74E-10 -7.629924 -6.712369* -7.376796' 
2 489.3803 37.53811 Z94E-10 -7.766302 -6.027864 -7.061437 
3 521.0340 52.16M 2.63E-10* -7.689518 -5.530236 -6.932915 
4 540.3065 29.97947 2.98E-10 -7.7&3454 -4.803308 -6.575113 
5 556.8042 24.13544 3.59E-10 -7.626003 -4.024993 -6.165924 
6 580.8652 32.97253 3.81E-10 -7.608615 -3.386741 -5.896798 
7 592.8871 15.36128 5.15E-110 -7.368279 -2.525542 -5.404725 
8 625.8624 39.08165* 4.81E-10 -7.515970 -2.052369 -5.300678 
9 652.1044 28.67188 5.23E-10 -7.538971 -1.454506 -5.071941 
10 679.8742 27.76982 5.69E-10 -7.590264 -0.884936 -4.871497 
11 710.9688 28.21541 6.06E. 10 -7.703125 -0-376934 -4.732621 
12 752.6307 33.04675 5-56E-10 . 8.011680* -0.064624 -4.789437_ 
indicates tag order selected by the criterion 
ILR sequential modfied LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final predicton error 
AIC: Akake Information criterion 
SC: Schwarz Information criterion 
HQ: Hannan-Qulnn Information criterion 
Table 4.3. BCL Optimal lag lenght 
The order of the VAR is therefore the same as for the consumer con- 
fidence model. In a more explicit form, with one lag, the model can be 
represented as follows: 
Ao Bo Yt Al B1 yt-l 
0 Iq xt 0 C, Vt 
III=III 
xt_i 
I+I Ut 
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where C1 is a (q x q) diagonal matrices modelling the AR(I) exogenous 
processes. The(p x p) structural sub-matrix AO is equal to the structural 
matrix of the previous model. In addition, we impose some zero restric- 
tions modelling the non-instantaneous relationship between the change in 
the unemployment rate, and the growth rate of the industrial production. 
The (p x q) sub-matrix Bo imposing the instantaneous relationships between 
exogenous and endogenous variable is the following: 
000 
000 
Bo 000 
000 
bi b2 b3 j 
It reflects the assumption that all exogenous variables have a direct im- 
pact on the Business Confidence Indicator. 
Given that the structural partioned matrix and the submatrix Ao are 
not singular, the reduced form of model can be written as folloWS27: 
[ yt Ao Bo Al Bi ][ yt-1 + 
Ao lut + Ao 'Bovt 
Xt 0 Iq 0 C, Xt-i 
II 
Vt 
I 
Tests for the exogeneity of the variables are reported in table 4.5. 
Ao Bo AO-1 AO-lBo 27 Notice that: 
101=[011 
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OILP equation PNII-US equation EEN equation 
Null Hypothesis : The Null Hypothesis : Tbe Null Hypothesis : The 
Follo%ving Coefficients Are Follo%ving Coefficients Arc FolloAing Coefficients Are 
Zero Zero Zero 
D_URX Lag(s) I D_URX Lag(s) I D_URX Lag(s) I 
D-IF Lag(s) I D-IP Lag(s) I D-IP L28(S) I 
R_STIR Lag(s) I STIR Lag(s) I STIR Lag(s) I 
PER Lag(s) I PER Lag(s) I PER Lag(s) I 
EC-MAN Lag(s) I EC-MAN Lag(s) I EC-NIAN Lag(s) I 
P'%II-US Lag(s) I OILP Lag(s) I OILP Lag(s) I 
EEN Lag(s) I EEN Lag(s) I PIMUS Lag(s) I 
Chi-Squared(7)= 9.563506 Chi-Squared(7)= 12.423783 Chi-Squared(7)= 12.466184 
with Significance Level with Significance Level %ith Significance Lcvcl 
0.21468743 0.03745576 0.08623327 
Table 4.4 Testing the exogeneity of the variables in the Dynamic equation 
models 
The coefficients are estimated by CLS. In particular, we use the estimator 
described in Theil(1971). The CLS estimator is: 
ß= (Z-, 0 1)x-1) (X, (Z-, 0 
where 0 and y are formed by stacking vectors from the N equations, and 
X is formed by stacking augmented Xi matrices: matrices with columns 
of zeros for explanatory variables in the other equations. The covariance 
matrix of the estimates is: 
4.5. BUSINESS CONFIDENCE MODEL: A DSE MODEL 157 
V(, 8) = [X' (F, -' 0 I)X] -1 
The maximization algorithm remains the one used for the CC1 model(i. e. 
BFGS described in Press at all. ). The model is estimated over the sample 
1993: 01-2003: 12, on monthly data. 
4.5.1 Data description 
Similarly to the consumer confidence model, ive use survey. data provided by 
the European Commission for the Business Confidence indicator(BC1). The 
BCI is the arithmetic average of the balances(in the percentage points) of 
the ansivers to the questions related to production expectations, assessment 
of order books and assessment of stocks of finished goods (with an inverted 
sign). 
The survey in manufacturing industry includes other questions (on sell- 
ing prices expectations, employment expectations and production trend in 
recent months) which are not part of the business confidence indicator. 
The real short term interest rate is computed as the difference between 
the three month Euribor and the annual percentage of producer price in- 
flation. We use the three-month on three-month growth rate of industrial 
production excluding constructions given its strong correlation Nvith BCI. 
Regarding the exogenous variables, the Chicago PMI index provides a 
proxy for production expectation in US manufacturing. In addition, the 
price of oil refers to dated Brendt and is expressed in euros, while the euro 
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exchange rate is measured in nominal effective terms. 
Tests for stationarity of the variables are reported in table A4.4. The 
table shows that, with the exception of Chicago PMI index, the Dicky fuller 
test does not reject the unit root hypothesis for all variables. Nevertheless, 
we just take the first difference of the industrial production and the oil price 
due to the high correlation with the BCI index. For the Business confidence 
index and the nominal effective exchange rate we keep the variables in level. 
Regarding the first variable, we recall the argument described for the CCI 
index while for the second one, we believe that firms are more interested in 
the level of the nominal effective exchange rate than its change. 
The roots analysis, reported in table A4.5 in appendix, shows that the 
estimated model does not contain explosive roots. Similarly to Consumer 
Confidence Model, residuals analysis in table A4.6 does not reject the nor- 
mality of the residuals while the Permanentau test rejects the hypothesis of 
autocorrelation. 
4.5.2 Impulse Response Analysis 
Similarly to the consumer confidence model we implement an impulse re- 
sponse analysis 28. Figure 4.10 shows the reaction of the BCI and its subcom- 
ponents to various shocks. The reaction of the variables have the expected 
sign and die out within forty periods. 
"Technical details about the impulse response analysis have already been given in the 
previous part of the chapter. 
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Figure 4.10 Responses of BO and its subcomponents to various shocks 
The magnitudes of the responses are summarized in figure 4.11. It shows 
the average impact on the BCI and its sub-components in response to a shock 
in the other variables of the system. 
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Figure 4.11. Average responses of BCI to various shocks 
The US production expectation in manufacturing appears to have the 
strongest impact on Business Confidence. This is also true when the BCI is 
replaced with one of the sub-components. The nominal effective exchange 
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rate and the price of oil affect Business Confidence to a smaller extent. 
The timing of the response are represented in Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12. BCI: Maximum impact and Timing 
The first difference in the growth rate of the industrial production and 
unemployment rate reach the maximum impact on Industrial Confidence 
respectively after three and six months. The responses of the BCI follow- 
ing a shock to US production expectations in manufacturing and the first 
difference of Oil Price peaks after eleven months. The price-earnings ratio 
and the nominal effective exchange rate achieve the maximum effect around 
two years. The change in the real short term interest rate reach the maxi- 
mum impact, after two months. The timing of the model slightly changes 
when replacing the BCI by its subcomponents. Among the other things it 
must be stressed the slower impact of the nominal effective exchange rate, 
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the price-earnings ratio and the oil Price on the Business confidence and its 
subcomponents. 
The first remarkable result of the impulse response analysis is that ex- 
ternal conditions appear to affect considerably business confidence in the 
euro area. In particular, the US PMI is the single most important factor 
driving confidence in the model. Beyond the importance of the US economy 
as a trading partner, the strong correlation of euro area business confidence 
with the US PMI could also reflect the crucial role of US in determining 
global economic trends and the usual lead of the US business cycle with 
respect to that in Europe. The peak of the effect of the US PMI is after 
about a year, which broadly corresponds to the average gap between the US 
and European cycle. Oil price and exchange rate developments also seem to 
have a significant role in driving business confidence, albeit significantly less 
so than US economic conditions. The negative impact of an appreciation of 
the euro exchange rate appears to have a stronger and more lasting effect 
on confidence than an increase in oil prices. 
Among domestic variables, actual industrial production seems to be the 
most important driver of business confidence in the short term, followed by 
the changes in the real short term interest rates and the unemployment rate. 
As regards the sub-components of the BCI, from the magnitude of the 
responses, it appears that the assessment of order books is the most reactive 
component of business confidence, which reflects the fact that it most di- 
rectly captures firm's demand expectations. It is particularly sensitive to the 
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US PMI, euro area industrial production and the exchange rate. Changes 
in the unemployment rate also seem to be an important factor affecting the 
assessment of order books, probably as a proxy for households' disposable 
income developments. Among other components of confidence, production 
expectations seems relatively more reactive than others to changes in stock- 
market valuation. Changes in stockmarket valuation can be viewed as supply 
side shocks affecting firms' financing conditions, and therefore changing the 
optimal level of production irrespective of demand expectations. Interest 
rates seem to affect confidence equally through its three sub-components: 
production expectations, assessment of stocks and order books. Finally, a 
relatively small effect of oil price shocks seems to come mainly via order 
books and the assessment of stocks, while production expectations seem 
little affected. 
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4.5.3 Forecast Error Decomposition 
In the same way as for the consumer confidence model, we then proceed 
with a forecast variance decomposition. Table 4.5 decomposes the forecast 
error into the parts due to each of the innovation processes: 
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Table 4.5 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
In particular, it provides the decomposition due to each variable at each 
step. The graphical representation of the forecast variance decomposition is 
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Figure 4.13 BCI: Decomposition of Forecast Error 
The variance of the business confidence index is primarily explained by 
the US production expectation of manufacturing. Innovation in this process 
quickly becomes the prime mover. 
The growth rate of the industrial production and the change in the real 
short term interest rate show their effect mainly in the first months. Then, 
their effect remain fairly constant. Even though the explanatory power of 
the price-earnings ratio is slightly higher than the previous variable, it is 
still quite low. The nominal effective exchange rate explains an increasing 
2 gEach curve corresponds to one of the colournns in table 4.5. 
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part of the variance while the other variables seem to explain just a small 
part of it. 
The forecast Error Decomposition basically confirms the results of the 
impulse response analysis. The dominating key factor of the industrial con- 
fidence indicator is the US production expectation of manufacturing. The 
growth rate of industrial production affects confidence basically in the short 
run. The nominal effective exchange rate seems to show its effects on the 
longer horizons. 
4.5.4 Concluding remarks 
This part of the chapter attempted to detect the main driving force of Busi- 
ness Confidence in the Euro Area. 
Similarly to the Consumer Confidence Model, we used a multivariate 
framework. The analysis suggests that, the among the variables of our 
model, the production expectation in US manufacturing is the principal 
factor driving the Business Confidence Indicator in the Euro Area. The 
US confidence indicator basically leads the Industrial Confidence Indicator. 
This result is supported by the magnitude and the timing of the responses. 
The Forecast Variance Decomposition confirms the results of the impulse 
response analysis. 
The cross comparison analysis of the average responses gives further 
insights. The most reactive component of the Industrial Indicator is the 
index measuring the assessment of the order books. The result is consistent 
among all sub-components with the exception of the index measuring the 
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assessment of the stock volume. 
4.6 General Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have analysed the key determinants of economic confi- 
dence in the Euro Area since 1993. We set up two multivariate frameworks 
to model respectively consumer and business confidence. 
The results suggest that consumer confidence is mainly driven by labour 
market developments in the Euro Area (measured by the -change 
in the un- 
employment rate) - The real short-term interest rate seems to play a key role 
in the long run. Stock market developments play a significant, but smaller 
role than the other factors, and smaller than the available literature seems 
to suggest. Stock market developments affect the consumer confidence index 
essentially, through its component measuring the way households perceive 
general economic conditions. 
Regarding the results for business confidence, the dominating factor is a 
measure of business confidence in the United States, which suggests a rather 
strong role for the world economic cycle on Euro Area business confidence. 
Among the endogenous variables, industrial production and real short term 
interest rate seem to have a significant effect in the short run, but this 
effect is of a lesser magnitude than the external factor just mentioned. In 
addition, stock market developments are assessed to have a larger effect on 
the confidence of firms compared to households. Regarding the breakdown of 
the business confidence indicator into its sub-components, the most reactive 
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component is the index describing the assessment of order books. 
Looking at the impact of monetary policy more in detail, it appears that 
changes in interest rates have the expected negative effect both on consumer 
and business confidence. A comforting result also concerns the timing of 
these effects, which is similar to the transmission lag of monetary policy on 
economic activity commonly found in the literature. These results provide 
some evidence for the presence of a "confidence channel" in the transmission 
of monetary policy on real activity. The models could be extended to include 
price variables to also analyse further, the transmission of monetary policy 
on inflation. However, the fact that the effect of interest rates on consumer 
confidence has a similar timing as the effect on real economic activity leads. 
to a cautious interpretation. Indeed, the model of consumer confidence does 
not include any variable of economic activity (other than the change in the 
unemployment rate), meaning that the confidence indicator itself could be 
argued to capture, in fact, the effects on economic activity. The results of the 
business confidence model tend to rule out the presence of such a problem. 
Indeed, the timing of the response to a shock in interest rates is similar 
to that in the consumer confidence model, while the business confidence 
model includes a variable controlling for economic activity (the industrial 
production variable). Thus, interest rates can be argued to affect business 
confidence beyond their impact on economic activity. 
However, further analysis is needed before concluding about the relative 
influence of monetary policy on the confidence of economic agents in the 
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Euro Area compared to other factors. 
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First, it cannot be ruled out that some variables may have been omitted 
in the models proposed in this chapter. Their omission may lead to bias the 
results. 
Second, the analysis of monetary policy shocks could be refined. In this 
respect, shocks are simply defined in the multivariate frameworks proposed 
in this chapter as a one standard deviation change in a given variable. Al- 
ternative ways of measuring shocks would need to be used to address the 
impact of monetary policy on confidence. In particular, policy shocks can 
be measured as the deviations of the actual policy rates decided by mon- 
etary policy-makers compared to the expected interest rates. Monetary 
policy shocks can also be seen as indicators of the monetary policy stance. 
This policy stance can be measured by the deviation of actual real interest 
rates from their natural level. Overall, alternative ways of measuring policy 
shocks may lead to different assessments of the impact of monetary policy 
on confidence. 
Finally, central banks do not affect confidence only through changes in 
interest rates. It is commonly argued that central banks pursuing a policy of 
the "steady-hand" (i. e. of keeping interest rates unchanged) make a positive 
contribution to confidence. 
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Part III 
Fiscal policy issues 
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Chapter 5 
The sustainability of the 
fiscal policy: Empirical 
Evidence in Euro Area and 
United States 
This Chapter provides a formal theoretical framework for analyzing the sus- 
tainability of fiscal policy based on the government intertemporal. budget 
constraint, and derives conditions that determine whether a fiscal stance is 
sustainable in the medium and long term. In contrast to previous studies, it 
uses a log-linearization of the public debt identity and generalizes the results 
obtained in literature by using a multivariate test. The analysis is applied 
to the fiscal position of the United States and Euro Area. On the basis 
of infinite horizon-tests the broad conclusion is that both countries have an 
unsustainable fiscal policy. The chapter also provides two procedures to con- 
struct forecasts of the future level of public debt. Forecasted values confirm 
the evaluation proposed in the cointegration analysis. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The sustainability of fiscal policy has been receiving increasing attention 
from economists. Several developed countries have been facing significant 
fiscal deficits in the last few decades. In the U. S, for instance, the fiscal year 
2000 ended with the highest dollar debt in the country's history - despite 
more claims of a 'surplus', fiscal year 2001 debt was higher than that and, 
2002 debt was $420 billion higher. The same is true for some of the EMU 
countries where, despite the imposition of deficit and debt ceilings, the public 
debt is higher than 100% i. e. Italy and Belgium. The main question about 
this issue is whether or not the high public debt is becoming more and more 
unsustainable. 
This chapter provides a formal theoretical framework for analyzing the 
sustainability of fiscal policy based on the government intertemporal budget 
constraint, and derives conditions that determine whether a fiscal stance is 
sustainable. This analysis is then applied to the fiscal position of the United 
States and the Euro Area. 
Most of the literature on this topic uses deflated variables and is focused 
on the peculiarities of the process generating public debt series in ratio to 
GDP. In particular, fiscal policy is declared sustainable if public debt, or 
the first difference, are found to be stationary. The stationarity of this 
variable (or the first difference) is usually conditioned to the stationarity of 
the explanatory variables, or to the presence of a cointegrated relationship 
between them. Most of these studies use univariate tests. 
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The theoretical framework provided in this chapter differs from the exist- 
ing literature, in several important aspects. In contrast to previous studies, 
it uses a log-linearization of the public debt identity and generalizes the 
results obtained in literature by using a multivariate test. 
In particular, the contribution of this study is twofold. First, it shows 
that, under the assumption of a stochastic interest rate, the sustainability of 
fiscal policy can be considered as a linear problem and then becomes suitable 
to be studied through a VAR technique. Second, it provides two different 
procedures to compute forecasts of the public debt level conditioned to given 
processes generating primary deficit and interest rate. The former is related 
, Mth the public debt identity in a VAR form and the latter arises from the 
iteration n-periods ahead of the public debt identity in non-linear form. 
The use of a multivariate test is justified by several considerations. First, 
by using a multivariate test, it is possible to apply specific tests for VAR 
models to the sustainability of the fiscal policy i. e. roots analysis. Second, 
under a Vector Error Correction representation, the VAR model permits 
to apply a cointegrated analysis to the data involving all variables in the 
system. 
The sustainability of fiscal policy has been studied under different sce- 
narios. In the former case, we assume both primary deficit and interest rate 
as exogenous variables. In the latter case, we assume the public debt and 
the primary deficit as endogenous variables and the interest rate as the only 
exogenous variable. 
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The analysis suggests that the condition for sustainability depends upon 
the stability of the VAR system. If the system is globally stationary, and 
then stable, the fiscal policy is said to be sustainable. On the contrary, if 
the system is not globally stationary, and then not stable, the fiscal policy 
is said to be unsustainable. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a short review 
of the fiscal deficit arithmetic; it derives the government's intertemporal 
budget constraint and the condition of sustainability in discrete time. Sec- 
tion 5.3 looks at the way in which fiscal sustainability has been assessed 
in the literature so far. Section 5.4 discusses the public debt identity in a 
VAR framework, and provides the conditions for sustainability. Two cases 
are presented in which different assumptions about the stochastic processes 
generating the primary deficit and interest rate are examined. Section 5.5 
applies this test to the U. S and Euro Area economies. Section 5.6 constructs 
forecasts of the public debt level conditioned to given processes generating 
primary deficit and interest rate. Finally Section 5.7 contains concluding 
comments. 
5.2 The Government intertemporal budget con- 
straint. 
Previous to the sustainability issue, a short review of the fiscal deficit arith- 
metic seems to be necessary in order, to set the theoretical framework for 
the subsequent sustainability analysis. 
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The government borrowing constraint(IBC) for period t may be written 
with the following dynamic equation: 
Bt = Ct - Tt + (1 + pt)Bt-1 - (Mt - Mt-1) 
where the variables are defined as follows: C-government spending ex- 
cluding interest payment; T-government revenues; B-public debt; M-nominal 
monetary base; p- real interest rate. 
Under the assumption of a constant money growth rate the identity(5.1) 
becomes: 
Bt = Gt-I - Tt-1 + (1 + pt-, )Bt-1 (5.2) 
The IBC is normally presented with variables as ratios of GDP. This 
is due to the common belief that the level of the public debt in nominal 
terms, is a misleading measure of the real indebtedness of the Government. 
In terms of ratio to GDP equation(5.2) can be expressed as follows: 
bt = gt - -rt + (1 + pt - ? 7t)bt-1 
where the lower case letters g, b, T denote the ratio of the corresponding 
upper-case variables to nominal GDP, pt is the real interest rate at time t 
and qt represents the output growth rate. In a more compact form, this 
identity can be rewritten as: 
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Abt = dt + rt-ibt-, (5-3) 
where dt = gt - -rt is the primary government deficit expressed as pro- 
portion of nominal GDP and rt is the real interest rate adjusted for output 
growth. Equation(5.3) states that the change in the stock of public debt 
from one period to the next must cover the budget deficit inclusive of inter- 
est payments (rbt- 1). 
The traditional approach in investigating the sustainability of countries' 
fiscal policy is based on the intertemporal budget constraint of the govern- 
ment. This is obtained solving the equation of the debt forward for periods 
+ 1, t+2, t+3t 
bt :- 
00 s bt+s dt + rl 
(I+rt+j) j=I 
In the long term fiscal policy is said to be sustainable if the present value 
of the existing stock of public debt is identical to the present value of future 
primary surpluses: 
bt =Esd, 
0', 
5=1 11 (1+rt+j) j=1 
Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability is that the 
right hand side of the intertemporal equation is zero as n--+ oo : 
t+s lim ri (I rt+j) 5 ýOoj=j 
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This also known as transversality condition and implies no Ponzi games, 
meaning no new debt is issued to meet new interest rate payments. 
This condition does not mean that debt should go to zero at any point 
in time. The debt can also grow at a positive rate. Of course a permanent 
positive growth rate is inconsistent with the above equation. A deficit at 
any point in time(or over a period of time) has to be offset by a surplus at 
another point in time(Uctum-Wickens, 1997). 
In the medium term, fiscal policy is sustainable, or intertemporally con- 
sistent, if it is able to achieve a given target level of the Debt-CDP ratio b*. 
The Government borrowing constraint becomes: 
T* 
dt bt - b* = r, 
5=1 
A (I+rt+j) j=l 
where b* denotes the desired level of debt-GDP ratio at the end of the 
planning period T*. 
The transversality condition, then, slightly changes in: 
T* b lim 
J=l 
The inclusion of a time constraint in the analysis leads to further consid- 
erations. In the previous case, as long as the output growth is higher than 
real interest rate (p < q), the discounted value of debt approaches zero as 
time progresses; this happens independently of the initial level of the debt. 
In this case the possibility of achieving the target level also depends 
upon the gap between the current and the target level of debt (bt - b*) as a t 
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time constraint to be respected exists. Thus, fiscal policy can be said to be 
sustainable if the previous conditions are respected, and if the government 
is able to generate surpluses capable of compensating for such a gap and for 
the deficits that have arisen in the interval T* - t. 
The previous considerations rely on the assumption of a constant interest 
rate and a constant output growth rate. In the following we try to derive 
conditions for the sustainability of the fiscal policy, when a stochastic interest 
rate is taken into account. 
5.3 Literature review 
A few years ago researchers were content to assume the existence of the in- 
tertemporal budget balance without worrying about whether the data gen- 
crating processes were consistent with such a constraint. More recently, 
researchers have tried to implement tests of the intertemporal budget con- 
straint in a variety of different context. Examples of such a growth in 
literature are Hamilton and Flavin(1986), Trehan and Walsh(1988,1991), 
Kremers(1988,1989), Wilcox(1989), Hakkio and Rush(1991), Tanner and 
Liu(1994), Quintos(1995), Haug(1991,1995), Ahmed and Rogers(1995), Wick- 
ens and Uctum (1997), Crowder(1997), Payne(1997) and Artis and Marcelino(1998). 
In these works the main tools used to analyse the sustainability of budget 
deficits seem to be stationarity tests for the stock of public debt, and coin- 
tegration tests between government expenditures and government revenues 
(or alternatively stock of public debt and public deficit). Some results of 
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these works follow. 
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Hamilton and Flavin(1986) suggest that a sufficient condition for the 
Present value of the Budget constraint (PVB C) to hold is that the primary 
balance, and therefore that public debt, is a stationary series. It should be 
noted that this is a sufficient but not necessary condition for sustainability; 
fiscal policy could be sustainable even if debt is non-stationary. They find 
that non stationarity can be rejected and that the PVBC therefore is not 
violated. 
Trehan and Walsh(1988) argue that if debt is integrated of order 1, and 
if the (expected) real interest rate is constant, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the PVBC to hold is that debt and the primary fiscal bal- 
ance (dt-1, bt-1) are cointegrated. Looking at the equation(5.3) one can see 
that if b is I(l), the change in debt must be stationary by definition; the 
overall deficit, dt-j+ rbt-1, is 1(0). Thus, if r is constant, dt-jand bt-1 are 
cointegrated with a cointegrating vector (1, r). 
Three years later the same authors('IYehan and Walsh, 1991) end up with 
conclusion that if the (expected) real interest rate is not constant: sustain- 
ability no longer implies that (dt-1, bt-1) are cointegrated. A sufficient con- 
dition for the PVBC to hold is that the overall deficit, dt-I + rtbt-1, is 
stationary. 
The approach of Hakkio and Rush(1991) is to test the cointegrated re- 
lationship between public spending and level of taxes. Their work relies on 
the hypothesis that the real interest rate is a stationary variable with mean 
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r. The authors assert that when there is cointegration between these vari- 
ables, the fiscal deficit is not sustainable; when there is cointegration with 
coefficient 0=I the deficit is sustainable; when there is cointegration with 
,6<1, government expenditures are growing faster than the revenues, and 
the deficit may not be sustainable. 
Wilcox(1989) shows that when the transversality condition holds, the 
present value of government debt is stationary and has an unconditional 
mean of zero. For the U. S. he finds mixed evidence on stationarity and 
rejects an unconditional mean of zero, thus concluding that postwar U. S. 
fiscal policy has been unsustainable. 
Wickens and Uctum(1997), by extending the results of Wilcox(1989) to 
the case where the discount rate is stochastic and time varying, and assuming 
the discounted primary deficit either exogenous or endogenous, show that 
a necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability is that the discounted 
debt-GDP ratio should be a stationary zero-mean process. 
Lastly, Roberds (1991) found that the transversality condition implies 
cross-equation restrictions on the stochastic processes generating debt and 
deficits in a VAR framework. 
The test implemented in the rest of the chapter, similarly the approach 
proposed by Wilcox(1989), Trehan-Walsh(1991) and Wickens and Uctum(1997), 
accounts for a stochastic interest rate. However, this study differs from the 
previous Nvorks in two important aspects. It uses a log-linear form of the 
5.4. A VAR FRAMEWORK 183 
public debt identity' and applies a multivariate test to the sustainability of 
the fiscal policy. 
5.4 A VAR M-amework 
The main aim of this section is to assess the sustainability of fiscal policy 
by using a VAR framework. 
The sustainability of public deficits is determined by the dynamics of 
the public debt. The factors which influence such dynamics can be derived 
from the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC). At time t it is as follows: 
bt = dt-1 + (1 + rt-l)bt-l 
where the variables keep the above mentioned meaning. 
In this form the IBC is not suitable to be studied by linear models. Under 
the assumption of a stochastic interest rate, the public debt is a non-linear 
combination of the explanatory variables. In order to express the IBC in 
a linear form, we take the log linear approximation of equation(5.2). This 
solves the non-linearity of the model and allows us to express the IBC in 
terms of a VAR(1) model. 
In log linear form the IBC becomes 2: 
d 
In bt = tz + 0-1 In bt-, + =In dt-1 + P-lrt-1 (5.4) b 
'As we mentioned in the introduction, to express the IBC in a log-linear form allows 
for estimating the model in a VAR framework. 
2 See appendix 5.1 for the proof. 
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where 8 is the discount factor (1/1 +T) and T, ý!, -f are respectively the 
sample means of public debt, primary deficit and real interest rate adjusted 
for the output growth rate. 
Equation(5.4)3 represents one of the equations of a three dimensional 
VAR(1) model having respectively the logarithm of the deflated public debt, 
the logarithm of the deflated primary deficit and the real interest rate as 
endogenous variables. The VAR(1) system can be represented as follows: 
yt =K+ lIyyt-I + ct (5.5) 
where yt is the vector of the endogenous variables (in bt, In dt, rtf, II,, is 
the (3 x 3) matrix of the coefficients and K is the (3 x 1) vector of constants. 
The sustainability of fiscal policy depends upon the stability of model(5.5). 
In particular, if model(5.5) is globally stationary, fiscal policy is said to be 
sustainable. If model(5.5) is not globally stationary, fiscal policy is said to 
be unsustainable. The stationarity of the VAR system is investigated in two 
steps. First, we apply a roots analysis and, then, if necessary, we conduct a 
cointegration analysis. The analysis is conducted under two scenarios. We 
assume the interest rate to be exogenous with respect to the remaining vari- 
ables in the system. Under this hypothesis, following the approach proposed 
by Wickens and Uctum (1997), we leave the discounted primary deficit to 
3A stochastic error term has been added in order to capture the error due to the log 
linear approximation. 
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be either exogenous or endogenous with respect to the public debt. The 
former case reflects a situation in which the Government, in setting public 
spending, neglects both the level of public debt and the level of real interest 
rate. On the contrary, the latter case describes a situation in which the gov- 
ernment, in setting the public spending at time t, takes into account both 
the level of the interest rate and the level of public debt at time t-1. For a 
Government devoted to reducing the level of public indebtedness, negative 
feedbacks from discounted debt and level of the interest rate are expected. 
Government reacts to an increase of the interest rate and or an increase of 
the public debt at time t-1, by reducing the primary deficit or by generating 
primary surpluses over time. 
a)Exogenous interest rate and exogenous primary deficit: 
A VAR(p) model including exogenous variables can be represented as 
follows: 
Yt =E IIY, iyt-i +Z 11--, izt-i + st (5.6) 
i=l i=O 
where Ily is (p x p) matrix, II,, is (p x q) matrix, zt is the vector of the ex- 
ogenous variables and et is a Gaussian process with zero mean and constant 
variance4. The other symbols keep the above mentioned meaning. 
If the system is a first order VAR, model(5.6) can be represented: 
4p and q represent respectively the number of endogenous and exogenous variables. 
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Yt = ljy, iyt-i + Ilz, izt-i + ect (5.7) 
In general, the estimated roots of the autoregressive polynomial in model(5.7) 
are obtained by the solutions of the equation: 
k 
ip" 
- ii"i Z-i o (5.8) 
The necessary and sufficient condition for stability is that the modulus 
of the roots in reverse characteristic equation(5.8) are smaller than one. 
The system is said to be unstable if the system contains roots equal to 
one. Nevertheless, if the variables are cointegrated, the system is globally 
stationary, and then stable, even though the system contains unit roots. 
The system is said to be explosive if one of the roots is greater than one 5. 
Under the assumption of exogenous interest rate and exogenous primary 
deficit, model(5.6) includes only an endogenous variable: Ily, i is just a scalar. 
The VAR is reduced to a univariate process. The stability of the system only 
depends upon the root of the public debt series. If lIy, i is smaller than one, 
the system is said to be stable. The root of the system, that we know 
to be equal to (I + -F) from the IBC in log-linear form, depends upon the 
5The condition for the stability of the VAR can be stated in terms of the roots of 
characteristic and reverse characteristic polynomial and can be confusing if it is not clear 
which polynomial is being referred to. In terms of the characteristic polynomials (II, - zI) 
the stability condition is that all eigenvalues (roots) have modulus less than one. In terms 
of the reverse characteristic polynomials (I - 111z) the stability condition is that none of 
its eigenvalues (roots) have modulus less than one. The former case is the one applied in 
this paper. 
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sample mean of the interest rate. If the sample mean of the real interest 
rate adjusted for the output growth rate is negative then IIy, i is less than 
one and the fiscal policy is said to be sustainable. If the sample mean 7 is 
positive, the coefficient Hy, i is greater than zero the system is explosive and 
the fiscal policy is said to be unsustainable. Finally, if the sample mean of 
the interest rate (adjusted for the output growth rate) is equal to zero (or 
close to zero), Ily, i is equal to one and cointegration analysis is required in 
order to assess the sustainability of the fiscal policy. 
Thus, the system is globally stationary if the processes generating the 
exogenous variables (i. e. primary deficit and interest rate) and the public 
debt are cointegrated. The cointegration analysis follows6. 
As VECM, model(5.6) may be reparameterised as follows: 
k-1 k-1 
Ayt =E ry, iAyt-i +E lr., iAzt-i + Tyyt-i+ Tzzt-i + Ct (5.9) 
i=l i=O 
where the ]Py, i 's, the ]P,, i 's, Ily and H,, are obtained from lIy, i 's and 
the H,, i 's by solving: 
k-1 k-1 
Ipý, - Hy, iL' = 
(Ipy 
- ry, iL') 
(1 - L) - IIYL 
k-1 k-1 
1: Ilý,, jL' = 1: ]P, ý, jL'(l - L) - Il-, L 
i=O i=O 
'Notice that, since the remaining parameters involved in model(5.6) are not considered 
in this analysis, stationarity is meant as stationary around some deterministic components 
or stationary around, some possibly non stationary pattern determined by exogenous 
variables. 
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When the exogenous variables zt are included, the dynamic properties 
as well as the interpretation of (5.9) will depend on the assumption about 
the full model for yt and zt. There are basically two alternative assumptions 
in the literature. In the first(Johansen, 1992a, Harbo at all, 1998) zt is 
assumed to be determined by a model like: 
k-1 k-I 
Azt 1: Gy, iAyt-i + 
1: Gz, iAzt-i 
i=l i=O 
In the second (Rahbek-Mosconi, 1998, Mosconi-Rahbek, 1996), zt is as- 
surned to be determined by a model of the type: 
k-1 k-I 
Azt Gy, iAyt-i + 1: ab'zt-i 
i=O 
and the stationary linear combinations of the levels of zt is allowed to 
enter the conditional subsystem without any restrictions. We have chosen 
the model proposed by Johansen(1992a). 
Under this assumption, Ily and II_, are assumed to share the same column 
space i. e. 
I =a 
, 
Y py , ii, = cf)3z 
so that model(5.9) may be rewritten in the form: 
k-1 k-1 
Ayt =Z ry, iAyt-i +E rz, iAzt-i + aß'yt-, +ceßz'zt-, + et 
i=O 
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where a is the loading matrix and 6' is the matrix of the cointegrated 
relationship. 
Since model(5.5) is a VAR(l), equation(5.9) becomes: 
Ayt = ay#'yt-j+aý, 6z'zt-j + ct y 
where ay is (p x p) matrix and ce,, is (p x q) matrix. 
As mentioned above, if the system contains unit roots the system is said 
to be unstable. Nevertheless, if the variables are cointegrated, the system 
is said to be globally stationary and then stable, even though the system 
contains unit roots. In this case, the system is said to be stationary if the 
only endogenous variable (i. e. bt) and the remaining I(1) processes in the 
system are cointegrated. If the interest rate is assumed to be a stationary 
proceSS7 , the cointegrated vector is between the public debt and the primary 
deficit. It is as follows: 
In bt-, 
eit-i = (1, ßl, 0) In dt-, 
rt-1 
] 
If the primary deficit is a stationary process the cointegrated vector is 
between the public debt and the interest rate. It is as follows: 
In bt-1 
eit-i = (11 01 ßi) In dt-1 
rt-1 
1 
'The stationarity of the real interest rate is an open issue and is strictly related with 
time series properties of the consumer price index(CPI). If the CPI is an I(l) variable, 
the real interest rate is not stationary as the inflation rate is 1(0). If the CPI is an 1(2), 
the inflation rate is I(l) and then nominal interest rate and inflation rate cointegrate with 
cointegrating vector(l, l), in the long run (St-Amant, 1996). 
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If the exogenous variables(i. e. primary deficit and interest rate) are both 
1(1) processes, a cointegrated relationship among all the variables is nec- 
essary in order for the system to be globally stationary. The cointegrated 
vector8 is: 
In bt-1 
In dt-1 
rt-1 
I 
b)Endogenous primary deficit and exogenous interest rate 
Under the assumption of an endogenous primary deficit, system(5-5) 
includes two endogenous variables and one exogenous variable. In this case, 
the matrix IIy, j is a (2 x 2) matrix and 11,, j is a (2 x 1) vector. In a more 
explicit form, model(5.5) can be expressed as follows: 
In bt In bt-1 ]+ (I + 7) Eti rt-1 + (5.12) In dt Ir2l W22 In dt-1 W23 
I[ 
Ct2 
] 
Unlike the previous case, the roots of the system will depend not only 
on the sample mean of the real interest rate(-r) but also on the sample mean 
of the primary deficit (i. e. ý! ), the sample mean of the public debt (i. e. T), 
the parameter measuring the feedback of the government with respect the 
public debt (i. e-W21) and the autoregressive coefficient of the primary deficit 
(i. e-7r22) - 
The system is stable and the fiscal policy sustainable, if the system 
contains both roots smaller than one and the process generating the only 
exogenous variable(i. e. interest rate) is stationary. The system is explosive, 
8AII cointegrated vectors have been normalized with respect to the public debt. 
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and the fiscal policy is unsustainable, if one or both roots are greater than 
one. Finally, the system is unstable if it contains unit roots. In this case, 
a Cointegration analysis is necessary in order to assess the stability of the 
system and, thus, the sustainability of the fiscal policy. 
The Vector Error Correction representation of model(5.12) is as follows: 
A In bt all a12 ßt 
In bt-1 ]+[ a13 ] ß'rt-1+[ '5ýt' 
] 
(5.13) 
[A 
In dt 
]=[ 
a21 a22 
]y[ 
In dt-1 a23 Z Et2 
where aij are the coefficients of the loading matrix. 8' and, 6' represent yz 
the sub-matrices of the partioned matrix 8'. The dimension of 6' depends 
upon the number of cointegrated relationships necessary, in order, for the 
VAR model to be stationary. If the system contains two unit roots, there is 
just one cointegrated relationship. In this case, the matrix of cointegrated 
relationship 3, is reduced to be a vector. It follows: 
ß' = eit-i) 
If the interest rate is stationary, the cointegrated vector is between the 
public debt and the primary deficit. It is as follows: 
In bt-1 
eit-i = (1 , ß, , In dt-1 
rt-i 
1 
If the system contains a unit root and the process generating the exoge- 
nous variable is not stationary, the cointegrated vector is between the public 
debt and the interest rate9. It is as follows : 
'The cointegrated vectors have been both normalised with respect to the public debt. 
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In bt-1 
eit-i = (1,0, ßi) In dt-1 
1 
rt-1 
1 
When the system(5.12) contains two unit roots and the process generat- 
ing the exogenous variable is not stationary, there must be two cointegrated 
relationships in order for the system to be globally stationary. In this case 
the matrix of the cointegrated relationship 8' is the following: 
G-2 
where ýjt-j and ýlt-2 are the two cointegrated vectors. 
The first cointegrated relationship is between the enclogenous variables(i. e. 
bt and dt) in the system. It is as followslo: 
-1 In bt In dt In dt-1 
rt-i 
1 
The second cointegrated relationship is between one or both of the en- 
dogenous variables (Le bt or dt) and the only exogenous variable(Le rt). 
If the primary deficit and the interest rate are cointegrated, the cointe- 
grated vector ýlt-2" iS: 
In bt-1 
ýlt-2 :: -- (0,1,01) In dt- I 
I 
rt-, 
If the public debt and the interest rate are cointegrated the cointegrated 
vector 61t-2 
12 iS: 
1OThe vector has been normalized with respect to the public debt. 
"The OV has been normalized with respect to primary deficit. 
12 The CV has been normalized with respect to public debt. 
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ýlt-2 ý (1) 01 01) 
If the second cointegrated relationsh 
tem, the cointegrated vector 6t-2" is: 
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In bt-, 
In dt-1 
rt-1 
ip involves all variables in the sys- 
In bt 
ýlt-2 
--'ý 
(I) 
J81; 
02) In dt: 
11 
rt-1 
I 
5.5 Empirical evidence 
In this section, we describe the data and the econometric methodology used 
in this chapter. The data used in the analysis are quarterly and are taken 
respectively from NIPA and ECB website. The U. S sample covers the period 
1966 to 2002. The Euro Area sample, due to unavailability of aggregate data, 
covers the shorter period 1977 to 1997. 
The econometric methodology follows in three steps: in the first step, we 
study the stationarity properties of the time series by using unit root tests; 
in the second step, we conduct classic tests aiming to test the specification 
of the model and the stability of the system (i. e. Lag length, exogeneity 
test and roots analysis). In the final step, given that the variables are not 
stationary, we apply a cointegration analysis. 
5.5.1 Univariate analysis 
The unit root test applied is the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (see 
for eaxample Said-Dickey, 1984). This test is performed to determine the 
13 The CV has been normalized with respect to public debt. 
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series order of integration. The order of integration of a series is the number 
of times a series needs to be differenced to achieve stationarity. The test is 
described in the appendix 5.2. 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected the series is non-stationary. In 
particular, if the first difference is stationary, the series is integrated of 
order one. For testing the stationarity of the first difference of the variable 
we apply again the ADF test to the first difference of the series. If the null 
of a unit root is rejected, the series in differences is stationary and thus the 
series in level is I(1). If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the series of 
the first differences is not stationary and one performs the ADF test on the 
second differences and so on. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the results of the Dicky Fuller test for both 
countries. Specifically, it shows the statistics, as well as the quantiles of their 
asymptotic distribution, for each variable in level. The null hypotheses under 
which the asymptotic distributions are tabulated are always joint hypotheses 
concerning the coefficient(p), the mean(p), and the trend(, 8). 14The reason is 
clearly explained in Hamilton(1994). The first three statistics are referred 
to the model without trend'5, while the remaining statistics to model with 
trend. 16The asymptotic distribution of all tests on the coefficients of this 
regression is not standard, but is known and tabulated. 17 Thus, the tables 
"See appendix 5.2 for further details about the Dicky Fuller and the Augmented Dicky 
Fuller Test. 
15 See model A 5.2.1 in the Appendix 5.2. 
"See model A 5.2.3 in the Appendix 5.2. 
17 The test statistic does not have a normal distribution so that it would be inappropriate 
to use conventional normal or Y tables to look up the critical values. Appropriate, critical 
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also report the references of the asymptotic distribution which the tests 
refer t018 - The shaded areas highlight the tests not rejecting the unit root 
hypothesis. All tests suggest that variables are non-stationary. 
Table(5.3) and table(5.4) show the same tests for the first differences 
of the variables. All tests reject the null hypothesis. The first differences 
of the variables are stationary. This proves that the variables in level are 
integrated of order one I(I). 
values, which depend the sample size have been tabulated by Puller(1976) and Dicky- 
Fuller(1981). These values were obtained by simulation. 
18 For instance, the first row of the table gives the critical value tabulated by Fuller(1976, 
p. 373, Block I) while the third row reports the critical value tabulated by Dicky- 
Fuller(1981, tab. 1) 
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AUGMEN'TED DICKEY-FULLER IN TEGRATION TESTS 
Variable= InB 
Max lag in the AR corr. -I 
Actual Sample size - 145 
TEST Statistic 1%value 2.5%value 5%value 10%value 
P-01 11=0 
_AJ F76; P. 371B4ockJ1 
P=O, 1-0 02 F76; p. 373, B1oc*J1 
P-01 1-0 4*71 DF81". Tab. l 
P=O, F76; P. 371. BbckJ11 
AM f 4, C4 0323, W40M '3.16 F76; P. 373, Bbcklll 
P=O, P-O'" 252 a69, 4,88 4.16 
1 
DF81--. Tab-11 
P=O, "I 2ig 8.73 7.44_ 6.49 &47 DFBI; Tab. 111 
AUGMEN'TED DICKEY-FULLER IMIGRATION TESTS 
Variabic = Ind 
Max lag In the AR corr. =I 
Actual Sampic sim = 145 
TEST Statistic 1%value 2.5%value 5%value 10%value 
P=O, P=O F76; P. 3710OCkll 
P=01 P=O -2.37 -3.61 -&V -289 -M F76. P. 373J31OCkll 
P=O, P=O Z94 6.7 5.67 4.71 3W DF81". Tab-I 
P=O, " 47t ý274 -23.6 -20.7 Als F76. p. 37I. BloW11 
P=01 " ýZU -4.04 -318' -3A5 . 3.15 F76; P. 373. Bk)Wll 
P=O, wo, " 1-97 11 ., 64 6.691' 4.88 kle DF8l; Tab. 11 
P=O, " zal. V--0,73 744, OAOý 6.47 1 Dnl; Tab. 111 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER INTEGRATION TESTS 
Variable =r 
Max lag In the AR corr. =I 
Actual S"Ie sin = 145 
TEST Statistic I 1%value 2.5%value 5 %value 10%value 
P=O, P-0 48-8 1 -laa '16Z -13,7 
41. F76p. 371ýNockll 
P-01 1-0 . 0.9s 161 -3,17' *2M -2M 
F76; p. 373JNockJ1 
0,45, 6-7, "1 4j1 3.80 DF81 **. Tab-I 
-21.4 -23'S, -20,7 -17.5 F76, P. 371. BIOWII 
P-0, *72j -4.04 -173 -3A5, -3. 
IS F76, P. 373, B1oCW11 
"I 11=01" I 
"1" 6.5 6W 4.88 416, DF81. *Tab. 11 
P-01 4.36 &73 7.44 16.49 SA7 I DF81,,. Tab III 
Table 5.1 United States: The ADF test for the variables in level 
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AUGMEINMED DICKEY-FULIXR INTE 
Variable - InB 
Alax lag In the AR corr. =I 
Actual Sample size - 82 
GRATION TESTS 
TEST Statistic 1%value 2.5%value 5%value 10%value 
vol JPQ 
-41 - 
F76; p. 371, B6ock11 
Vol 14ý0 km, . 3ý IT -M QrA F76; P. 373, BIOCkll 
vol 11ý0 Vt. 3.86 DF81, Tab. 1 
vol Vo *Z V *V. 4 -23.6 -2M7, 4 17 rz F76: P. 371, BiDCJd11 
vol -103k RtM AAS WS, Is F76, p. 373, BiDck111 
VA 11ý01" 4M 60 CM 4.89 415 DF81; Tab-9 
vol " 6w &73 IM OA9 &41 DF81. Tb-111 
AUGNIENTED DICKEY-FULLER INTEGRATION TESTS 
Variable - Ind 
Max lag In the AR corr. -I 
ActualSaFMIesize -82 
UST Statistic 
- 
1%value 2.5%value 5%value 10%value 
P=O, P=O 4.41 6.3 F76, p-37I. Block1l 
P=01 V-0 -1-96 -3$1 -3-11 -Zsa F76: P. 373, BWd1 
P=01 1-0 227 U 6.57 4.71 &W M81, Tab. 1 
vol -3.01 -27.4 -23.6 -20.7 -17.5 F76. P. 371, BbcW11 
P=01 -1.74 A04 -&-73 -3.45, -3.15 F76: P. 373, BicW11 
v% 11ý01" Z32 64, US 
4. W 4.10 DFBI. Tab-H 
P=01 " sm M 7.44 640 6-47' 
. 
DFauawa 
AUGNIEN TED DICKEY-FULLER INTEGRATION TESTS 
Variable -r 
Max lag In the AR c(xT. -I 
Actual Sample size -82 
TEST Statistic I 1%value 2.5%value 5%value 10%value 
P=O, P=O F76, p. 371. Blockil P=01 V-0 -0.67 4m -all -ZW' -ZW F76; P. 373, Bbckll 
P-01 11-0 1130 al au, Of smý DFBI. Tab. 1 
P=O, -0.16 -27A 04, -, W*Z -1746, F76; P. 37J, BiDck111 
P=01 -W% 404 -3,73 a45 -3, . 
1s, F76; P. 373, BbCk111 
vo, P=O, " 1.71, 5.59 4. W, 4.10 I)F81; Tab. U 
Pý01 22a a73 7.44 1149ý 6A7' DFBI", Tab. 111 
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AUG". %MNTED DICKEY-FULLER INTEGRATION TESTS 
Variable - InB 
Max lag In the AR corr. -I 
Actual Sample size - 145 
TEST Statistic 1%value 2.5%value 5%value 10%value 
P=01 PýO -74.05 -19.8 -16.3 -13.7 -11 F76p. 371. Blockil 
vol 1. --0 -5.43 -3.51 -3.17 -2.89 -2.58 F76: p. 373. Bicý] 
vol 1. -0 14.75 6.7 5.57 4.71 3.86 DF81; Tab-f 
PAI " -76.39 -27.4 -23.6 -20.7 -17.5 F76; P. 371, BbCW11 
P-01 " -5.52 -4.04 -3.73 -3.45 -3.15 1`76, P. M. Blocid1l 
P=O, P=O, " 10.18 6.5 5.59 4.88 4.16 DF81; Tab. 11 
PMO, " 15.26 8.73 7.44 6.49 5.47 DF81; Tab. 111 
AUGMENTED DICKTY-FULLER INTEGRATION TESTS 
Variable - Ind 
Max lag In the AR corr. -I 
Actual SamrAe size - 145 
TEST Statistic 1%value 2.5%value 5%V21Ue 10%V21tie 
P-01 11ý0 -107.96 -19.8 -16.3 -13.7 -11 F76. p. 371.8iockll 
vol PýO -6.54 -3.51 -3.17 -2.89 -2.58 F76; P. 373, BiOCk11 
P=01 V-0 21.41 6.7 5.57 4.71 3.86 DF81; Tab-I 
vol " -108.12 -27.4 -23.6 -20.7 -17.5 F76: p. 371. B1ock111 
Vol " -6.54 -4.04 -3.73 -3.45 -3.15 F76; p. 373, Bkx: Ull 
P=O, P=%" 14.29 6.5 5.59 4.88 4.16 
1 
DF81. Tab. 11 
] 
"1" 21.43 8.73 7.44 6.49 5.47 DF81; Tab. 111 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER INTEGRATION TESTS 
Variable -r 
Max lag in the AR corr. -I 
Actual Sample size - 145 
TEST Statistic 1%value 2.5%value 5 %value 10%value 
P=01 11=0 -61.85 -19.8 -16.3 -13.7 -11 F76; p. 371. BbckJl 
vol P-0 -5.25 -3.51 -3.17 -2.89 -2.58 F76o. 373. Bioddl 
vol vo 13.81 6.7 5.57 4.71 3.86 DF81. Tab. 1 
P-01 0=0 -76.03 -27.4 -23.6 -20.7 -17.5 F76ýp. 3? 1. Bk)CkJ11 
vol " -5.94 -4.04 -3.73 -3.45 -3.15 F76: P. 373, BiOCkJ11 
P=O, P=O, P=O 11.78 6.5 5.59 4.88 4.16 DF8J. TabJ[ 
P=01 P=O 17.66 8.73 7.44 6.49 5.47 DF81. Tab. 111 
Table 5.3 United States: The ADF test for the first difference of the 
variables 
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AUGNIEN'TED DICKEY-FULLER IINTEGRATION TESTS 
Variable - InB 
Max lag In the AR corr. =I 
ActualSamplesize -82 
TM Statistic 1%value 2.5%value 5%value 10%value 
P-01 1-0 -13.42 -19.8 -16.3 -13.7 -11 F78; P. 371. BloWl 
P=O, P=o -3.91 -3.51 -3.17 -2.89 -2.58 FMP. 37300W 
PA, P=o 7.72 6.7 5.57 4.71 3.86 DF81, 'Tab. 1 
P=01 " -14.86 -27.4 -23.6 -20.7 -17.5 F76; P. 371. BbCk111 
vol " -4.18 -4. G4 -3.73 -3.45 -3.15 F76: P. 373, BbW11 
P=O, po, " 5.88 6.5 5.59 4.88 4.16 DF81, Tab. 11 
P=01 " 8.74 8.73 7.44 6.49 5.47 1 muabmj 
AUGNIENTED DICICEY-FULLER ]INTEGRATION TESTS 
Variable - Ind 
Max lag In the AR coff. =I 
Actual Sanple size - 82 
TESr Statistic 1%value 2.5%value 5%value 10%value 
P=01 P4 -17.2 -19.8 -16.3 -13.7 -11 F76: p. 371,81oýl 
11ý01 IL-0 -2.92 -3.51 -3.17 -2.89 -2.58 F70; P-373. BIOMI 
P-0, P=o 4.59 6.7 5.57 4.71 3.86 DF81", Tab. 1 
P=01 -21.22 -27.4 -23.6 -20.7 -17.5 F76: P. 371. BbWf1 
P=01 -3.42 -4.04 -3.73 -3.45 -3.15 F76; p. 373. BbWll 
P==O, P=O, P=O 4.27 6.5 5.59 4.88 4.16 DF81.. Tib. 11 
P=01 " 6.05 8.73 7.44 6.49 5.47 . 
E)FBI. Tab. 111 
AUGME, NrED DICKEY-FULLER EVITGRATION TESTS 
Variable= r 
Max lag In the AR corr. -I 
Actual Sarnoe size - 82 
TESr Statistic 1%value 2.5%value 5%value 10%value 
1-01 9ý0 -24.39 -19.8 -16.3 -13.7 -11 F74,371. Bioddl 
vol V-0 -3.45 -3.51 -3.17 -2.89 -2.58 F76. p. 373,9"1 
Pý01 vo 6.24 6.7 5.57 4.71 3.86 DF81; Tab. 1 
P=01 " -33.32 -27.4 -23.6 -20.7 -17.5 F76ýP. 371. Btddll 
vol VO -4.37 -4.04 -3.73 -3.45 -3.15 F76, p. 373, BbW11 
V, D, IL4, " 6.76 6.5 5.59 4.88 4.16 DF81', Tab. 11 
P-01 " 9.81 8.73 7.44 6.49 5.47 1 mixab. m 
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5.5.2 Specification analysis 
This subsection is aimed at testing the specification of the model. In the 
following, the results of the maximum lag test, the exogeneity test and the 
roots analysis are reported. 
The optimal lag length has been checked by classical tests like Akaike 
(AIC), Scwartz(BIC) and Hannan and Quinn(HQ) criterias '9. Table (5.5) 
shows the results: 
MAXIMUM LAG ANALYSIS 
INFORNIATION CRITERIA 
United States 
LAG AKAIKE HANNAN-QUINN SCHWARZ 
1 1ý- 28.84 __ "-- -_ _2i: 8_6ý_ 
_., 
'.. ý_.. I_- 
2 29.394 29.225 28.979 
3 29.399 29.155 28.798 
4 29.499 29.179 28.712 
Euro Area 
LAG AKAIKE HANNAN-QUINN SCHWARZ 
I 33ý1948 YjF. 75ý--- 
' 2 36.809 3ý. 571 36.21 4 
3 37.154 36.808 36.291 
4 37.108 36.655 35.977 
Table 5.5 Optimal Lag Lenght 
The model selected is the one where the statistic reaches its minimum. 
The optimal lag length is one for both countries. 
"Maximum lag analysis in VAR models is discussed at lenght in Lutkepohl(1991) 
and Reimers(1993). The formulae for the information criteria, i. e. Akaike (AIC), 
Scwartz(BIC), Hannan and Quinn(HQ) may be found in Lutkepol(1991). 
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Regarding the exogeneity test, we use three consecutive F-tests to check 
for the exogeneity of the real interest rate with respect to the public debt 
and primary deficit. First, we test whether the lag of real interest rate enters 
into both public debt and primary deficit equations. Then, we test whether 
the lags on public debt and primary deficit are jointly equal to zero into real 
interest rate equation. Table 5.6 reports the results for the Euro, Area and 
United states: 
United States Euro Area 
Inb equation Inb equation 
Nuff Hypothesis: The Following Coefficients are Zero Nu Hypothesis: The Following Coefficients are Zero 
r Lag(s) I r Lag(s) 1 
F(1,142) = 13.31774 with Significance Level 0.00036854 F(1,79) = 3.377 with Significance Level 0.049 
Ind equation Ind equation 
Null Hypothesis: The Following Coefficlenits are Zero Nu Hypothesis: The Following Coefficlents are Zero 
r Lag(s) I r Lag(s) 1 
F(1,142) = 3.81432 with Significance Level 0.042 F(1,79) = 5.9197 with Significance Level 0.017 
r equation r equation 
Null Hypothesis: The Following Coefficients are Zero NH Hypothesis: The Following Coefficients are Zero 
Inb Lag(s) 1 Inb Lag(s) I 
Ind Lag(s) I Ind Lag(s) 1 
F(2,142) = 2.30491 with Significance Level 0.106 F(2,79) = 1.83012 with Significance Level 0.169 
Table 5.6. Testing for the exogeneity of the real interest rate. 
F-tests reject the hypothesis" that the lagged coefficient on the interest 
rate is zero for the first two equations. On the contrary, the F-test for 
the interest rate equation rejects the hypothesis that the lagged coefficients 
on the public debt and primary deficit are jointly equal to zero. Overall, 
20The hypothsis is accepted at 95% confidence when the significance level is greater 
than 0.05. 
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empirical evidence does not reject the exogeneity of the real interest rate 
for both countries. The real interest rate affects both primary deficit and 
public debt but these variables do not affect the real interest rate. 
Given that real interest rate is exogenous , we conduct the roots analysis 
under the scenario (b) of section 5.4. Specifically, we conduct the analysis 
in terms of the characteristic polynomial. The stability condition is that all 
eigenvalues (roots) have modulus less than one2l. 
The roots of the model(5.7) are reported below: 
ROOTS 
United States 
NUMBER ROOT ABSOLUTE VALUE 
1 (0.97453.0.00000) 0.97453 
2 (0.96070,0.00000) 0.9607 
Euro Area 
NUMBER ROOT ABSOLUTE VALUE 
1 (0-98548,0.03903) 0.98625 
2 (0.98548, -0-03903) 0.98625 
Table 5.7 The roots of the model 
where the first number represents the real part and the second number 
represents the imaginary part. In both countries the roots are very close to 
one. Despite they are slightly lower in United States, the system seems to 
be unstable for both countries. 
"In the case of complex roots, say vj = v: + v'i, where vj' and v'i are the real part 3ji 
, 
)l, ]0,5 and imaginary parts of vj, the modulus is defined as mod(vj) = 
[(Vjl)2 + (V. ý 
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5.5.3 Cointegration analysis 
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Having established the empirical model, the next stage is to determine the 
cointegration rank corresponding to the number of equilibrium relationships 
among the variables in the VAR. The procedure for assessing the cointegra- 
tion rank of the I(1) model is represented by a sequence of Likelihood ratio 
tests, as shown in Johansen(1996). Specifically, only the so called trace test 
is computed since the lambda-max test, although easily computable, does 
not give rise to a coherent testing strategy as illustrated-in Johansen(1994) 
based on Pantula(1989). The tests are reported, together with the criti- 
cal values2l in Table(5.8) and Table(5.9)23. The problem of testing for the 
cointegration rank r is deeply connected with the problem of determining 
the appropriate trend polynomial. In fact, the test has been conducted in 
each of the five models proposed in Johansen (1994) (i. e from MI to M5). 24 
22 The critical values are tabulated in Johansen(1996), 
23 The hypothesis is accepted when the calculated value is greater than the tabulated 
value. The shaded area highlights the first type error probability at which the hypothesis 
is not rejected. 
24 The specification of the models is as follows: 
MI. Modell : mo =0 and mi =0 (i. e. y, =0 and jul = 
0) Zero mean in the 1(0) 
components, non-zero mean in the 1(1) components. 
A12. Afodel2 : mo = ab, and m, 0 (i. e. juo abo andjul = 
0) Non-zero mean in both 
the 1(0) and the I(l) components 
M. AfodeM: mo = mo and mi 0 (i. e. jao unrestricted andy, = 
0) Non zero mean 
in the 1(0) components, linear trend in the I(l) components 
. 
Af4. Afodel4 : mo = mo and rn, = abi (i. e. po = unrestricted and abi) Linear 
Trend in both the 1(0) and the I(l) components 
Af5. Afodel5 : mo = mo and rnl = m, (i. e. po = unrestricted and jul = unrestricted) Linear Trend in the 1(0) components, quadratic trend in the I(I) components. 
Af6. Alodel6: Model2 and Model3 jointly 
Af7. Afodel7: Model4 and. Alodel5 jointly 
The meaning of the various model, except for Model 6 and 7, is self-explained in paren- 
thesis. For instance, the part of the table corresponding to Model 1(NI1) reports the 
results of the test when both constant and trend (i. e. p, =0 and fil = 0) are restricted to 
be zero. The part of the table marked with Model 2 shows the results of the test when 
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Moreover, the strategy for jointly determining the cointegration rank and 
the trend polynomial discussed in Johansen(1992), is implemented (i. e. M6 
and M7). 
the constant is restricted to be equal to abo (i. e., uo = abo) and the trend to be equal to 
zero (ix. ju, = 
0) and so on. Model 6 and 7 implement the strategy for jointly determining 
the cointegration rank and the trend polynomial discussed in Johansen(1992). 
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TRACE TESTS FOR = COINUGRAUON RANK (r) 
r Const. Trend Statistic 1 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
ml 0 0 0 39.26 1 14.3 18.83 21.63 2431 26.64 29.75 
1 0 0 11.05 1 5.42 8.45 10.47 I-z -53 14A3 wt 
2 0 0 2.53 1 0.58 1.82 2.86 3.84 4.93 6.51 
r Const. Trend Statistic 1 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
rvu 0 abO 0 74.88 1 23.28 28.75 32 34.91 37.61 41.07 
1 abO 0 17.09 11.25 15.25 Ei-lli , - 
-jf9Aý- 
2 abO 0 6.35 3.4 5.91 
i. 3 2i 9.24 10.8 12.97 
r Const. Trend Statistic 50% 80% 910% 95% 97.50% 99% 
N13 0 mo 0 73.3 18.7 23.64 26.79 29.68 32.56 35.65 
1 mo 0 16-65 7.55 11.07 13.33 15AI Elj: ý52 2 MO 0 6.08 0.44 1.66 2.69 3.76 4.95 6.65 
r Const. Trend Statistic 1 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
M4 
0 mo abl 74.22 29.53 35.56 39.06 42.44 45.42 48.45 
1 mo abl 17.29 15.59 -- 
6 4.76 
_A32 
T7-. 75 j6i5- 
2 RIO abl 6.6 5.55 8.65 10.49 12. 
i i4. ij 16.26 
r Const. Trend Statistic 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
ms 0 mo m1 69.59 22.66 28,13 MA2 34.55 36.94 40.49 
1 mo m1 12.75 9.68 jý3ý- [- W06 18.17 20.13 23.46 
2 nio ml 2.9 0.45 1.61 2.57 3.74 4.85 6.4 
r Const. Trend Statistic 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
0 abO 0 74.88 23.28 28.75 32 34.91 37.61 41.07 
N16 0 nio 0 733 18.7 23.64 26.79 29.68 32.56 35.65 
1 abO 0 17.09 11.25 15.25 j jlg _ 
19.96ý 220 24.6 
1 mO 0 16.65 7.55 11.07 _ 13.33 _ IiAl FT52 " 
Z" 
2 abO 0 6.35 3.4 5.91 7.52 9.24 16.8 12.97 
2 nio 0 6.08 0.44 1.66 2.69 3.76 4.95 6.65 
r Const. Trend Statistic 1 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
0 nio abl 74.22 1 29.53 35.56 39.06 42.44 45.42 48A5 
M7 0 mo ml 69.59 22.66 28.13 31.42 34.55 36.94 40A9 
1 rnO abl 17.29 15.59 20. . 19 
&16 2-7.15 30; 45 
1 mo ml 12.75 9.68 
[_, 
13.56, 
_ ýz- ' - 
tW 
- 
tj 
_-AL - 
13 
-6-4 
234k 
2 mo abl 6.6 5.55 
i 65 IOA9 12.25 14.21 16.26 
2 mo ml 2.9 0.45 1.61 2.57 3.74 4.85 6.4 
NOTE: THE HYPOTHESIS IS ACCEPTED MIEN CALC VALUE < TAB. VALUE 
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TRACE TESTS FOR = CORTMGRATION RANK (r) 
r Const. Trend Statistic 1 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
ml 0 0 0 25.61 1 14.3 18.83 21.63 24.31 j, - 1 0 0 10.1 1 5.42 8.45 10.47 12.53 14.43 16.31 
2 0 0 0.85 0.58 1.82 2.86 3.84 4.93 6.51 
r Const. Trend Statistic 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
Su 0 abO 0 33.44 23.28 28.75 32 E)ý41 I 
1 abO 0 15.12 11.25 15.25 17.85 19.96 22.05 
2 abO 0 4.82 3.4 5.91 7.52 9.24 10.8 12.97 
r Const. Trend Statistic 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
ND 0 niO 0 26,68 18.7 23.64 --29.68 R. 5§- 35.65 
1 mo 0 11.64 7.55 11.07 13.33 15.41 17.52 20.04 
2 mo 0 4.74 0.44 1.66 2.69 3.76 4.95 6.65 
r Const. Trend Statistic 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
M4 0 mo abl 45.22 1 29.53 35.56 39.06 42.44 [, 4 
1 mo abl 14.24 1 15.59 20.19 22.76 25.32 27.75 30.45 
2 mo abl 6.38 1 5.55 8.65 10.49 12.25 14.21 16.26 
r Const. Trend Statistic 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
M5 0 mo MI. 36.81 22.66 28.13 31.42 34.55 
1 mo ml 6.79 9.68 13.56 16.06 18.17 20.13 23.46 
2 mo ml 0.23 0.45 1.61 2.57 3.74 4.85 6.4 
r Const. Trend Statistic 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
0 abO 0 33.44 23.28 28.75 32 - , 4-1.0-.. 7" 
M6 0 mo 0 26.68 18.7 23.64 [72RC75iý AM_ 3545 
1 abO 0 15.12 11.25 15.25 17.85 19.96 22.05 24.6 
1 mo 0 11-64 7.55 11.07 13.33 15.41 17.52 20.04 
2 abo 0 4.82 3.4 5.91 7.52 9.24 10.8 12.97 
2 nio 0 4.74 0.44 1.66 2.69 3.76 4.95 6.65 
r ConsL Trend Statistic 50% 80% 90% 95% 97.50% 99% 
0 nio abl 45.22 29.53 35.56 39.06 42.44 45A2 4&45 
M7 0 mo MI. 36.81 22.66 28.13 31.42 34.55 X94 4DA9 
I mO abl 14.24 15.59 20.19 22.76 25.32 27.75 30.45 
1 mo ml 6.79 9.68 13.56 16.06 18.17 20.13 23.46 
2 mo abl 638 5.55 8.65 10.49 12.25 14.21 16.26 
2 rnO ml 0.23 0.45 1.61 2.57 3.74 4.85 6.4 
NOTE. THEIriPOTHESIS IS ACCEPTED IKEEN CAM VALUE< TAB. VALUE 
Table 5.9 Euro Area: Testing for cointegration rank 
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As illustrated in Johansen(1992), in order to control for the first type 
error probability, the tests have to be read from top to bottom, comparing 
the statistics with appropriate quantiles. The selected rank is the first for 
which the hypothesis is accepted. 
The tables show that, when the model with or without unrestricted 
constant and restricted trend is used, and the first type error probability is 
fixed to 5%, the selected rank is equal respectively to 0 for Euro Area and 
1 for United States in each model. 
The inference on the cointegration rank for the I(1) model strongly re- 
jects the hypothesis of a cointegrated relationship for the Euro Area while 
does not reject the hypothesis of a cointegrated relationship between the 
endogenous variables for United States 25 . Nevertheless, for this country we 
still have a possible source of non-stationarity represented by the real inter- 
est rate, In this case, the problem of the fiscal policy sustainability relies 
on the time series properties of this variable. If the U. S. real interest rate 
is stationary, fiscal policy is said to be sustainable. If the U. S. real interest 
rate is not-stationary, fiscal policy is said to be unsustainable. The station- 
arity of the real interest rate is an open issue and is strictly related with 
time series properties of the consumer price index(CPI). If the CP1 is an 
25 The estimated cointegrated vector for U. S is the following: 
Inbt-i 
Z= (1, -2.5511,0) In dt-1 
1 
rt-i 
1 
The model is estimated by using the Maximum likelihood algorithm illustrated in Jo- 
hansen(1988). 
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I(l) variable, the real interest rate is not stationary as the inflation rate is 
1(0). If the CPI is an 1(2), the inflation rate is I(l). Therefore, the nominal 
interest rate and inflation rate cointegrate with cointegrating vector(l, l). 
Consistently with a part of literature arguing that U. S CPI is 1(2), evidence 
from our sample suggests that the U. S real interest rate is not stationary26. 
Therefore, fiscal policy in United States is said to be unsustainable. How- 
ever, there is a different strand of literature(St-Amaunt, 1996) arguing that 
the real interest rate is stationary in the long run. If we take this result as 
true, then fiscal policy in United States should be considered as sustainable 
in the longer period. 
Overall, the analysis seems to suggest the instability of the system and 
the unsustainability of the fiscal policy in the Euro Area. An higher degree 
of uncertainty regards the fiscal position of United States. The sustainability 
of the fiscal policy for this country becomes an issue strictly related with the 
debate about the stationarity of the real interest rate. However, empirical 
evidence from our sample shows that the real interest rate is not stationarity 
and thus fiscal policy is not sustainable. 
5.6 Forecasting public debt 
The purpose of this section is to provide two different methods to construct 
forecasts of the future level of public debt. The two approaches differ in 
the assumption about the process generating primary'deficit and in the 
2 6See table 5.1 for the results of the Dicky Fuller Test. 
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technique utilized to compute forecasts. The former is based upon the VAR 
estimates and does not make any assumption about the process generating 
the primary deficit. The latter uses an iterative procedure and assume the 
condition for sustainability proposed by Wickens and Uctum i. e. a zero mean 
primary deficit. The two approaches follow: 
a) Forecasts from a VAR model 
The public debt identity in VAR form has several advantages. One of 
them is related to the possibility to make forecasts. Under the assumption of 
an exogenous AR(1) interest rate, model(5.4) can be represented as follows: 
In bt Kj ++ In bt-1 b 
In dt K2 + 721 722 923 In dt-1 Ct2 
rt 000 7r33 rt-, 62 
+ 
'6tl 
(5.14) 
In this case, forecasted values of the public debt level are constructed 
using the optimality of the conditional expectation. Provided that the errors 
are independent white noise, the optimal predictor for a generic VAR(p) 
process is the following: 
Et(Yt+h) =v+A, Et(Yt+h-1) . ..... + 
ApEt(Yt+h-p) (5.15) 
The formula (5.15) can be used for recursively computing the h-step 
predictors starting with h=l: 
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Et(yt+, ) = v+Alyt+... +Apyt-p+l 
Et(Yt+2) = v+A, Et(yt+, )+A2Yt+Apyt-p+2) 
By these recursions ive get for the VAR(1) the formula for computing 
the forecasts h-periods ahead. It follows: 
Et(Yt+h) = (lk+ A, +... +A h)V +A h 11 
where A, is the (3 x 3) matrix in model(5.14). 
b) Forecasts from an iterative procedure 
The previous method constructs forecasts based upon the assumption 
that the processes generating primary Deficit and interest rate will continue 
into the future. In practice, however, it may be necessary to alter fiscal policy 
to achieve sustainability. This suggests the need to analyze sustainability 
allowing for expected future changes in fiscal policy. This method, in fact, 
aims to provide a procedure to construct forecasts conditioned to a given 
process of the primary deficit. 
For given values of public debt, primary deficit and interest rate at time 
t, at time t+1 the public debt identity in non-linear form is as follows: 
At time t=l it is 
Bi = Do + (1 + ro)Bo 
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A time t=2 it is: 
B2 = Di + (I + ri)BI 
At time t=3 it is: 
B3 = D2 + (I + r2)B2 
In general at time t 
Bt = Dt-I + (I + rt-I)Bt-I 
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By substituting Bt-1 in Bt recursively and assuming an initial value 
of public debt greater than zero (i e-Bo > 0) the above identity can be 
rewritten in terms of a geometric series of deficits/surpluses and the initial 
value of public debt: 
Bt = Dt-, + Dt-2(l + rt-1) + Dt-3(l + rt-1)(1 + rt-2) + 
DO(l + rt-1)(1 + rt-2) (1 
rt-(t-, )) Bo(l + Tt-1)(1 + 'rt-2) 
(1 + rt-t) 
or equivalently: 
Bt 
[Dt-i i-1 
)] + Bo( 
t 11 (1 + rt-i+j) 11 (1 + rt-i) 
j=1 i=l 
If the interest rate r is a stationary process, in particular a white noise 
Nvith drift (i. e. rt = IL + vt), and the primary deficit is a zero mean process 
the above equation becomes: 
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Bt = 
[c 
+ vt-i+j))] + Bo (1 + IL + vt-i)] t-i(I 1 (1 + IL 
The expected value of this process is as follows: 
E(Bt) = (1 + tt)tBo 
If Nve assume y to be equal to the sample mean of the interest rate(i. e. -f) 
and impose BO equal to the value of public debt at the end of the sample 
period(i. e. B,, ) the forecast of public debt at time t+s can be obtained as 
follows: 
(5.17) 
Equation(5.17) allows to computation of public debt forecasts between 
period t and period t+s. 
Figure 5.1 shows the computed forecasts and the actual values of the 
public debt series in both countries. 
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The solid line represents the actual values of the variable while the dashed 
lines represent the forecasts; F,, and Fb specify the kind of forecasts. The 
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series F,, represents the forecasts computed by method a and Fb represents 
the forecasts computed by method b. Forecasts fifteen periods ahead start 
from 2003: 04 in the United States and from 1998: 01 in the Euro Area. Both 
procedures give arise to consistent estimates. This is particularly true for the 
Euro Area where the two forecasting methods produce similar results. For 
the U. S the forecasted public debt with the VAR model seems to be initially 
decreasing, but then it increases on the path of the forecasts computed with 
alternative method. Forecasts constructed under the case b are coherently 
lower than the forecasts constructed under the -case in the Euro Area. This 
is probably due to the fact that, in the second case, we assume a zero mean 
primary deficit and a stationary real interest rate. On the contrary, in the 
first case, forecasts are conditioned to the past evidence of the primary deficit 
(that is negative) and interest rate. 
The forecasted levels of public debt diverge towards higher values in both 
countries. Forecasts seem to confirm the empirical results obtained in the 
previous part of this chapter. They also verify the sustainability condition 
proposed by Wickens Uctum(1997). 
Forecasts evaluation is implemented by looking at the out-of-sample fore- 
casts. Figure 5.2 compares our forecasts (dashed lines) with the actual value 
of the US public debt six quarters ahead(solid line). 
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Chart 1 also reports 95% forecast interval computed with the VAR 
model (grey lines). These intervals are computed as b (h) ±z (a/2) 07b (h) where 
b(h) is the point forecast, O'b(h) is the square root of the first diagonal ele- 
ment of the forecast MSE matrix and z(a) is the upper percentage point of 
the standard normal distribution (Lutkepohl, 9 1). 27 Notice that prediction 
"In our case h goes from one to six. 
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interval(P. 1) is slightly asymmetric. This is due to the fact that the model 
is formulated in logs and then is used to compute forecast points for the 
original variable. The asymmetry of the forecast interval for re-transformed 
variable, is an issue that is clearly explained in Chatfield 1993(Chatfield 
1993, Section 4.8). 28 
Forecast interval include the actual values of the public debt. Moreover, 
both methods perform relatively well. The observed out-sample forecast 
errors" for both procedures are shown in chart 2, figure 5.2. 
A comparative analysis suggests that method b generates positive fore- 
cast errors while method a gives rise to negative forecast errors. 
Consistently with the theory, the out-of-sample forecast errors tend to 
get larger as the horizons gets longer. This is due to the fact that errors, 
at each time interval, build up in a cumulative way. Overall, the analysis 
shows evidence of forecast success for United States. Method b seems to 
have a better performance. It generates lower out-of-sample forecast errors 
(in absolute value) and captures the increasing level of public debt. 
Regarding the Euro Area, out-of-sample forecasts are not observable due 
28 If a model in logs is used to compute point and interval forecasts for future values of 
the original variables, then, a re-transformation of the forecasts and prediction intervals 
in their original units is required. 
However, if the analysts takes logs of a variable, finds point forecast of the logs and 
assumes that they are unbiased, and then takes antilogs to get point forecasts of the 
original variable, then the latter forecasts will no longer be unbiased. Suppose that the 
analyst finds a 95% prediction interval (i. e. P. I) for the logarithm of the variable. If one 
takes the antilogs of the upper and lower limits of this P. I. to get re-transformed P. I. for 
the original variable, then it can be easily shown that there will still be a 95% probability 
that this interval will include the future value of the original variable. Nevertheless, this 
re-transformed P. I. will generally be asymmetric, as it reflects the asymmetry in the errors. 
2 'jForecast errors are computed as follows: (B(k) aB 
(h)) 
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to data limitation. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis between our fore- 
casts and OECD forecasts for the sample period 1998: 01-1999: 02 can still 
give interesting insights about the goodness of the two forecasting proce- 
dures. Figure 5.3 plots the predicted values with method a (F,, ) and method 
b(Fb) against OECD forecasts(Chart 1). Moreover, it reports the deviation 
of our forecasts with respect to the OECD predicted values in percentage 
point(Chart 2). 
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Chartl(figure 5.3) shows that 95% forecast interval covers the OECD fore- 
casts. Nevertheless, while our forecasts predict an increasing level of public 
debt, the OECD forecast predict a decreasing level. A proxy of the out-of- 
sample forecast error is given in chart 2 by taking the difference between our 
forecasts and the predicted values from OECD30. The two methods yields 
"This approximation relies on the assumption that OECD forecast do not differ signif- 
icantly from the actual values. 
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similar results. Method a performs slightly better. Forecast analysis for 
the Euro Area shows that our forecasts do not differ significantly from the 
OECD forecasts. However, it should be born in mind that, while our forecast 
procedures predicted an increasing level of public debt, the OECD model 
forecasted a decreasing level. 
Altogether, the section seems to support the goodness of our forecasts 
and the hypothesis of unsustainability of fiscal policy. 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have log-linearized the public debt identity and expressed 
it in terms of a multivariate system. By using the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) and applying a cointegration analysis to data, we have de- 
rived conditions suitable for determining whether or not fiscal policies are 
sustainable in the long run. It arises that the condition for sustainability 
depends upon the stationarity of the VAR system. In particular, if the VAR 
model is globally stationary, fiscal policy is said to be sustainable. If the 
VAR model is not globally stationary, fiscal policy is said to be unsustain- 
able. 
The stationarity of the system depends upon the number of cointegrated 
relationships between the variables. A three dimensional VAR, where all 
variables are endogenous and integrated of order one, is stationary if it con- 
tains two cointegrated relationships. In our case there are two endogenous 
variables and an exogenous variable. Hence, if there are not cointegrated 
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relationships, or there is only a cointegrated relationship but the exogenous 
variable is not stationary, fiscal policy is said to be unsustainable. 
We have applied these conditions to the fiscal stances of the United 
States and Euro Area. The results of the ADF test show that public debt, 
primary deficit and interest rate are integrated processes of order one, in 
both countries. The following cointegration analysis suggests that there 
are not cointegrated relationships in the estimated VAR for the Euro Area 
and one cointegrated relationship between the endogenous variables in the 
estimated VAR for the United States. Unlike the Euro Area, U. S fiscal 
position seems to be in a better situation. This is probably due to the 
higher growth rate of the GDP shown from the U. S with respect to the 
Euro Area in the sample period. The broad conclusion is that Euro Area 
has an unsustainable fiscal policy in the long run if the processes generating 
primary deficit will continue into the future. An higher degree of uncertainty 
regards the Fiscal position of United States. The sustainability of the fiscal 
policy for this country depends on time series properties of the real interest 
rate. Empirical evidence from our sample suggests the real interest rate is 
not stationarity and thus the fiscal policy is unsustainability. This result is 
consistent with a part of literature. However, there is a different strand of 
literature arguing that the real interest rate is stationary in the long run. If 
we take this result as true then, the fiscal policy in United States is said to 
be sustainable in the long run. 
We have also constructed forecasts for the public debt level in two dif- 
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ferent ways. The forecasted values of public debt, obtained with both pro- 
cedures, show a diverging path. These values are consistent with the evalu- 
ation elaborated in the cointegration analysis. Altogether the study rejects 
the hypothesis of sustainability of fiscal policy and stresses the need of an 
increasing fiscal austerity in the coming years, in order to achieve the sus- 
tainability in these countries. Inspection of the data reveals that an attempt 
in this direction has been made by the U. S. in the decade 1991-2001. In this 
period the U. S. federal government was running a large budget surplus. 
This surplus arose from various sources. The two tax increases in 1990 and 
1993, signed respectively by the elder George Bush and Bill Clinton, and the 
productivity acceleration in the late 1990s pushed the federal government's 
budget from deficit to surplus. Unfortunately, shocks to economy can alter 
the government's revenue and spending. In fact, only a few months after 
George W. Bush moved into the White House, the terrorist attacks in Sep- 
tember 2001 induced an increase in the government spending that brought 
the public debt back on the diverging path. The same effort has been made 
in the Euro Area where most of the EMU countries have shown a converging 
path toward the value of the public debt, set up by the stability growth and 
pact. Nevertheless, there are countries like France, Germany and Portugal 
that have recently broken the stability growth and pact by generating deficit 
greater than the deficit ceiling and countries, like Italy and Belgium, where 
the public debt is much higher than the target level. In the next chapter, 
the fiscal position of these countries is examined and the optimal fiscal rule 
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ensuring the convergence towards the public debt target, is estimated. 
Chapter 6 
Optimal Fiscal policy rules: 
Empirical Evidence in Italy 
and Belgium 
This chapter attempts to characterize the optimal fiscal policy rule in the 
presence of a public sector with objectives of convergence for public debt 
and primary balance to GDP ratios. To this end, the study uses a stochastic 
simulation framework. In order to ensure the existence of converging paths 
towards the target values of fiscal variables, we introduce a simple fiscal 
policy rule. According to this rule, the primary balance ratio is adjusted in 
relation to the distance between the current and the target level of the public 
debt, the current and the target level of the primary deficit and the output 
gap. The study gives interesting insights. First, it shows that the fiscal 
rule displaying time invariant parameters may produce non linear dynamic 
processes of adjustment of the public debt. Second, it suggests a procedure 
to estimate the parameters, and related confidence intervals, characterizing 
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the optimal fiscal policy rule. Finally, it constructs a stochastic efficiency 
frontier illustrating the fiscal trade-off for the public sector . The analysis 
is first applied to a theoretical economy and then to Italy and Belgium. 
6.1 Introduction 
Sustainability of public finances and sound fiscal policies are at the core of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU). The Treaty of Maastricht and the 
Stability and Growth Pact set up precise objectives of fiscal convergence, for 
the public sectors of each member country. According to the protocol of the 
Treaty, the general government deficit to CDP ratio should in fact not exceed 
3% and the public debt to GDP ratio should be lower than 60%. In addition, 
the Stability and Growth Pact requires member countries to reach a close 
to balance position over the medium term. The question of whether a given 
level of public debt is sustainable under specific economic conditions has, 
therefore acquired growing importance in the EMU, where governments can 
finance current deficits with higher taxes and/or lower public expenditures, 
without any recourse to seigniorage. This chapter illustrates the dynamics 
of debt and primary balance ratios under the hypothesis that the public sec- 
tor presents well-defined objectives of convergence in a neoclassical model 
of analysis with three types of agents: consumers, firms and government. 
The main aim of the study is to fully characterize a fiscal policy rule en- 
suring stability for different initial fiscal positions. Moreover, the analytical 
framework makes it possible to estimate the optimal fiscal policy rule that 
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minimizes, for given weights, a quadratic loss function accounting for the 
distance between the level of the public debt and a benchmark profile, the 
level of primary deficit and its lower bound and the output gap. The analy- 
sis is then applied to the EMU countries that have shown the highest public 
debt to GDP ratio, in the last three decades(i. e. Italy and Belgium). 
The study differs from the existing literature in different aspects. First, 
we use a neoclassical model instead of an endogenous growth model with 
overlapping generations, that is commonly considered the most appropriate 
tool of analysis to explore the influence of the public debt in the economy. 
Second, we consider a policy reaction function of the government explicitly 
accounting for the output gap. Third, we include an exogenous stochastic 
interest rate that is completely under the control of the monetary policy 
authorities. 
We prefer a neoclassical model for two reasons. First, the overlapping 
generation model(OLG) studies the government debt convergence in the 
long run', while this chapter aims to analyse the public debt convergence 
on a short/medium horizon. Second, we need a theoretical model explicitly 
accounting for the output gap. The main goals of this chapter are, in fact, 
to introduce a stochastic interest rate under the complete control of the 
monetary policy authority and estimate the fiscal authority trade-off. For 
both purposes the output gap plays a central role. 
This analysis provides interesting insights into the linkages between fiscal 
'An unfortunate feature of the two period OLC model is, in fact, to consider each 
period as being composed by thirty years, that is commonly considered as long period. 
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variables (i. e. debt and primary deficit ratios) and the dynamics of the 
interest rate. Moreover, the simulation exercise allows us to explore different 
path of adjustments depending on initial conditions and numerical values 
assigned to the parameters characterizing the fiscal policy rule governing the 
public sector. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 relates the present paper 
to the economic literature, while Section 6.3 introduces the reference model. 
Section 6.4 calibrates a theoretical economy and performs some simulation 
exercises. In particular, it derives the parameter space compatible with 
the sustainability of public finances and estimates the optimal fiscal policy 
rule. It also constructs the efficiency frontier showing the fiscal trade-off of 
the Government. Section 6.5 applies the procedure used for the theoretical 
economy to Italy and Belgium. Section 6.6 concludes summarizing the main 
results of the chapter. 
6.2 Related Literature 
In addition to the studies already described in the previous chapter, there 
are parts of literature studying the sustainability of fiscal policy and related 
issues from different perspectives. Before turning to recent stochastic sim- 
ulation model-based studies, we highlight some examples of recent works 
that have addressed similar fiscal policy issues using a deterministic, or non- 
stochastic, framework. 
One of the most familiar projection exercises is McCallum (1996). In this 
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study, McCallum uses a projection model and estimates that, over the pe- 
riod 2003-2018, there could be enough federal fiscal room to cut the federal 
personal income tax in half or increase program spending by a third (rel- 
ative to GDP). McCallum assumes that the federal government maintains 
a balanced budget over this period and then projects federal fiscal room 
given constant growth and interest rate assumptions. While the author ac- 
knowledges that there is some uncertainty associated with his projections, 
he does not attempt to quantify the sensitivity of his results. McCallum 
(1999) again projects fiscal dividends, however, in this exercise his estimates 
of fiscal room are reduced by prudence factors "in view of the major uncer- 
tainties involved in any future projections". Over the period 1999 to 2007, 
McCallum estimates that if all of his revised estimates of federal fiscal room 
were devoted to tax reduction, federal personal income taxes could be cut by 
20 per cent after adjusting for prudence factors. While McCallum attempts 
to account for uncertainty in his estimates, there is no way of determining 
whether the prudence factors he uses are sufficient to ensure that his fiscal 
objectives will be achieved. 
An alternative approach is based on the overlapping generations models, 
in which the breakdown of the Ricardian equivalence makes the govern- 
ment debt be net wealth for households. These models, considered the most 
appropriate tool of analysis to explore the influence of public debt on the 
economy, are proposed in Diamond (1965). He analyzes the effects of a pos- 
itive stock of debt on the long-run competitive equilibrium of an economy, 
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with neoclassical technology. The author shows that government debt causes 
a decline in the utility level when the equilibrium is dynamically efficient, 
but may increase the utility when the economy is dynamically inefficient. 
Ihori (1978) studies the effects of government debt on the long-run optimal 
conditions and analyzes the growth paths corresponding to alternative gov- 
ernment policies in a life-cycle economy. Other recent contributions, shifting 
away from a present budget balance perspective, conduct the analysis into 
a life-cycle model. Chalk (2000) analyzes the sustainability of permanent 
bond-financed deficits and shows the conditions under which a growth rate 
larger than the interest rate is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to 
ensure the sustainability of a permanent budget deficit. De la Croix and 
Michel (2002) investigate the effects of the introduction of public debt on 
the dynamic properties of a two-period overlapping generations model, and 
derive the conditions for ensuring sustainability. Marin (2002) studies how a 
simple primary surplus budgetary rule can ensure the sustainability of public 
finances and provide automatic stabilization in a small open economy. 
A final approach is based on stochastic simulation methods. A number 
of recent studies(like the current work) have applied these techniques, in 
order to examine how much "fiscal prudence" would be required to insure 
against the risk of running a deficit. Boothe and Reid (1998) examine the 
case where the fiscal authority seeks to balance the budget, on average, over 
a number of years. Their simulation results indicate that a contingency 
reserve of between $6 and $9 billion would be sufficient to avoid a deficit 
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outcome with 90 per cent probability over a budget period of two to four 
years. Robson and Scarth (1999) examine the case where the fiscal authority 
plans a budget surplus equal to one per cent of GDP, each fiscal year (which 
is currently about $10 billion). Their simulations indicate that aiming for a 
surplus of this magnitude would entail a negligible risk of running a deficit. 
Hermanutz and Matier (2000) examine a fiscal planning framework charac- 
terized by rolling two-year budget plans. They find that a prudence level 
of $3.3 billion in the first year and $7.2 billion in the second year would 
provide insurance against a deficit outcome, with 90 per cent probability in 
each year. DaIsgaard and De Serres (1999) examine how member countries 
of the European Monetary Union (EMU), can avoid running budget deficits 
in excess of 3 per cent of GDP as specified in The Stability and Growth Pact. 
Their simulation results show that aiming for a cyclically adjusted budget 
deficit of between 1.0 and 1.5 per cent of GDP would achieve this objec- 
tive with 90 per cent confidence. This implies a level of prudence for the 
cyclically-adjusted budget balance of between 1.5 and 2.0 per cent of GDP. 
These studies focus on how uncertainty influences the budget balance, but 
not the level of debt or the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
This study tries to keep together the strengths of each approach. To 
this end, it differs from the existing literature in several important aspects. 
First, we focus on the level of debt in ratio to GDP. Second, we use a neo- 
classical model instead of an endogenous growth model with overla ' pping 
generations. Third, we consider a policy reaction function of the govern- 
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ment explicitly accounting for the output gap. Fourth, we use a stochastic 
simulation framework including an exogenous stochastic interest rate, that 
is completely under the control of the monetary policy authorities. The 
description of the model follows in the next section. 
6.3 Reference Model 
The theoretical framework used in the analysis is a simple model with three 
agents: government, firms and consumers. In particular, the model is a 
backward-looking2, closed-economy model' accounting for the impact that 
fiscal policy has on output gap. 
The supply side is described as an autoregressive Phillips curve: 
7r +, 67ryt 't 7rt =a '7rt-1 -1 
+ u7r 
This equation relates the CPI inflation rate(i. e. -7rt) to its own lag(i. e. 7rt-1) 
and to a lagged output gap(i. e. yt-1) measured as a percent gap between the 
2 As stresses in chapter I, there is a large part of literature arguing that the behaviour 
of the private agents should be forward-Iooking and the forecast should be therefore an 
integral part of the price setting behaviour. Nevertheless, a different strand of this lit- 
erature(i. e. Rudebusch and Svensson 1999,2002; Ball 1999,2000), following in the spirit 
the VAR models popularized by Sims, focuses on ad-hoc backward-looking model. They 
argue that this kind of models are appreciable from at least two important aspects. They 
tend to offer a good fit of the data, and their dynamics closely resemble those filtered with 
structural VARs, an issue that pure forward-looking models have some troubles in dealing 
with(Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002). 
3 The main goal of this chapter is to provide a procedure to characterize the optimal 
fiscal policy rule for a government with commitment. The initial choice of the model for a 
virtual economy is then marginally important. Section 6.5 will show how this procedure 
can be easily extended to small open economies by changing the theoretical framework. 
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actual real GDP and the potential GDp4. The specification of aggregate sup- 
ply is consistent vAth an adaptive representation of inflation expectations. 
The expectations are treated implicitly by the inclusion of lagged values of 
the variables. 
The demand side is described by the following equation: 
y yt = ayyt-i -, 8y(it-i - Irt-1) + ut (6.2) 
According to equation(6.2), the output gap is related-to the annual real 
interest rate and its own lag. The real interest rate is calculated as the 
difference between the short-term interest rate and the inflation rate. 
In the specified model the interest rate is an exogenous variable under 
the complete control of monetary authorities. In particular, we assume 
that the monetary authorities use the interest rate as policy instrument. 
Thus, the interest rate is most realistically interpreted as an overnight rate. 
Policymakers set the interest rate after observing the current shocks u' and t 
Ot. Notice that we assume policymakers to set the real interest rate. In 
practice, the interest rates controlled directly by policyrnakers are nominal 
rates. However, policyrnakers can move the real interest rate to their desired 
level by setting the nominal rate equal to the desired real rate plus inflation5. 
The monetary policy rule followed by the monetary authorities in order to 
'Notice that, with respect to chapter 3, we have switched back the notation for the 
output gap from g to y 
51t is, of course, a simplification to assume that spending depends directly on the 
overnight interest rate. Future work might consider an extension in which spending de- 
pends on a longer-term interest rate, which is linked to the overnight rate through the 
term structure. 
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stabilize output gap and inflation bias is a simple Taylor rule. It follows: 
it a' (Tt - W*) + (yt - Y*) + ul (6.3) 
where the inflation target(i. e. W*) is set to be equal to the target an- 
nounced by the European central Bank in the Maastricht treaty(i. e. 2%). 
The public sector is described by an infinite lived government whose flow 
budget constraint is: 
bt = st-1 + (1 + rt-l)bt-, (6.4) 
where bt is the government debt expressed as proportion of nominal GDP, 
rt-1 is the real interest rate adjusted for the output growth rate, st-1 is the 
primary budget surplus expressed as proportion of nominal GDP and is 
defined as the difference between the total revenues and total expenditures. 
Equation(6.4) states that the changes in the stock of public debt from one 
period to the next, must cover the budget surplus/deficit inclusive of interest 
payments (rt-1 bt-1). 
The public sector presents clear objectives of convergence for public debt 
and primary balance. In order to ensure the existence of converging paths 
towards the target values of fiscal variables, the government follows the 
following simple fiscal policy rule: 
st = a, (st-, - d*) +a2(bt-, - b*) +a3(Yt-I - Y*) (6.5) 
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where d* and b* are respectively the targets set up by the stability growth 
pact for primary deficit and public debt (i. e. 3% and 60%). 
According to this reaction function, the primary balance ratio is adjusted 
in response to the distance between the current and the target level of the 
public debt to GDP ratio, to the distance between the current and the 
lower bound of the primary surplus (deficit) to GDP ratio and to the output 
gap. This rule differs from the one proposed by Marin(2002) for the term 
accounting for the output gap. This term aims to catch the stabilizing power 
of the Government on the economy. When the economy goes into a recession 
taxes automatically fall, and transfers automatically rise. When economy 
goes into expansion taxes increase and transfers automatically fall. Here, we 
consider the case in which the government uses only the benefit rate as the 
instrument to control the dynamics of the primary surplus. Theoretically, 
the government has two instruments: the tax rate, T, and the benefit rate, 
G. In the simulation, we keep the tax rate constant over time. 
We consider a policy framework wherein the fiscal authority sets the 
program spending at the beginning of each fiscal year. No tax or spending 
changes are made during the year. The fiscal authority revises its budget 
in the subsequent year taking the outcome from the previous period into 
account. As stressed in the stability growth pact, the Government cannot 
run primary deficits exceeding the 3% of GDP. On the other hand, the 
Government can decide to devote the whole amount of the tax revenues to 
the reduction of the public debt meaning to run a surplus equal to the level 
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of taxes (i. e. G = 
In our framework the fiscal authority faces a fundamental conflict be- 
tween its debt control objective and its other objectives; namely policy 
smoothing and economic stabilization. Among these three goals, the debt 
control objective has clearly the most important implications for the credi- 
bility of the debt reduction plan. If the fiscal authority demonstrates that it 
can keep the debt to GDP ratio close to the announced profile, agents and 
the other EMU countries will come to believe that the debt reduction plan 
will be successful. This would give credibility to the government in two ways: 
at national level with respect to its own electorate and at international level 
with respect to the other EMU counties. However, the government is also in- 
terested in minimizing the malcontent of consumers and firms of the current 
generation. It acknowledges that consumers and firms perceive the surpluses 
generated in order to reduce the level of public debt to its target level, as an 
unfair redistribution of wealth from the current to the past generation. An 
excessive aggressive behavior of the fiscal authority would cause unpopular- 
ity for the Government, among the voters that would cost the no re-election 
at the end of the mandate. Last but not least, the government is also in- 
terested in the fiscal policy as an instrument to stabilize the economy. This 
issue has a long tradition in macroeconomics, dating back to Keynes 'The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money(1936). The fiscal au- 
thorities, through a balanced Budget Rule, seek to dampen business cyclical 
fluctuations by implementing a counter cyclical overall policy stance. This 
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entails moving the budget balance toward a surplus (deficit) position during 
expansionary (contractionary) periods. Therefore, the higher the variance of 
the output gap the higher is the cost associated with an unstable economy. 
In order to examine the nature of the fiscal trade-off and evaluate alternative 
fiscal strategies, ive use the following loss function: 
n 
Lt Al (Bt-1 - BP* 
)2 + 
-%2(Dt-I -D 
*)2 + A3(Yt-1 _ Y*)2 (6.6) 
where the difference between the public debt and the benchmark profile(BP* )6 
measures the cost in terms of credibility for the government. The distance 
between the primary deficit and the deficit ceiling measures the malcontent 
of the consumers and firms of the current generation and the third term mea- 
sures the loss attached to the difference between the GDP and the natural 
rate. 
The parameters Al 7 A2, and A3 , are respectively the non-negative weights 
attached to each goal and are determined by policymakers' tastes. We use a 
quadratic loss function as we treat symmetrically both positive and negative 
deviations from the targets. 
The joint model captures several phenomena that are important for pol- 
icyrnaking in practice. Both output and inflation are subject to unfore- 
castable shocks. Output movements are persistent, because lagged output 
6 In order to set a loss function for the Government we assume that the fiscal authority 
initially determines a benchmark profile in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Specifically, we assume 
a Government with clear objectives of convergence that planned to generate a surplus equal 
to 4% plus interest on the public debt at time t-1. It then seeks to minimize stochastic 
fluctuations in the debt-to-GDP ratio relative to the benchmark profile. 
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enters into equation (6.2). Inflation is inertial: once it rises, it stays high un- 
less output falls. Finally, policy can offset shocks only with a lag. It takes a 
period for policy to affect output, and a period for output to affect inflation; 
combining these lags, it takes two periods for policy to affect inflation. This 
structure captures the stylized fact that policy affects output more quickly 
than it affects inflation (eg, McCallum, 1995). In addition, it characterizes 
a fiscal policy rule for the Government accounting for the fiscal policy trade- 
off. The main virtues of the model are simplicity and realism. An important 
limitation is that the model ignores the Lucas critique. However, there are 
several studies supporting the statistical unimportance of this critique for 
the Philips curve when the analysis relies on a backward-looking model. This 
statement, to some degree, is even more real for a closed economy(Estrella 
and Fuhrer, 2002). Thus, our results still remain of interest. 
Two more limitations regard the fact that the Government only has the 
public spending instrument to control the public debt dynamics and the 
assumption that equation(6.1) and equation (6.2) remain unchanged across 
different policy regimes; this may be untrue. We must keep this possibility 
in mind when interpreting the results. 
6.4 Calibration and Simulation 
Once Nve set up the theoretical framework we can simulate the model. Fol- 
lowing the approach proposed by Annichiarico and Ciammarioli(Annichiarico- 
Ciammarioli, 2004), we study the dynamics of the public debt for different 
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families of parameters in the reaction function. 7 Specifically, we search for 
the combinations of parameters (al, a2, a3), in the interval ] 0,1 [, that char- 
acterizes the optimal fiscal policy rule. We define as optimal the fiscal rule 
that minimizes the quadratic loss function expressed in equation(6.6) 
In order to perform some simulation exercises, we interpret each period 
as a year. A year is a roughly realistic time lag for the effects of policy on 
output, and two years is about right for inflation (Christiano et al., 1996). 
In the simulations, we take the initial conditions as given and we assume 
that the fiscal rule, described with equation(6.5), becomes operative at time 
t=1. For simplicity, we assume the tax rate to be constant at its long-run 
level(10%) and the primary balance surplus to be equal to zero at time t=1 
(si = 0). We also set the initial level of the public debt to be equal to 100%. 
For equation(6.1) and equation(6.2) the analysis uses a set of parameters 
base borrowed from the closed-economy model in Ball(1997) reported in 
table 6.1. 
Calibrated Model 
Y1.1 
Yt 0.8 -1.0 
7E t 0.4 1 
r, 0.5 1.5 
Table 6.1 Calibrated values 
'Unlike this study, we operate in a three dimensional space. 
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Based on the evidence discussed there, we assume that the coefficient 
on lagged output(i. e ay) to be equal to 0.88; we set the parameter 6Y to 
be equal to 1.0 (meaning that a one-point rise in the interest rate reduces 
output by one percent)9; we assume the Phillips curve to be vertical in the 
long run meaning that the coefficient a' is equal to 1.0 and finally we set the 
Phillips curve slope(i. e., B') equal to 0.410. For equation(6.3) we borrow the 
parameters estimated by Taylor in the seminal paper of 1989. Specifically, 
we assume that the coefficient measuring the reactivity of the interest rate 
to the output gap a' to be equal to 0.5 and the coefficient measuring the 
reactivity of the interest rate to the inflation rate to be equal to 1.5. 
The stochastic simulation procedure operates as follows. Stochastic 
shocks displace all endogenous variables in the model each period. Mutually 
independent random shocks are drawn from a zero mean normal distribu- 
tion, with variances calibrated to be roughly consistent with the historical 
data. " 
On the base of the calibrated coefficients we simulate the model 50 years 
ahead. Figure 6.1 shows the dynamics of the public debt for given combi- 
nations of parameters. Each chart plots the dynamic of the public debt for 
8In the aggregate-sp ending equation, the coefficient on lagged output(i. e. aV) should be 
large, as output fluctuations are persistent. 
9This value is close to the effect estimated in the macro- econometric framework based 
on VAR models proposed by Rudebusch(1995). With j6Y = 1.0, a three-point rise 
in the 
interest rate reduces annual growth from 2.5 percent to -0.5 percent. "The choice of this value relies on the fact that the sacrifice ratio for reducing inflation 
is 11,6'. Evidence suggests that a plausible ratio is 2.5, implying that 8' must be equal 
to 0.4 ( Ball, 1994b) 
"The stochastic simulation process is repeated 1000 times. 
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the values of al, a3 reported at the top of the graph and a2 assuming the 
values: 0.1,0.5 and 1.0. The grey horizontal line represents the public debt 
target (i. e. Bstar = 60%). 
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Figure 6.1 Simulated Public debt for different combinations of parameters 
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This figure gives interesting insights. First, it arises that, for some com- 
binations of parameters, the public debt is divergent. 12 Second, there are 
families of parameters failing to reach the target even though they show 
converging paths. 13 This is due to the fact that the Government, at some 
point, starts generating surpluses equal to the interest paid on debt at time 
t_1.14 This makes the public debt stationary around a value of public debt 
that is different from the target. 15 In this case we say that the steady state 
is not the same as the target. Finally, some combinations of parameters give 
rise to the overshooting of the target level. 16 
The parameter space(al, a2, a3) of the coefficients ensuring the conver- 
gence paths toward the Public debt target is reported in figure 6.2. This is 
obtained by excluding the explosive combinations from the domain of the 
coefficients. The shaded area represents the whole combinations of parame- 
ters determining diverging paths for debt, while any other combination of 
those parameters(not shaded area) represents a fiscal policy rule guarantee- 
ing never increasing debt. 
12 With the exception of chart C. 1, this is true for each combinations of parameters 
displaying a coefficient a2 equal to 0.1. 
13 For instance, the combination of parameters al = 0.5, a2 = 0.5, a3 = 0.5 in chart GA 
or the combination a, = 1-0 , a2 = 1.0 and a3 = 1.0 in chart G. 6. 141n chart CA, for example, the government starts generating surpluses approximately 
equal to the interest paid on debt at time t-1 after 15 years; and after 8 years in chart 
G. 6. 
151n chart GA and chart G. 6, the value of public debt around which the simulated public 
debt becomes stationary(Bstar') is 70% that is 10% higher than the target level (i. e. 60%) 
16For instance, in chart G. 1 the combination of parameters a, = 0.1, a2 = 1.0 and 
a3 = 0.1 leads to an overshooting of the public debt target. 
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Figure 6.2 The 3-D scatter plot of the explosive combinations of parameters 
The figure does not provide a clear relationship among the parameters. 
Nevertheless, it gives interesting insights. In particular, the shaded area 
suggests that the condition for the convergence is that the parameter gov- 
erning the adjustment of the public debt towards its target, a2, should be 
approximately greater than 0.4. However, if the parameter regulating the 
speed of the adjustment, al, and the parameter responding to the output 
gap movements, a3, are both low (let's say less than 0.2) then a value of a2 
smaller than 0.4 still ensures the convergence toward the public debt target. 
Among the converging values(not shaded area) we search for the fiscal 
rule that minimizes equation(6.6). In order to do that we perform the sim- 
ulation n= 1000 times for given weights in the loss function. The three 
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dimensional scatter plot of the combinations (al, a2, a3) for the following 
weights (A, = 0.4, A2 = 0.2, A3 = 0.4) is reported in Figure 6.3. 
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0.4- - 
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Figure 6.3 The 3-D scatter plot of the whole combinations minimizing the 
loss function 
Each point displays the fiscal rule (aj, a2, a3) that minimizes the loss 
function after each iteration. The number attached to each point represents 
the frequency with which that combination of parameters is resulted to be 
the minimizing rule. 17 The point with highest frequency(i. e. 156) represents 
17 In order to avoid the overcrowding of the figure, we only report the families of para- 
meters displaying the highest frequencies. Notice that if we had reported the frequencies 
for each combination, the summation of such frequencies would have been 1000. 
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the optimal fiscal rule for the weights above mentioned" 
We repeat the same procedure for different weights in the loss function. 
Specifically, we repeat the same simulation exercise as the weight on the 
difference between the public debt and its benchmark profile increases by 
0.1 at each step. The change in Al implicitly determines the weight on the 
term related to the output gap since A3 is set to be equal to 1-A, and A2 
is assumed to be equal to a constant value (i. e. 0.2). Thus, as the weight on 
debt increases by 0.1, the weight on the output gap reduces by the same 
amount at each step. 
Among other things, figure 6.3 also suggests some skewness in the out- 
come of simulation. In fact, the optimal fiscal rule seems not to be perfectly 
centered. This is the first signal about the fact that the distribution of 
the vector (al, a2, a3) is probably not normal. This guess is confirmed by 
univariate normality tests conducted on each single distribution of the pa- 
rameters. The results of the tests are reported in tables 6.2 and 6.3: 
"Notice that 156 out of 1000 simulations is not an extremely high frequency. Never- 
theless, since all families of parameters showing the highest frequencies are distributed 
around that point, we can assess, with a certain degree of confidence, that the optimal 
fiscal policy rule is characterized by those parameters. 
6.4. CALIBRATION AND SIMULATION 245 
Skewness 0.84615 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis -0.18112 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0.24401698 
Jarque-Bcra 120.69513 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
kl=. l a2 
Skewness -0.36981 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0.00000187 
Kuttosis -0.76482 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0.00000087 
Jarque-Bera 47.16632 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
Xl=. l a3 
Skewness 1.47561 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 2.29377 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0 
Jarque-Bera 582.12883 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
Xl=. 2 al 
Skewness 1.05336 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 0.38211 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0.01397681 
Jarque-Bera 191.01184 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
kl=. 2 a2 
Skewness -0.77009 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis -0.27429 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0.07767419 
Jarque-Bera 101.97516 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
). l=. 2 a3 
Skewness 1.48732 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 2.14148 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0 
Jarque-Bera 559.7658 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
11=3 al 
Skewness 1.17342 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 0.71838 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0.00000382 
Jarque-Bera 250.98743 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
Xl=. 3 a2 
Skewness -0.94042 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
KUTtOSiS 0.13517 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0.38459738 
Jarque-Bera 148.1596 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
11=3 a3 
Skewness 1.43725 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 2.01187 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0 
Jarque-Bera 512.93219 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
XI=. 4 al 
Skewness 1.29824 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 1.17067 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0 
Jarque-Bera 338.00795 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
Xl=. 4 a2 
Skewness -0.99681 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 0.13659 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0.37962332 
Jarque-Bera 166.38329 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
kl=. 4 a3 
Skewness 1.53163 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 2.10276 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0 
Jarque-Bera 575.21476 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
Table 6.2 Univariate Normality Tests 
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[-ii -=-5 -, 
Skewness 1.33761 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 1.23211 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0 
Jarque-Bera 361.4532 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
X1=. 5 a2 
Skewness -1.14483 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 0.82252 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0.00000012 
Jarque-Bera 246.6302 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
2,1=. 5 a3 
Skewness 1.60863 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 2.94106 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0 
Jarque-Bera 791.6921 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
XI=. 6 al 
Skewness 1.30382 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 1.01175 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0 
Jarque-Bera 325.9778 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
11=. 6 a2 
Skewness -1.18467 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 0.95702 Signif Level (Ktr--O) 0 
Jarque-Bcra 272.0694 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
%1=. 6 a3 
ll=. 7 al 
Xl=. 7 a2 
Skewness 1.37347 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 1.32548 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0 
Jarque-Bem 387.6066 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
Skewness -1.16272 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 0.70235 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0. 00000625 
Jarque-Bera 245.8726 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
2,1=. 7 a3 
Skewness 1.77941 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 3.34311 Signif Level (Ktr--O) 0 
Jarque-Bera 993.3963 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
Skewness 1.40789 Signif Level (Sk=O) 0 
Kurtosis 1.3758 Signif Level (Ku=O) 0 
Jarque-Bera 409.2286 Signif Level (JB=O) 0 
Table 6.3 Univariate Normality tests 
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- The Jarque-bera test and the tests on the skewness and kurtosis strongly 
reject the normality of the process generating the single parameters and 
therefore, the normality of the process generating the vectors of the optimal 
fiscal policy rules. The actual distribution of the parameters is investigated 
graphically in figure 6.4 and 6.5. Each graph shows the histogram of the 
outcome simulation for each single parameter. The skewness of the dis- 
tributions is clearly displayed in each graph. In theory there is only one 
distribution that is defined on the domain ]0,1 [ and is right or left skewed 
depending on the parameters characterizing the distribution. This variate is 
called Beta distribution19. We use this distribution in order to approximate 
the outcome of our simulation with a continuos distribution. The goodness 
of fit is shown in figures 6.4 and 6.5: 
"For further details about Beta distribution see appendix 6.1. 
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Figure 6.3 Beta approximation 
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Figure 6.5 Beta approximation 
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The black line represents the beta distribution for given parameters (ce, 0). 
The maximum likelihood estimation of the values (a, B) used in each ap- 
proximation, are reported, together with 95% confidence intervals, in the 
following table: 
al a2 a3 
MLE Lower Upper MLE Lower Upper MLE Lower Upper 
a 1.9223 1.6852 4.2849 7.385 6.8175 9.863 4.1012 3.6782 20.875 kl=. l 0 4.8274 2.1594 5.37 10.582 7.9525 11.301 22.616 4.5242 24.357 
a 1.9142 1.6774 4.2713 7.7913 7.2229 10.459 4.0558 3.6255 21.098 2,1=. 2 0 4.814 2.151 5.3566 11.172 8.3597 11.885 22.859 4.4862 24.621 
CE 2.473 2.1421 8.1618 3.5718 3.2255 2.306 5.6657 5.002 32.187 Xl=. 3 P 9.2236 2.8038 10.285 2.4331 3.9182 2.5603 35.422 6.3293 38.656 
a 2.473 2.1421 8.1618 3.4537 3.1134 2.2604 5.8522 5.1596 35.104 Xl=. 4 0 9.2236 2.8038 10.285 2.3876 3.7941 2.5148 38.422 6.5448 41.739 
a 3.2174 2.8303 12.882 3.3018 2.9446 1.4494 7.5711 6.558 49.676 Xl=. 5 14.324 3.6045 15.767 1.5468 3.6589 1.6441 54.724 8.5842 59.773 
CE 3*4247 2.9347 14.46 4,4531 4.003 1.5229 7.5843 6.4713 48.583 Xl=. 6 P 16.448 3.9146 18.436 1.6253 4.9032 1.7277 54.288 8.6973 59.994 
a 3.5549 3.0697 15.501 5.4067 4.8894 1.3339 7.1686 6.1484 45.063 Xl=. 7 01 17.487 4.04 19.473 1.4285 5.9239 1.5231 50.274 8.1888 55.484 
Table 6.4 Maximum likelihood estimation of a and 8 with related 95 per 
cent confidence intervals 
Once we have obtained the theoretical process generating the coefficients, 
we replace the parameter value, produced by the simulation, with the mode 
of the Beta distribution that we used for the approximation. Then, we 
compute the quantiles of the distribution in order to construct the confidence 
interval for each parameter. These intervals, together with the parameters 
and the values of Al at which these parameters are obtained, are shown in 
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table 6.5: 
Lower al Upperl 
l 
Lower a2 Upper Lower a3 Upper 
0.20713 0.2132 0.37701 0.36788 0.3709 0.48006 0.13088 0.1333 0.20054 
0.26541 0.2713 0.43094 0.44988 0.4529 0.56521 0.12345 0.1937 0.231 
Xl=. 3 0.13301 0.1375 0.24618 0.552 0.555 0.74092 0.11363 0.1148 0.1671 
XI=4 0.16665 0.1712 0.28199 0.596 0.599 0.78913 0.12701 0.1982 0.223 
ll=. 5 0.14134 0.1442 0.23157 0.654 0.657 0.84153 0.11666 0.1174 0.15751 
Xl=. 6 0.11434 0.1171 0.19865 0.751 0.754 0.90291 0.09996 0.1007 0.14172 
%I=. 7 
1 
0.12179 0.1244 0.20191 l 
l 
0.86291 0.8659 0.99803 0.10301 0.1038 0.1458 
Table 6.5 Modes and related 95 per cent confidence intervalsfrom a Beta 
distribution 
Table 6.5 suggests that optimal fiscal rules are characterized by a high 
parameter on the debt gap(i. e. a2)- On the contrary, the parameters mea- 
suring respectively the reactivity of the Government to the output gap and 
to the distance between the level of primary deficit and its lower bound are 
both very low. Specifically, they are both close to 0.1. This means that, 
given the initial conditions and the benchmark profile for the government, 
the optimal fiscal rule shows a higher reactivity to the debt gap with re- 
spect to the other objectives. This result is consistent with the fact that, 
among the assumptions underlying the model, we modeled a Government 
with a clear objective of convergence. Thus, a higher reactivity of the fis- 
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cal authority to the debt control objective was then expected. Moreover, 
the outcome of the simulation also highlights the highly conflicting nature 
of the three goals. This trade-off is partially illustrated by the efficiency 
frontiers. We assess the capacity of each fiscal policy rule to provide eco- 
nomic stabilization by measuring the extent to which fiscal policy influences 
cyclical fluctuations in output. In particular, we try to quantify the trade- 
off between the debt control objective and the economic stabilization by 
constructing the efficiency frontier for the government. This is obtained by 
reporting the standard deviation of the output gap and the standard devia- 
tion of the simulated public debt from its target respectively on the vertical 
and horizontal ax. The curve is illustrated in figure 6.6. 
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At each point on the black line corresponds to the optimal fiscal rule 
and the weight A, at which it is obtained. The figure shows the extent to 
which a policy maker could sacrifice its debt control objective, in favour of 
a higher economic stabilization objective. It shows that strict debt rules 
are needed as the weight attached to the public debt objective increases. 
Nevertheless, strict debt rules would provide more debt control, but at the 
cost of less economic stabilization. For example, when the weight Al is equal 
to 0.1 the standard deviation of output gap is approximately equal to 0.17%. 
But when the value of Al increases to 0.7 the standard deviation of output 
becomes equal to 0.29%. 
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6.5 Public Debt Dynamics in Italy and Belgium 
The procedure followed for a theoretical economy in the previous section 
is now applied to the EMU countries with highest public debt in the Euro 
Area(i. e. Italy and Belgium). However, for these countries we do not apply 
the backward-looking closed economy model used in the previous section, In 
the Pre-Euro period Italy and Belgium were commonly considered as small 
open economies. The estimation of a theoretical framework for these coun- 
tries, therefore, cannot neglect the effect of the exchange rate on output gap, 
as well as the role played by the exchange rate in the monetary transmission 
mechanism. In order to fill these gaps we modify the model by adding the 
real exchange(e) to equation(6.8) . The model turns out to be the Ball's 
model proposed in chapter 2. Unlike the second chapter, here we use annual 
data and thus consider only one lag. The model is as follows: 
7rýTt_l + '67ryt_l + UIT 7rt =a t_j (6.7) 
yt = ckyyt-, -, 8y(it-I - 7rt-1) - 6yet-, + uy (6.8) t-I 
wrt + (I - w)et = ayt-1 +b [7rt-1 + ýYet-fl (6.9) 
where CY is the parameter measuring the reactivity of the output gap 
to the real exchange rate and w is the weight attached to the interest rate 
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in the MC120 (Le wrt + (1 - w)et). All the other symbols keep the above 
mentioned meaning. The inclusion of the real exchange rate changes the 
Taylor rule in two aspects. First, the policy variable becomes a combination 
of r and e(i. e MCI). Second, the inflation rate is replaced by a combination 
of inflation and lagged exchange rate2l. 
Once we have implemented the reference model we proceed as follows. 
First, we estimate the equations (6.7), (6.8), and (6.9). Then, we simulate 
the model including the identity budget constraint and the reaction func- 
tion for the government, on the base of the estimated parameters. In the 
simulation we assume the initial level of public debt to be equal to the level 
of indebtedness for the Government under examination, at the end of the 
sample period (i. e. 2003). Specifically, we set the initial public debt for Italy 
to be equal to 106.2% and for Belgium to be equal to 100.5%. In addition, 
we keep the tax rate to the long run value that we assumed to be equal 
to 10%. For the estimation we use annual data provided by the European 
commission for the sample period 1983-2003 22 . All variables are demeaned 
and the model is estimated by using the OLS technique. We use, for the two 
countries, a bilateral exchange rate against the dollar. Table 6.6 and table 
6.7 show the estimates respectively for Italy and Belgium. 
20Following Ball(1998) we assume w to be equal to 0.75. We do not exclude the possi- 
bility that a different value of w could affect the results of the simulation. 
2 'For further details about the MCI see section 2.3 Chapter 2. 
22 We uses a short sample due to the limitation of the data on the yearly base. 
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Belgium 
Yt-l 7rt-I r, -1 et-, nt-, +ýe,, 
Yt 0.65 -0.38 -0.20 
(s. e 0.14) (s. e 0.07) (s. e 0.04) 
0.91 
1 
0.32 
0 1 (s. e 0. ) (s. e . 5) 
MCI,, 0* 39 1.21 
(s. e 0.33) (s. e 0.38) 
Table 6.6 Estimated coefficients for Belgium 
Italy 
yt-I 7ý-j rt-I e', nt-, +ýej 
Yt 0.38 -0.35 -0.11 (s. e 0.13) (s. e 0.04) (s. e 0.03) 
Rt 0.94 0 06 
0.52 
0 (s. e . ) (s. e . 22) - 
0.25 1.08 
(s. e 0.45) (s. e 0.47) 
Table 6.7 Estimated coefficients for Italy 
The tables suggest that coefficients have the right sign in both coun- 
tries. They are lower in Italy than in Belgium. 
The results of the simulation are described in the follo, "ing part of this 
section. For these countries Nve only report the main tables and graphs. The 
outcome of the simulation determining the parameter space is illustrated in 
figure 6.7 and figure 6.8: 
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Similarly to the previous section, the shaded areas represent the whole 
combination of parameters(al, a2, a3) leading to diverging paths for public 
debt. A comparative analysis suggests that the explosive area is more ex- 
tended in Italy than in BelgiUM23. In addition, both countries show greater 
explosive areas than the theoretical economy. This can be explained as fol- 
lows. Both countries, but especially Belgium, have a starting fiscal position 
higher than the initial value that we assumed for the theoretical economy. 
Moreover, the overall effect of the exchange rate and the interest rate on 
the output gap for Italy and Belgium is lower than the impact, of the real 
interest rate on the same variable, in the first model. Finally, the monetary 
policy authorities, in both countries, have shown a less aggressive behavior 
with respect to a virtual central bank having as reactivity function the rule 
estimated by Taylor(1967). These factors jointly caused a higher interest 
rate and, therefore, a higher growth rate for public debt during the simula- 
tion. Consequently, a more aggressive behavior of the fiscal policy authority 
on the debt objective, seems to be needed in order to avoid diverging paths 
for the simulated public debt. 
The optimal fiscal policy rules for the two countries and for different 
weights are reported respectively in table 6.8 and table 6.9. 
23 From Figure 6.7 and 6.8, the explosive areas seem to be very similar in both countries. 
Nevertheless, looking at the dimension of the files obtained as outcome of the simulation, 
it arises that Italy is clearly characterized by a larger explosive area. 
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Lower al Upp er 
T 
Lower a2 Upper 
1 1 
Lower a3 Upper 
0.12491 0.131 0.29479 0.69 0.693 0.80218 0.10791 0.114 0.27779 
Xl=. 2 0.13514 0.141 0.30067 0.751 0.754 0.86633 0.20714 0.213 0.37267 
2,1=. 3 0.09945 0.0999 0.1107 0.773 0.776 0.96192 0.2365 0.241 0.34967 
XI=4 0.15641 0.161 0.27175 0.831 0.834 0.999 0.1136 0.1182 0.22894 
Xl=. 5 0.15011 0.153 0.24034 0.8624 0.8654 0.999 0.11211 0.115 0.20234 
%1=. 6 0.13821 0.141 0.22252 0.996 0.999 0.999 0.14021 0.143 0.22452 
1111=. 7 0.11041 0.113 0.190531 
1 
0.996 0.999 0.999 1 
1 
0.12841 0.131 0.208531 
Table 6.8 Belgium: Modes and related 95 per cent confidence intervals 
from the Beta distributions 
Lower al Upp]er 
[Lower 
a2 
- 
Upper 
FLO-Wer 
a3 Upper 
kl=. l 0.09391 0.1 0.26379 0.773 0.776 0.88518 0,10391 0.11 0.27379 
kl=. 2 0.11614 0.122 0.28167 0.878 0.881 0.99333 0.10214 0.108 0.26767 
kl=. 3 0.0965 0.101 0.20967 0.885 0.888 0.999 0.1185 0.123 0.23167 
%1=4 0.09941 0.104 0.21475 0.91 0.913 0.999 0.12941 0.134 0.24475 
Xl=. 5 0.10711 0.11 0.19734 0.996 0.999 0.999 0.11811 0.121 0.20834 
ll=. 6 0.11921 0.122 0.20352 0.996 0.999 0.999 0.12821 0.131 0.21252 
I'll =. 7 0.12841 0.131 0.20853 1 
1 
0.996 0.999 0.999 0.11941 0.122 0.199531 
Table 6.9 Italy: Modes and related 95 per cent confidence intervals from 
the Beta distributions 
These tables also show the 95% confidence intervals for such parameters. 
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Similarly to the theoretical economy, strict debt rules result to be optimal in 
both countries. The simulation suggest that a very aggressive behaviour of 
the fiscal authorities in the these two countries is needed in order to hit the 
target. For Italy the optimal fiscal rule is characterized by the maximum 
value of a2 for every value of A, greater than 0.4. The same applies to 
Belgium for every value of Al greater than 0.5. Unlike Italy, the optimal 
fiscal rules for Belgium seem to show a slightly higher reactivity of the 
primary surplus to the output gap. The value of a3 for this country is, in 
fact, greater than 0.2 for A, equal respectively to 0.2 and 0.3. This means 
that Belgian government, in setting the public spending, has a higher margin 
of control for stabilizing the economy and a less tight fiscal trade-off. This 
result is confirmed by the efficiency frontiers for the two countries that are 
reported in figure 6.9: 
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The figure shows an Italian efficiency frontier slightly shifted to the right 
with respect to the Belgian one. For every value of Al the standard devia- 
tions of the two objectives are greater in Italy than in Belgium. This means 
that, despite a smaller fiscal position, the Italian government, in the simula- 
tion exercise, performed worse, in the achievement of its goals, with respect 
to the Belgian fiscal authority. This could be due to the differences in the 
economic and financial structure of the two economies highlighted with the 
estimated models. Despite these little asymmetries, the performances of the 
rules in Italy and Belgium seem to be very close to one another. Altogether 
the outcome of the simulation seems to highlight the need for an aggressive 
behavior on the part of the fiscal authorities in Italy and Belgium. In order 
to ensure the convergence of the public debt toward the target level the gov- 
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ernments, of the two EMU countries, should set the public spending mainly 
on the base of the distance between the public debt level and its target. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter evaluated a set of alternative strategies aiming to reduce the 
public debt toward its target in the presence of uncertainty. In order to eval- 
uate the performance of a simple fiscal policy rule in terms of its capability 
of guaranteeing convergence and sustainability of public finances, we simu- 
lated a neoclassical model with an exogenous; stochastic interest rate under 
the complete control of the monetary policy authorities. The policy reaction 
rule considered in the theoretical framework linked the primary balance ratio 
to the distance between the current and the target level of public debt, the 
distance between the primary surplus and the deficit ceiling, and the output 
gap. With the objective of satisfying the rule, the government has only the 
benefit rate as the fiscal instrument. Furthermore, with the aim to stabilize 
the public debt at its target level, the government must take into account 
the trade-off that a fiscal framework usually arises. The simulation exercise 
made it possible to explore a different path of adjustments depending on 
numerical values assigned to the parameters characterizing the fiscal policy 
rule governing the public sector. In particular, it constructed a procedure 
to estimate the optimal fiscal policy rule given some initial conditions. 
This analysis provided interesting insights into the linkages between the 
fiscal rule parameters and the dynamics of the public debt. It emerged that 
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the implementation of a fiscal rule characterized by time invariant parame- 
ters may trigger a non linear process of adjustment towards the objective of 
convergence. Specifically, the smaller the parameter regulating the reactiv- 
ity of the primary surplus to the distance between the public debt and its 
target, the higher is the probability that the government can generate an 
explosive path for public debt. When the analysis is applied to Italy and 
Belgium it arises that the explosive area is slightly greater, in Italy, than in 
Belgium. These differences, as well as the differences in the parameters char- 
acterizing the optimal fiscal policy rules, are mainly due to the asymmetries 
in the economic and financial structure of the two economies, highlighted 
with the estimated models. 
Among other things, the study has also provided the procedure to con- 
struct confidence intervals for the parameters characterizing the optimal 
fiscal policy rule and a procedure to estimate an efficiency frontier illus- 
trating the fiscal trade-off for the Government. The efficiency frontier gave 
further insights. Strict debt rules provide more debt control, but at the cost 
of less economic stabilization. Regarding the two countries under examina- 
tion, Belgium performed better than Italy in the achievement of the fiscal 
objectives. 
The model is relatively simple, tractable and easy to understand. Some 
of our results may depend, at least in their quantitative details, on the 
choices we have made for the model's parameters. We would argue, hoNv- 
ever, that our calibration of the macroeconomic model is largely accepted 
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from a part of the literature. Furthermore, the study shows that, once we 
estimated the macroeconomic model, the procedure is applicable to different 
economies. An example of such an applicability is given for Belgium and 
Italy. 
The estimated rules are not intended to serve as an explicit guide in 
setting fiscal policy. Nevertheless, the whole analysis represents a simple 
transparent way to characterize the behavior of the fiscal authority in a 
stochastic simulation framework. Moreover, it could be used to evaluate a 
wide range of fiscal policy issues. The study is not the last word on the 
debt strategy problem. More work is required in a variety of directions. 
Diture work is definitely needed to enhance the richness of our stochastic 
environment. 
Part IV 
General Conclusions 
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This dissertation focused on the rules and the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy in the Euro Area. In the first part (Chapters 1 to 2) we 
studied the main features of the economic structures of the EMU countries 
emerging from the single country evidence. In particular, we analyzed the 
asymmetries in monetary policy transmission and monetary rules perfor- 
mance across EMU members. In the second part (Chapters 3 and 4) we 
considered Euro Area as a whole. The third chapter studied asymmetric be- 
havior of the ECB and the Bank of England during the different phases of the 
business cycle, while the fourth chapter focused on the confidence channel in 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. To this end it constructed a 
model for the Consumer and Business confidence. In the final part(Chapter 
5 and 6) the thesis faced fiscal policy issues. Specifically, Chapter 5 pro- 
poses a multivariate test for sustainability of fiscal policy, while Chapter 6 
estimated the optimal fiscal rule for a Government with commitment. 
The main conclusions the dissertation reached can be summarized as 
follows. 
Chapter 1 attempted to analyze different rules capable of modeling how 
the central banks of EMU countries have made policy choices affecting in- 
terest rates. In particular, the study focused on six different rules relating 
to the interest rate, which the central banks are assumed to control, to a 
set of variables thought to affect monetary authority behavior. This kind 
of study provided insight into how the new European monetary institution 
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should conduct and characterize its policy strategy. In other words, it can 
suggest how the ECB should move interest rates once a change in real out- 
put, inflation occurs. The first step of the analysis was the construction 
of a macroeconomics model to use as a basis for the comparison of esti- 
mated reaction functions. The features of the model are very important 
because the conclusions obtained depend, of course, on the belief that the 
economic structure implied by the proposed model is not grossly incorrect. 
The econometrics analysis considered the main properties of six different 
rules: three different specifications of the Taylor rule, an optimal feedback 
rule and a forward-looking rule. The first question considered in the compar- 
ative analysis was the ability of the rules to replicate historical interest rate 
movements, that is the central bank behavior. The results emerging from 
the study stressed that simple rules perform quite well in following interest 
rates historical records. The ability to mimic interest rate changes increases 
once an interest rate smoothing term is included in the reaction function. 
This suggested that central bank behavior can be better explained by adding 
a lagged interest rate. Moreover, considering a forward-looking dimension 
that takes into account expectations of future inflation movements, seems to 
give further improvement. The second issue is related to the ability of the 
rules to minimize the volatility of the variables the central bank considers 
as targets and, therefore, to stabilize the economy. The analysis suggests 
that even if the rule obtained by solving an optimal control algorithm is 
consistently, across the EMU countries, the top-performing rule, the per- 
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formance of a simple forward-looking rule with a smoothing term for the 
interest rate is almost as stabilizing as the optimal feedback rule. Then, it 
can be concluded that the gains a central bank can obtain by following a 
complicated rule are not so great. In addition, the easier communicability 
of the simple rule can also increase the transparency and thus the credibility 
of the central bank. The problem of transparency is of particular interest, 
once the problem of the possible rules the European Central Bank should 
adopt is considered. In fact, the inability of the ECB to communicate with 
the agents about its strategy is one of the main problems the new monetary 
institution is facing. It follows that the ECB should use simple rules as 
guidelines for its monetary strategy. 
The aim of chapter 2 was to shed some light on how each channel of trans- 
mission may, heterogeneously, work in different countries and how those dif- 
ferences may change by the introduction of the euro. The analysis has been 
divided in two parts. In the first part, the possible asymmetries in output 
and prices responses to a monetary policy shock, across EMU countries, have 
been analyzed. We have shown that imposing restrictions on the estimated 
structural models according to the monetary constraints each country faced 
during the EMS period, obtains well-behaved and quantitative comparable 
effects of the monetary policy shocks in all the countries. In the second part, 
we have modelled policy behavior with monetary rules that accounts for ex- 
change rate changes. After estimating the efficiency frontiers for each EMU 
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country, we have implemented the impulse response analysis in the light 
of the new instrument of monetary policy. The impulse response analysis 
highlights that output gap and inflation in the selected economies, respond 
to identical monetary policy shocks with a similar speed and movement, al- 
beit with different size of effect. From the empirical analysis applied in the 
chapter, it emerges that the effect of a monetary shock on output depends 
mostly on the output structure of the countries. The results suggest the 
presence of small divergences across EMU members. Those asymmetries, 
concerning the interest rate channel, will probably not be so large to deter- 
minate frictions for the EMU. Other channels, not considered here, could 
be a cause of concern. The chapter did not take into account the asym- 
metries that might arise from the credit channel or from the stock market 
channel. Nevertheless, it seems plausible to imagine that the cross-country 
differences in monetary transmission across EMU countries, could decrease 
over time as a result of an increasing financial structures homogeneity. This 
means that, in the long run, asymmetries in monetary transmission will not 
be a cause of concern. However, some differences are likely to persist; those 
divergences call for a better understanding and monitoring of the national 
monetary transmission mechanisms. 
Chapter 3 analyzed whether monetary authorities asymmetrically affect 
real economy depending on the phases of the business cycle. In particular, 
the chapter measured the likely effects of monetary policy actions on output 
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and inflation, using a multivariate extension of Hamilton's regime switching 
model. The empirical analysis suggested that the two central banks display 
more aggressive behavior in recession rather than in expansion. In both 
countries the implied targets were significantly higher in expansion than in 
recession. The estimated regime dependent Taylor's rules, as well as the 
estimated inflation targets, also confirmed that, while the Bank of England 
contemporaneously targets output and inflation, the primary goal of the 
ECB consists of achieving price stability. Some interesting results also came 
from the impulse response analysis. The model appeared to perform quite 
well. No price puzzles have been detected in the simulations. In general, an 
interest rate shock leads to a larger effect on the output gap during recession 
than during expansion. Common to the UK and the Euro, Area, the results 
highlight significant negative effects of an increase in interest rate during 
recessionary periods. Some differences arise from the size and the timing 
of the responses. The patterns of the responses are supposed to be depen- 
dent upon the particular strategy followed by the central bank. A central 
bank that primarily aims at achieving price stability, like the ECB, has a 
greater and quicker output response during recession than a central bank 
that targets several variables, like the Bank of England, that, in contrast, 
has quicker but smaller output reaction during expansion. Altogether the 
analysis strongly suggests that the stage of the business cycle is important 
in the monetary policy decision process. A central bank cannot neglect the 
specific regime where the monetary action takes place. 
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Chapter 4 analyzed the key determinants of economic confidence in the 
Euro Area since 1993. We set up two multivariate frameworks to model 
respectively consumer and business confidence. 
The results suggest that consumer confidence is mainly driven by labour 
market developments in the euro area (measured by the change in the unem- 
ployment rate). The real short-term interest rate seems to play -a key role in 
the long run. Stock market developments play a significant, but smaller role 
than the other factors, and smaller than the available literature seems to 
suggest. Stock market developments affect the consumer confidence index, 
essentially, through its component measuring the way households perceive 
general economic conditions. 
Regarding the results for business confidence, the dominating factor is a 
measure of business confidence in the United States, which suggests a rather 
strong role for the world economic cycle on Euro Area business confidence. 
Among the endogenous variables, industrial production seems to have a 
significant effect in the short run, but this effect is of a lesser magnitude than 
the external factor just mentioned. In addition, stock market developments 
are assessed to have a larger effect on the confidence of firms compared to 
households. Regarding the breakdown of the business confidence indicator 
into its sub-components, the most reactive component is the index describing 
the assessment of order books. 
Looking at the impact of monetary policy more in detail, it appears that 
273 
changes in interest rates have the expected negative effect both on consumer 
and business confidence. A comforting result also concerns the timing of 
these effects, which is similar to the transmission lag of monetary policy on 
economic activity commonly found in the literature. These results provide 
some evidence for the presence of a "confidence channel" in the transmission 
of monetary policy on real activity. The models could be extended to include 
price variables to also analyze further the transmission of monetary policy 
on inflation. However, the fact that the effect of interest rates on consumer 
confidence has a similar timing as the effect on real economic activity leads 
to a cautious interpretation. Indeed, the model of consumer confidence does 
not include any variable of economic activity (other than the change in the 
unemployment rate), meaning that the confidence indicator itself could be 
argued to capture, in fact, the effects on economic activity. The results of the 
business confidence model tend to rule out the presence of such a problem. 
Indeed, the timing of the response to a shock in interest rates is similar 
to that in the consumer confidence model, while the business confidence 
model includes a variable controlling for economic activity (the industrial 
production variable). Thus, interest rates can be argued to affect business 
confidence beyond their impact on economic activity. 
However, further analysis is needed before concluding on the relative in- 
fluence of monetary policy on the confidence of economic agents in the Euro 
Area compared to other factors. First, it cannot be ruled out that some vari- 
ables may have been omitted in the models proposed in this chapter. Their 
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omission may lead to bias in the results. Second, the analysis of monetary 
policy shocks could be refined. In this respect, shocks are simply defined 
in the multivariate frameworks proposed, in this chapter, as a one stan- 
dard deviation change in a given variable. Alternative ways of measuring 
shocks would need to be used to address the impact of monetary policy on 
confidence. In particular, policy shocks can be measured as the deviations 
of the actual policy rates decided by monetary policy-makers compared to 
the expected interest rates. Monetary policy shocks can also be seen as 
indicators of the monetary policy stance. This policy stance can be mea- 
sured by the deviation of actual real interest rates from their natural level. 
Overall, alternative ways of measuring policy shocks may lead to different 
assessments of the impact of monetary policy on confidence. Finally, central 
banks do not affect confidence only through changes in interest rates. It is 
commonly argued that central banks pursuing a policy of the "steady-hand" 
(i. e. of keeping interest rates unchanged) make a positive contribution to 
confidence. 
Chapter 5 studied the sustainability of the fiscal policy in the Euro Area 
and the United States. By using the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
and applying a cointegration analysis to data, it derived conditions suitable 
for determining whether or not fiscal policies are sustainable in the long run. 
It arose that the condition for sustainability depends upon the stationarity 
of the VAR system. In particular, if the VAR model is globally stationary, 
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fiscal policy is said to be sustainable. If the VAR model is not globally 
stationary, fiscal policy is said to be unsustainable. 
The broad conclusion is that both countries have an unsustainable fiscal 
policy. Unlikely the Euro Area, US fiscal position seems to be less wor- 
rying. This is probably due to the higher growth rate of the GDP shown 
from the US with respect to the Euro Area in the sample period. The 
chapter also constructed forecasts for the public debt level in two different 
ways. The forecasted values of public debt show a convergence towards 
lower values. These values are consistent with the evaluation elaborated in 
the cointegration analysis. Altogether the study rejected the hypothesis of 
the sustainability of fiscal policy and confirmed the results obtained from a 
strand of literature. 
Chapter 6 evaluated a set of alternative strategies aiming to reduce the 
public debt toward its target, in the presence of uncertainty. In order to 
evaluate the performance of a simple fiscal policy rule in terms of its capa- 
bility of guaranteeing convergence and sustainability of public finances, we 
simulated a neoclassical model with an exogenous stochastic interest rate 
under the complete control of the monetary policy authorities. The pol- 
icy reaction rule considered in the theoretical framework linked the primary 
balance ratio to the distance between the current and the target level of 
public debt, the distance between the primary surplus and the upper limit 
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of the primary deficit, and the output gap. With the objective of satisfy- 
ing the rule, the government has only the benefit rate as fiscal instrument. 
Furthermore, with the aim to stabilize the public debt at its target level, 
the government must take into account the trade-off that a flscal frame- 
work usually arises. The simulation exercise made it possible to explore a 
different path of adjustments depending on numerical values assigned to the 
parameters characterizing the fiscal policy rule governing the public sector. 
In particular, it constructed a procedure to estimate the optimal fiscal policy 
rule given some initial conditions. 
This analysis provided interesting insights into the linkages between the 
fiscal rule parameters and the dynamics of the public debt. It emerged that 
the implementation of a fiscal rule characterized by time invariant parame- 
ters may trigger a non linear process of adjustment towards the objective of 
convergence. Specifically, the smaller the parameter regulating the reactiv- 
ity of the primary surplus to the distance between the public debt and its 
target, the higher is the probability that the government can generate an 
explosive path for public debt. When the analysis is applied to Italy and 
Belgium it arises that the explosive area is slightly higher, in Italy, than in 
Belgium. These differences, as well as the differences in the parameters char- 
acterizing the optimal fiscal policy rules, are mainly due to the asymmetries 
in the economic and financial structure of the two economies highlighted 
with the estimated models. 
Among other things, the study has also provided the procedure to con- 
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struct confidence intervals for the parameters characterizing the optimal 
fiscal policy rule and a procedure to estimate an efficiency frontier illus- 
trating the fiscal trade-off for the Government. The efficiency frontier gave 
further insights. Strict debt rules provide more debt control, but at the cost 
of less economic stabilization. Regarding the two countries under examina- 
tion, Belgium performed better than Italy in the achievement of the fiscal 
objectives. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Y1 Y1.1 Yt-2 YO Yt4 ql 
Germsay 0.767 0.083 0.083 -0.195 -0.151 -0.208 R. 1, .1 I., q 11371 1.17.1 1., "1 (. 1.1 
Austria 1.179 -0.642 0.213 0.127 -0.182 0.230 p. ý] p .1 V ý1 [- -1 (. zzj p'. ) D. - 
Belgium 0.784 -0-074 -0.018 O. OS6 -0.206 0.173 .1 . - 
p .1 [--1 [., -1 1. .1 1, -1 P -1 
Netherlands 0.457 0.102 0.093 0.044 -0.157 -0,070 13.. ] 1-] 10 U) P-I 1.2-1 1-1 D... - 
France 0.788 0.050 -0.025 -0.084 -0.171 0.059 
119-11 1-1 1. "1 (- M t-1 p IN 
Ireland 0.613 0.278 -0.119 -0.155 0.020 -0.210 R! 
1, .1 P, -1 [.. 1 p.. ) 1. .1 1.1 "1 
Italy 0.794 -0-228 0.247 -0.137 -0.143 0.135 
("'I U., q p "I U, M UM PM 
Spain 0.709 0.230 0.169 -0.452 0.039 -0.265 a. 11 -) 1. q 11 M J-) I-M U. -I Dw - I.. 
Finland 0.878 -0.093 0.027 -0.115 -0.145 0.302 R, ... V, ql [.., I [.,. I p .1 1. -1 14351 Dw-L" 
Portugal 0.824 0.083 0-064 -0.237 -0.004 -0.015 R' - 
vM p 361 1-) 12.1 J. 'q I. oz) -. 1- 
Table A2.1: Estimated coefficients for the aggregate demand equation 
2rt Ir, 
-l 
7r, -3 Irt-3 Irl4l Yl-I 0 q, 
Germany 0.398 0-023 0.144 0-435 0.070 1.876 a, 
Myn p 1'] 11-11 (. t'I 11,71 0. 
Austria -0.052 0.149 0.100 0.803 OA82 3-582 I-] t-I 1-1 1-1 IL., I (13.1 
Belgium 0.080 0.263 0.176 0.481 0.146 4.631 0-tw 
IM 1-11 11M I-] llýl 1ý21 D-U 
Netherlands 0.141 0322 0.000 0-537 0.166 4.717 
I-I 13-M lo'. 1 11.1 11. ] [.,. 1 b-L" 
France 0.599 0.10S 0-096 0.207 0-016 -0.930 a, -w 
IIVI IM791 1- -1 it. ] lot'] 1.1.131 D. -- 
Ireland 0.137 0.358 0.502 0.003 0.143 0.000 
[I. %] I ... 1 14.911 1'. ) 11=1 I'Lot'l bw - 1.11 
Italy 0394 -0.205 0.266 -0.142 -0.186 0.096 I.. ) p1j's J-Lýl plul 1'. ) OW -M 
Spain 0.030 0.225 0.147 0.598 0.105 1.074 0- 
("I 1-1 11.1 1-1 (-1 11431 
Finland 0.499 -0.186 0114 0.473 0.209 4.585 
15-1 1-1 IM (-I f-I W11 (U'l 
Portugal 0.366 0.111 0.146 0-376 0.039 -0.832 0. - 
Table A2.2. - Estimated coefficients for the aggregate supply equation 
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4 11-1 Irl-I Yt-1 qc 
,$ 11-1 DE qt 
DE 
Germany 0.891 0.097 0.125 1.163 - 
1-1 (", 1 RZI VW-La 
Austria 0.053 0.179 0.410 0.813 a'... 
Belgium 0.605 0.183 -0.056 0.083 
Netherlands - 0.131 0.271 1.054 0.760 
11-1 11-1 1.. ] lik1g) 
France 0.791 0.116 0.095 0.062 0.157 
1.17,1 it. ) (. A. ) [.. 1 1,71 
Ireland 0.78 0.17 0.06 0.03 0-33 
Italy 0.886 0.097 0.103 0.079 0.009 
1-] 13.011 (1.1 1-) 
Spain 0.450 0.485 0.026 0.069 -0.001 e. c. 
(4 In 0 -1 I-M Pýn 1-. 9 vW. 
Finland 0.952 0.073 0.021 -0.024 0.005 1, -1 
1ý1 11-1 1&491 J-] VW-L" 
Portugal 0.909 0.055 0.066 - 0.079 0.037 V. - 
Table A2.3: Estimated coefficients for the monetary policy function 
283 
Appendix 2.2 
-A preliminary descriptive study, following 13jorksten N. and Syrjanen 
M. (1999), is performed using the convergence barometer. The use of this 
graphic analysis helps to recognize the possible sources of an asymmetric 
effect of monetary policy. For each country the last observation available at 
the end of the year 2000 of concerning inflation, credit growth, GDP growth, 
unemployment rate, fiscal balance and the debt/GDP ratio is comparedv6th 
statistics on the same variables referred to a weighted Euro Area average. 
The values in the Figure A2.1 to A2.4 refer to observations available from 
the OECD Economic Outlook. These six key variables show some structural 
and cyclical divergences among the European countries. The GDP growth 
differences are quite large: the good performance in the European periphery 
tends to amplify those asymmetries. In particular, the positive trend of real 
growth in Finland, the Netherlands and Ireland seems to be offset by lower 
GDP growth in Italy. Asymmetries emerge also in the inflation rate: the 
high-growth countries like Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands are 
experiencing a higher inflation rate than the core European countries such 
as Germany or France. Finally, some considerations concerning the unem- 
ployment and public debt dynamics have to be given. Here, the difficulties 
of Italy and Spain in recovering a high employment rate together with the 
pressure for a downward trend of public debt in Belgium and Italy, represent 
the major explicative phenomena of the differences in the macroeconomic 
performance across EMU countries. 
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Figure A2.1: Convergence Barometer for Euro-Area Countries 
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Appendix 2.3 
Here we describe the methodology utilized to compute the variances. 
Model(2.12) can be represented in a more explicit form as follows: 
Yt Cel 0 -(18+20) YI-I Cf2 0 0 Yt-2 
7Ft P2 71 
1 
Irt-, 0 72 
] I 
74-2 
qt Z1 Z5 Z9 qt Z5 Z6 Z10 qt-2 
a3 0 0 Yt-3 C4 00 Yt-4 
0 73 
1 
6 '74-3 0 74 6 
I 
74-4 
Z3 Z7 0 qt-3 Z4 Z8 0 qt-4 
ioo et io2 0 Et-I 
01 77t 
1 
010 77t-i 
Zll Z14 Z12 Vt 00 Z3 Vt-i 
2 where zi are respectively equal to: z, = ma, + np(l + al); 
Z2 : -- MCf2(l + a, ) + npCf2; Z3 = ma3(1 + al) + npCe3; 
Z4 =: MCf4(l + al) + npCe4; Z5 = nyl; 
Z6 ý MY2 (1 + 'fl); Z7 ' M73 (1 + 71); Z8 : -- MY4 (1 +'71); 
zg = -{(mal +np) (ß+ ý'-)}; zio =mal +np; zil = M2Z12 = (M + 00 
np) ` 0 
For given parameters and given value of m and n, it is possible to compute 
the variances of the vector X using the following standard formulas: 
(I9K2- A0 A)-lvec(E, )) 
where A is the companion matrix and E, is the variance covariance 
matriX24 
"For details see Lutkepol, chapter 6 
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In order the construct the set of efficiency frontiers. We search, over a 
wide range of m and n, the combinations that minimize the following loss 
function: 
Loss = (1 - A)Var(y) + AVar(7r) 
where A is the weight that we impose upon the variance of the inflation 
in the loss function and (1 - A) is, consequently, the weight that we impose 
upon the variance of the output. 
Every point of the efficiency frontier represents the combination of m 
and n that minimizes the loss function for a given value of A. 
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Appendix 3.1 
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Figure A3.1: Statistical properties of the normalized residuals 
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Appendix 3.2 
Let denote with Xt the vector of the endogenous variables and with st 
the regime variable. The density of Xt in state j is equal to: 
-n/219-11-1/2 exp f (Xt Ist = j; 0) = (27r) j 
[(-112)(Xt 
- IiXt)'Qil(Xt - IiXt)] 
The joint multivariate distribution function of Xt and st is then equal 
t025: 
P(Xt, St = j; 0) =Z 7rj - f(XtISt = j; 0) (A 3.2.1) 
j=l 
where irj is the unconditional probability to be in state j and m is the 
number of states. 
The unconditional multivariate normal density is given by the sum of 
equation(A 3.2.1) 
m 
(yt; 0) =E P(xt, st = i; 
j=l 
25 
This result follows from the fact that the conditional probability of A given B is: PfAandBI P{AIBI -- PJBJ 
This expression implies that joint probability of A and B occurring together can be 
calculated as: 
P JA and B} =PJAIBI -P {B} 
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The estimates of the parameters are obtained maximizing the log likeli- 
hood unconditional multivariate normal density: 
T 
L(O) =Z log f (yt; 0) (A 3.2.2) 
t=l 
7n 
subject to the constraints that E irj =1 
j=1 
In a more explicit form the maximization problem(A 3.2.2) can be re- 
written as: 
TM 
n/2 1 ý2-11-1/2 eXp L(O)=Elog 
E7rjf(27r)- 1/2) (Xt - IfXt)"0371 (Xt - IfXt) 
t=1 
I 
j=1 
M 
subject to the constraints that 7rj =1 
Maximum likelihood estimation of 0 is based on the implementation of 
the Expectation Maximization problem proposed by Hamilton (1990). This 
algorithm, introduced by Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977), is designed for 
a general class of models where the observed time series depend on some un- 
observable stochastic variables. For a MS-VAR model these are the regime 
variables st. Each iteration of the EM algorithm consists of two steps. The 
expectation step involves a pass through the filtering and smoothing algo- 
rithm, using the estimated parameters vector Oj-1 of the last maximization 
step in place of the unknown true parameter vector. This delivers an esti- 
mate of the smoothed probabilities Pr(st JY, Oi-1) of the unobserved states 
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st where s records the history of the Markov chain. In the maximization step, 
an estimate of the parameter vector 0 is derived as a solution ý of the first 
order conditions associated with likelihood function, where the conditional 
regime probabilities Pr(slY, O) are replaced with the smoothed probabilities 
Pr(slY, Oj-') that are derived in the last expectation step. Equipped with a 
new parameter vector 0 the filtered and smoothed probabilities are updated 
in the next expectation step, and so on, guaranteeing an increase in the 
value of the likelihood function at each step. 
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Appendix 3.3 
This appendix aims to prove that the expected duration of a phase can 
be computed as (1 - pjj)-1. In particular, we want to prove the expected 
duration to be in regime 1 is actually equal to (1 - p1j)-1: 
Co 
z-1 -1 Zpl, p11) = (1 - p11) (A 3.3.1) 
z=l 
The first member of the above equation can be rewritten as follows: 
00 
p11) E zpli (A 3.3.2) 
z=l 
It is known that: 
00 
Z-1 Epil 
z=1 -pil 
and consequently that: 
00 00 
Pii pzi-1 
Pii Ei Epz 
Z=I z=1 P11 
"0 
The first derivative of E pl, with respect to pil is: 
Z=l 
00 
49 Epil 
Z=l (A 3.3.3) 
'Opil pll)2 
By expressing the first derivative as a function of z, the equation(A 3.3.2) 
can be written as follows:: 
295 
PZII 00 z=l Z-1 
Opil 
zzpi (A 3.3.4) 
z=l 
By equalizing the second member of equation(A3.3.4) to the second 
member of equation(A 3.3.3) we obtain: 
00 
Z-1 =1 
zzpli 
(A 3.3.5) 
z=l p11), 
The proof follows by plugging equation(A3.3.5) into equation(A3.3.1) : 
00 (1 ('-Pll)EZP'll 
-(I-pll)2 
Z=l 
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Appendix 4.1 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER INTEGRATION TESTS 
Variable - UR 
ill,. hig I. i4. All a, I 
ctua bam 130 
Stjiii tic 1. value 2.5% value 5% value 10% vsluý 
P-6, P-u F76 P 373. B-11 
p=o' R=o . -j-, I 
P=O, ll-0 'ý F76a. 371.5- 
P=O, P-0 F76: p 372, B1.0111 
P-0, P=0,0-0 DF81JOA1 
. 111. T. 1a. 1a 
- 
V-W)le= PER 
Maxiag in theAR corr. -I 
Actual S-I! 1e f.. - 130 
TEST Statistic 1% value 2.5% value 5% value 10% value 
F76;, 371,81-11 
P-0, '-0 - '; .ý __ -- F76; p. 373.01-11 
DFai; T. b, l 
F? G: p. 371, B1-k111 
p=(), 11=4) 
DF I; T. b. 11 
ALI L', rEDDlCKEY-kL ... 
Variable= R-Sifir 
Max 12g in the AN corr. =I 
Ack-1 S.. le size 13" 
TEST Staý tic 1% , -je 
2.5% value 5% value 10% value 
1M, 171a 
F7CP. 373,1311011 
DF61: T. b. 1 
P-o' F76; p. 373,6ý-11 
P=d, A-1), 3 DFUJ-11 
. -J-111 
V-rable EC-con 
Max 121 in the AR corr. I 
AýW. l S. aipl, sl. c 
TEST Statistic 1% value 2.5% v-., ý 5% value 10% value 
p-" A=Q F76,371,61-11 
F76; p. 373,51-11 
O-J-1 
p-o' A=o F76; p. 71,51-111 
P=o, A=D VIA. -Il 
P-o' J-D, I =o : ý7 :' QF81: T, b. 11 
Table A4.1 CCI: -UL. 1 root t -es. s 
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Roots analysis 
Levels 
Estimated Model 
1.0839 0.9553 0.9553 0.9229 
0.9451 0.9451 0.7062 0.0488 
Table A4.2 Roots of the CCI model 
JARQUE-BERA NORMALITY TEST 
EQUATION SKEWNESS p-value KURTOSIS p-value SKEW. &KURT. p-value 
1 2.281 0.131 2.04 0.153 4.321 0.115 
2 0.918 0.338 0.021 0.886 0.939 0.625 
3 6.105 0.013 4.857 0.028 10.962 0.004 
4 0.668 0.414 0.417 0.519 1.084 0.581 
S, ýSTEIVI 9,4112 
-, 
9.052 6.64C7 :: ý 106_ 7d, iSý -1 
7 
NOTE: NORMALITY IS ACCEPTED WHEN p-value>0.05 
MARDIA MULTIVARIATE NORMALITY TEST 
SKEWNESS p-value KURTOSIS p-value SKEWAKURT. p-value I 
NOTE: NORMALITY IS ACCEPTED WHEN p-valuo>0.05 
Table A4.3 Residuals Analysis in the CCI model 
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A IGM AS TSD DICKE V-YVLLZA 1.1 TAG AA I- I SETS 
TI ST st. 1l. fl. 1% -Ill. 2.5% -1.. S% . 1.. 16% -1.. 
4"'Q': 1, 1 1 8 1: 1 , - 
4 
1 
, 4 - 01 . 4-0 
U 
1 
AT 
fit 1 s: f 
. 114 1 
AUGAIIINTIlD DICK-F-1 All.. TA-A 
TEST st'll'ti, 1 1% . 1.. 23% .. 1.. 5% '. l.. 16% .. 1.. 
1. - - i4l' 
IA -z. wi . 3.117 
ETA? w1w Is Vr ý'.? i -Xv. 4 3 A 4A. 7 
IT AS A. T9PAI IT AT -F VLL9aINTAGRA AT 0A 19 ... 
IT 11. A. 
A. -I - 
I 
. 11. 
TEST st. 11.11. 1% -1.. 2.5% -N. 18% . 1.. 
isle 7 -. -IT 
a.. . 4.67 41.51 t7 -z 0 - -2.90 
+. 3w 8.7 as? &. 7 1 
* 
. 2.76 4. " -&.? x .3' 4t is 
........ P.. 2.42 9.5 569 4 1 ,' 1 ,9 
....... " o? a., A P . 11. 
M 8: . .:. , 
. AUMENTS ICK. -U LRA TRON TESTS RAT. 
-- -a 
AT . .11.1;. A. 
TEST 3% V, 16e 2. s% -1- 3% , 1,, 11% all* 
. 3.51 -3 1? ý2.11 a -2.1111 
a.. s. st 4.1 , '4LT 
1 ", 1.4 Is" 
a. . #-a -' is AM -17.4 224 ý31k. 
t 
341 -4 . 111A a ' as 4*11 4A# 
N . I. A "44 6.411 5.47 
A. -PITSTS DICKRY-1 LLRA 1.4T ... AT... -H 
- I. -. 18 1. 
AT I Ill 1. .. All ..... .I 
A. -I 
TEST st. ti. 11, 1 1% -1.. 2.5% -N. 5% -1.. 18% -Ilm. 
...... : -icw 
...... 4AM -2jr -2 #v -8 AHI 
" " 4 1 + 1 c'4 P... A 4" is 6 11 ' 4.18 
... .A # Ir ' 
4 
- 
Table A4.4 BCI: Unit root tests 
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Roots of the model 
Levels 
Estimated Model 
11 
1.0247 0.9654 0.964 0.9617 0.9445 0.9445 0.8516 0.7999 
0.964 0.956 0.956 0.8415 0.76 0.6169 0.2982 0.2982 
1 
Table A4.5 BCI: Roots analysis 
JARQUE-BERA NORMALITY TEST 
EQUATION SKEWNESS p-volue KURTOSIS p-vslue SKEW&KURT. p-value 
1 2.421 0.12 1.249 0.264 3.671 0.16 
2 0.193 0.661 2.685 0.101 2.878 0.237 
3 0.701 0.402 0.102 0.749 0.804 0.669 
4 0.344 0.558 0.341 0.559 0.685 0.71 
5 0.272 0.602 0.109 0.742 0.381 0.827 
6 0.091 0.763 0.82 0.365 0.911 0.634 
7 2.707 0.1 0.78 0.377 3.487 0.175 
8 2.667 0.102 1.341 0.247 4.009 0.135 
SYSTEM, 
NOTE: NORMALITY IS ACCEPTED WHEN p-value>0.05 
MARDIA MULTIVARIATE NORMALITY TEST 
SKEWNESS p-value KURTOSIS p-value SKEWAKURT. p-value 
NOTE: NORMALITY IS ACCEPTED WHEN p-value>0.05 
Table A4.6 Residuals Analysis in the BCI model 
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Appendix 5.1 
The public debt identity at time t is as follows: 
bt = dt-1 + (1 + rt-, )bt-, (A 5.1.1) 
or alternatively it is: 
ez = ex + ey 
where: 
z= Inbt 
x= Indt 
ln[(l + rt-l)bt-1] 
The first order Taylor polynomial approximation of f (x, y, z) = e' - [ex 
ey] =0 about x=Y= In-d, y=F= ln[(l + T)T] and z=T= In*&- follows: 
e' + e'(z - «2) - le-' + e'(x - !)+ e'Y + e'Y(y - «g» =0 (A 5.1.2) 
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By substituting z, x and yx%rith their respective values, equation(A 5.1.2) 
becomes: 
e 
Inb +e Inb (In bt - In e 
Ind 
+, In 'a(In dt-1 - In'd) + . 
1n((1+7)ý) 
+e (ln((l + rt-, )bt-1) - ln((l + 
or equivalently: 
b+b(Inbt-Inb) = d+ 
+d(In dt - Ind) + (1 + T)b 
+(l +T)ý [(In(l +rt-1) + In bt-1) - ln((l +-f)ý)] 
By rearranging: 
b(l+lnbt-Inb) = dlndt+d(l-lnd)+ 
(1 + T)T [(l + In(l + rt-1) + In bt-1) - ln((l +"f)L)j 
By dividing both sides by T(l + T) : 
dd 
0(1+lnbt-lnb) = 8(=Indt+=(l-lnd))+ bb 
[1 + In(l + rt-1) + In bt-1 - ln((l + T)ý)] 
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where 8 is the discount factor and it is equal to (1 + -f)-1 
By solving with respect to 6 In bt : 
d 
, 81nbt = -, 8+, Blnb+, 8[=(l -Ind)]+ b 
d 
+1 - ln((l + T)ý) + In bt-1 + =, 3 In dt + In(l + rt-1) b 
By replacing In(l + rt-1) with rt-1 : 
d 
, 
81nbt = -0+, 81nb+, B[=(l -Ind)]+ b 
d 
+1 - ln((l +T)L) + In bt-1 + =, 8 In dt-1 + rt-1 b 
and dividing both sides by 8 we obtain the log linear approximation of 
the public debt identity: 
d In bt =K+, B-l In bt-, += In dt-1 +, 6-lrt-, b 
where r. is a constant equal to: 
d 
K= -1+lnb+ =(l-lnd)]+, 8- -, 8- ln((l+-f)b) b 
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Appendix 5.2 
The Dickey fuller (DF) test is based on the estimation of the following 
equation: 
Ayt = /I + pyt-l + Ct (A 5.2.1) 
where et (t = 1,2, .... T) are the error terms assumed to 
be stationary 
and uncorrelated. The null hypothesis HO states that the series has a unit 
root (i. e. the series is not stationary). Formally, the -null hypothesis is 
p=0 versus the alternative p<0. For testing this hypothesis we compute 
the t-statistic in the usual way but the distribution of this statistic is not 
standard. Critical values were supplied by Dickey and Fuller(1979,1981). If 
HO is rejected, the series yt is stationary and if HO is not rejected the series 
is not stationary. 
If the error terms are correlated, lagged values of the dependent vari- 
able are added until the errors are not correlated and we have then the 
Augmented Dickey -Fuller (ADF) test (Said Dicky, 1984). For non trending 
series this test is performed by estimating the following equation: 
k-1 
Ayt = bt + pyt-l + Ayt-i + --t (A 5.2.1) 
and testing p=0 versus the alternative p<0, where k is the number of 
lags of the dependent variable. 
Conversely, for trending series it is convenient to use the models: 
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k-1 
Ayt = IL + pyt-l + Ayt-i + Ct (A 5.2.2) 
k-1 
[i +, B(t - T/2) + pyt-1 + Ayt-i + ct (A 5.2.3) 
where 6 is the coefficient of the linear trend. If the null hypothesis is 
not rejected the series is non-stationary. 
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Appendix 6.1 
The Beta distribution is a general type of statistical distribution which 
is related to the gamma distribution. It has two free parameters, which are 
labeled, according to one of two notational conventions, respectively with a 
and P. 
The domain of the distribution is included in the interval ]0,1[. The 
probability function P(x) and distribution function D(x) are respectively 
given by: 
P(x) = 
(i - r(a + ß) (1 - x)ß-ixa-i (ce, ß) - r(a)r(ß) 
D(x) = I(x; a, b) 
where B (a, b) is the beta function, I(x; a, b) is the regularized beta func- 
tion and a,, 8 >0. 
The following plots are for various values of (a,, 8) with a=I and 6 
ranging from 0.25 to 3.00. 
P(X) 
x 
D(x) 
I 
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The distribution is normalized since: 
f1 
P(x)dx 
The characteristic function is: 
1x a-l(l 
- X)b-I -27rixtdX = 
0B (a, b)) 
-e 1 F, (a; b; z) 
where 1 F, (a; b; z) is a confluent hypergeometric function. 
The raw moments are given by: 
/it =f P(x) (x - lt)'dx = 
1ý(a +'3)1ý(C' + r) 
0 r 0 IP(a +, 6 + r)]P(a) 
(Papoulis 1984, p. 147), and the central moments by: 
)'2Fl (-r, a; a+ 
where 2 F, (a; b; c; x) is a hypergeometric function. 
The mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis are given by: 
IL 
2 a, 6 
(a +, 3)2 (a +, 8 +1 
2(, 8 - a)(I +a+ 6)112 
(a, 8)1/2(2 +a+, 6) - 
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72 '---: 
6[a3 + a2(1 - 2ß) + ß2(1 + ß) - 2aß(2 + ß)] 
(ceß)(a +ß+ 2)(a +ß+ 3) 
The mode of a variate distributed as a Beta (a,, 6) is: 
a-1 
a +, B - 
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